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Demiurge by a magic spell creates the world
out of pneuma, fire and other ingredients,
and when the mixture is stirred a volatile,
transparent substance, which only God can
see, rises to the surface, which he calls
psychosis— soul-stuff. This is the "efflor
escence," and from it souls are formed.
— Von Franz

(Commentary on Aquinas’ Aurora Consurgens)
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CHAPTER I

THE MYTHIC PERSPECTIVE AND EPISTROPHE

"Entering myths" means recognizing our
concrete existence as metaphors, as
mythic enactments.
— Hillman

This essay attempts an understanding of Psyche'si madness, or psycho
pathology, which is truly psychological, that is, an inquiry into
Psyche-Pathos-Logos, the science of Soul's movement.

This inquiry

recognizes Psyche's direct experience as the primary data of a
science of Soul.

Psyche's experience of madness, therefore, shall

receive primary attention, rather than mental or physical descriptions
of the events of Psyche's madness.

Often the attempts of "objectiv

ity" through describing the mental and physical events of Psyche's
madness have led inquiry away from contact with the object of inquiry
— Psyche experiencing its madness.
Psyche, Myth and Madness
Madness appears as one of the human Psyche's
atic fantasies.

fundamental them

In the everchanging relatedness of madness and

Ipsyche will be used in this work as a proper noun, generally
representing both conscious and unconscious psychological processes
and phenomena; however, more specifically, Psyche shall refer to the
realm of psychological experience — Soul (Christou, 1963). This
personification may provide a subjectivity, intentionality and con
sciousness to help deepen the understanding of psychological exper
ience.

1
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culture, similar themes, accounts and understandings of madness emerge.
They are never exactly the same, but are nonetheless recognizably alike.
Alike in general form, and alike in general meaning; that is, there are
myths of madness.
This study concerns the connection of the human Psyche with myth
and madness.

Our development of a mythic perspective toward madness

may begin by a return to the origin of the words psyche, myth and mad
ness .

This return to the original meanings may allow a more meaningful

relationship and connection to emerge.

"Psyche" has its origins in the

Greek psulce, soul; "myth" in the Greek muthos, the understanding of
events; and "madness" in the Old English and Germanic gemad (and
earlier Greek ameiben'). to change or move.

In considering then "myths

of Psyche's madness" a process is begun to understand the changing
events or movement of the soul or rather to consider the human soul's
understanding the events of its change and movement.

Before proceed

ing with a discussion of individual myths of madness, however, more
attention must be given to the method of understanding madness which
has been proposed:

the mythic perspective.

Myth and Myth-Making
In Western culture, the history of deepening the understanding
of our experiences through a process of "myth-making" has been a
continuous, complex and elegant activity of the human Psyche, and
throughout the history of our culture, many different meanings have
been given to the words "myth" and "myth-making."

In this work, the

word "myth" will not be used in the nineteenth-century understanding
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of a "fictitious account," an "invention" or a "fable."

It will also

not be used in the current religious or anthropological meaning of a
"true story" from the past (which may serve important functions in or
ganizing individuals' behaviors or in providing social groups with a
continuity of practical rituals).

Myth will not be used here to mean

a "fiction," or an "illusion" or what cannot really exist.
Both the words "myth" and "myth-mating" may be used, however,
psychologically, as words to represent a process of the human Psyche.
Jung (1977) understood myth as a dramatization of a series of psychic
images; he stated "man has always lived In the myth" (p. 348).

Hill

man (1975b), too, observes that "psychological living implies living
in a fantasy, a story, being told by a myth" (p. 143).

Used psycho

logically, mythos (the understanding of events) organizes random
psychic images and happenings, turning them into understandable, lived
experiences.
As long ago as A. D. 263 Plotinus (c.A.D. 263/1956) stated the
principle that all knowing comes by "likeness," and that all things
desire to return to the originals of which they are copies and from
which they proceed.

These originals, as suggested by Hillman (1975b)

and Campbell (1975), may be best presented, and are preserved, in
myths.

Here the "likeness" of thought, feeling and behavior have a

universal and authentic foundation.

Mythic images and figures are

eternal metaphors of the imagination, the universals of fantasy
(Vico, 1744/1968); and image and fantasy, afterall, are the substance
of all human experience.

Myth-making is our method of engaging our

selves in experience.
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Through the process of myth-making described by Dilthey
(1962), Hillman (1975a, 1975b, 1977), Unamuno (1954), and Vico
(1744/1968), we move and are moved from mythic image to specific
personification and thereby back to myth.

That is, we enter myth

to personify and to enact a particular concrete experience, and
this engagement or connection to the literal, personified images
returns us and carries us back into myth.

These myths, then, are

at the same time the origin of our ideas, conceptualizations and
theories, a means of enhancing, expanding and clarifying them, and
a way to see through them.

For example, Plotinus'

(c. A. D. 263/

1956) method of "reversion" (epistrophe) is a way of seeing through
the particular details (personifications) of the experience of the
moment to reach a fuller understanding and meaning of the possibil
ities and potentials inherent in a particular situation, an under
standing much wider and deeper than could be achieved through the
purely concrete and literal way of understanding typical of practi
cal daily experience.

The similar notion of abduction (Bateson,

1979; Peirce, 1940), may also provide us with a method of inquiry
appropriate to Psyche's experience.
To appreciate the mythic origin of a particular view, is to
expand and deepen the opportunities and experiences inherent in
that view —

the range of events and possible happenings which are

typically connected and related with such a view, or naturally forth
coming from such a particular view.

At the same time, however, it is

important to keep in mind the peculiar nature of the mythic perspec
tive.
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As Hillman (1975b) has observed:
Mythical metaphors are not etiologies, causal ex
planation, or name tags. They are perspectives
toward events which shift the experience of events;
but they are not themselves events.
(p.101)
Mythical thinking, says Hillman, is a mode of being in the world
which brings with it imaginal persons and personifications.
mythical consciousness

"To

[thinking] the persons of the imagination

are real".... Just as in dreams, "the persons present themselves as
existing prior to any effort of ours to personify" (Hillman, 1975b,
p. 17).
Myth shall be used in this work psychologically, to denote
specific imaginal accounts organized and provided by Psyche in order
to become engaged and reflected in life's particular literal, con
crete objects and events.

Myth-making, then, shall be used to rep

resent the process through which Psyche understands both the external
object work and reflects and understands itself.
Although a formal review of the psychological understanding of
myth-making within Western culture far exceeds the concern of this
work, this has been described by many individuals (Campbell, 1949,
1972; Eliade, 1963; Hillman, 1972, 1975b; Kerenyi & Jung, 1949;
Neuman 1949/1954).

It is in this tradition and upon this way of

understanding myth, myth-making and Psyche that this work builds.
It is, then, this mythic perspective which is proposed to
provide us access to the way madness variously becomes viewed, ex
perienced and understood by both a particular madman and the members
of the social group or culture in which he lives.
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Myth-Making and Madness
Throughout the history of Western culture, groups and socie
ties of people have recognized among themselves particular indivi
duals whose feelings, thoughcs and behaviors were different from
their own in ways clearly distinguishable from that of others in
their group.

Among these "different" individuals were, first, a

group who were different due to dulled or diminished capabilities.
There was also a second group, who were different because the range
of their experiences appeared quite beyond the experiences of most
other individuals, and they were often frightening and unintelli
gible to other members of their group.
Those individuals with dulled or diminished levels of function
ing often found some position or place of acceptance within their
group, and were often cared for and protected.
a familiar example.
longs the madman.

The village idiot is

To the second group of individuals, however, be
Unlike that of the first group, the relationship

between the madman and his social group varies as greatly as the ex
perience of madness itself.

In the history of Western culture, the

patterns of enactment of madmen in relationship with their social
group weave an elaborate and rich tapestry, the experience and
phenomena of madness appearing as protean and ephemeral as Psyche.
These theories or accounts of madness may be understood mythi
cally, as a statement by and about Psyche.

Different myths of mad

ness provide their own unique perspective of the phenomena, and
potentially increase the richness, depth and meanings of the exper
ience for both the madman and those relating to him.

To view madness
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from a mythic perspective is to understand more fully the sub
jective relationship between the madman's attempt to establish
a relatedness of some kind with others in his group, and the
attempts by others to interpret a particular meaning and under
standing of the madman's experience.

This understanding may pro

vide the basis for a new relatedness or response to him.

That is,

both the madman and those who interact and relate with him are in
volved in a process of "myth-making" to account for, and attempt
to understand, their respective experiences.

As Hillman (1972) has

observed, "Relationships offer containers for craziness" (p. 38).
Without a suitable container or myth, to be shared by both the
madman and his fellows, little relatedness may occur.
This myth-making can be understood as a kind of dialectical
process between the madman and his fellows - an attempt to estab
lish or re-establish some form of relatedness.

A dialectical in

teraction often continues in some fashion until a consensus is
reached (an acceptable myth is agreed upon) between the madman and
those with whom he interacts.

An example is the "possession" account

of madness, where both the madman and the members of his social group
agree to understand their experience of madness as the result of an
invasion of the madman by an alien being.

This understanding or myth

of madness requires that an exorcism then be performed to reverse the
madness.
This dialectical process may seek a "meaning in Psyche's mad
ness", and may lead to important understandings for both the madman
and his social group.

Since social groups, themselves, often provide
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ready-made attitudes towards madness, a similar dialectical pro
cess of "myth-making" may also occur more generally within a cul
ture, as a particular cultural group attempts to define norms for
its experience.
Each particular myth of madness holds the answers to the very
questions it seeks to understand.

Specific questions regarding the

definition and determinants of madness must be understood within
the context of each particular myth of madness; they cannot exist
separately from a particular myth.

That is, apparently similar or

alike concrete enactments of madness may hold quite different mean
ings or understandings for respective madmen and their social groups.
Psyche's

experience of madness, Soul's understanding the events of

its change and movement, and the significance this may hold for
both a madman and his society, are the primary interests of this
essay.

The myths of madness reviewed here shall be primarily West

ern myths, since it is in and from Western culture that the vast
majority of our individual collective myths have become articulated
and understood, and become meaningful to us.
Throughout this work, the emphasis shall be on particular myths
of madness, their pattern, content and structure, on the manner in
which they become operationalized (literalized), and on the unique
expressions and limitations these literal interpretations provide
for a fuller understanding of the phenomena of Psyche's madness
Except for the purpose of amplifying a particular myth, no attempt
will be made to itemize or organize thoughts, feelings or behaviors
which might in one social, cultural or political context be considered
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madness.

The careful work of many individuals, especially Acker-

knecht (1971) and Hillman (1972) have adequately demonstrated the
ethnological relativism of psychopathological judgements.

The

particular thoughts, feelings and behaviors which are identified as
"sick," are "sick" only in a particular society at a particular
time and place.

The "normal" thoughts, feelings and behaviors of

one age and culture are more or less "abnormal" in another time and
place.

Hillman (1975b) warns, however, against a danger inherent in

a relativism of psychopathology:
To take this relativism to its final consequences can
suggest that if there are no kinds of psychic sickness
to be found universally, then the universals of psycho
pathology (madness^ disappear and we are left with an
empty bag called "psychopathology."
(p. 62)
A relativistic view of madness (itself a myth of madness may make the
particular concrete expression of madness less significant and meaning
ful in a purely literal or diagnostic sense, however, it does not alter
the phenomena of madness or its importance and significance for the
individual madman and the society in which his madness finds expression.
The problem and experience of madness remain.
In the process of re-viewing madness from a mythic perspective
an increased appreciation and understanding, an increased depth and
richness may be gained from each particular view of madness, and
thereby for the whole phenomena of madness.

A mythic perspective

presents the possibility of seeing through the concrete descriptions
of a particular view of madness, of seeing through particular classi
cal, medieval or modern myths of madness to the more general, original
images and patterns of Psyche's madness from which the particular
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experience of madness has arisen.
A selection of representative accounts of Psyche's madness
from different periods in the history of Western culture will be
re-viewed through a mythic perspective in our attempt to understand
various patterns of Psyche's madness experienced by particular mad
men and those in their social groups.

A mythic perspective and the

methods of epistrophe and abduction shall provide methods of inquiry
into these experiences of Psyche's madness —

Soul's movement.
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CHAPTER II
PRIMITIVE MYTHS OF MADNESS
"I am not trying to make you into a sick, crazy
man," Don Juan went on. "You can do that yourself
without my help."
— Castaneda

Among the "primitive" people of Western culture several myths
of madness can be identified which appear to have been used to
account for and understand individuals' experiences of madness.

The

origin of these myths may extend back to early Paleolithic times
(750,000 B. C.).

Although very little written record of madness

among the so-called "primitive" peoples exists in the West, the work
of Clements (1932), Levi-Strauss (1966), Sigerist (1951), Aclcerknecht
(1971) and Ellenberger (1970) provides examples from similar cultures
of accounts used by primitive people to help them understand the par
ticular phenomena of madness they experienced.
Examples of myths used to account for experiences of madness
within groups of "primitive" people include sorcery, object or spirit
intrusion, breach of taboo and soul loss (Ellenberger, 1970)„
As in most accounts of madness, primitive myths recognize the
peculiar nature of madness and the special circumstances and res
ponses required to engage an individual in his madness.

In almost

every "primitive" culture, including certain African societies today,
distinction is made between situations requiring the attention of a
local "practical" doctor, herbalist, or a Western medical doctor, and

11
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the kind of situations, typically forms of madness, which require
the special attention of a shaman or medicine man.

Harley (194.1.)

and Ross (1972) have both found that in almost all cases they obser
ved in certain African societies, the "zoe [shaman] is sought for
the treatment in cases of insanity, epilepsy, witchcraft, and chronic
illnesses where the malady is attributed to the influences of spirits"
(Ross, 1972, p. 74).

It is likely (Ellenberger, 1970) that this

practice of specialization was typical of most "primitive." peoples
including Western groups.

Halifax (1979) has edited and provided

commentary for a collection of narratives by present-day shamans,
many of whom currently "shamanize" within Western culture.

Paradox

ically, these shaman continue to use traditional myths for engaging
madness which also serve as the original imaginal foundation for
most, if not all, later myths of madness within our culture.

"Primi

tive" shamanic myths of madness understood a madness of Psyche which
takes a direction which is not circumscribed or curtailed by the mad
man's society, but rather is grounded in another world, oriented to
ward a different universe.

Halifax (1979) observed that

Balanced between worlds, the shaman teaches by power
ful example that illness can be a passageway to a
greater life where there is access to great power at
great risk. The healing image that the shaman pro
jects is of disease as a manifestation of the trans
formative impulse in the human organism.
(p- 18)

Sorcery Myth
The sorcery myth of madness holds that the variety of signs of
madness, physical or psychic, manifest in an individual are the re
sult of the individual's having been the victim of a spell, potion,
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or other magical procedure arranged by a powerful sorcerer, an
event arranged either as direct retribution for some real or im
agined transgression by the individual, or on the behalf of someone
requesting such retribution.

Since this myth understands the in

dividual's madness to be literally "caused" by the "black magic" of
the sorcerer, a literal attempt is then made by the madman, or by
someone in his behalf, to remove this "cause".

This can be accom

plished either, again literally, through the killing of the suspec
ted sorcerer or, symbolically, through the "killing" of the "black
magic" with a counter-magic, which is produced in some manner by
another sorcerer.

When a sufficiently powerful counter-magic has

been produced, the madman is able to return to normalcy within his
social group.
One of the few first hand accounts of a sorcery myth of mad
ness is provided by Basedow (1925) as follows:
A man who realizes he is being "boned" by an enemy
is, indeed, a miserable sight. He stands aghast,
his eyes staring at the treacherous pointer, his
hands lifted as though to ward off the lethal medium
which he imagines is pouring into his body. His
cheeks blanch and his eyes become glassy, and the
expression on his face becomes horribly distorted,
like that of a person stricken with palsy. He
attempts to shriek, but the sound chokes in his
throat, and all one sees is froth around his lips.
His body begins to tremble and his muscles twitch
involuntarily. He sways backwards and falls to the
ground, and appears for a short while to be in a
swoon; but he soon begins to writhe as if in mortal
agony and, covering his face with his hands, begins
to moan. After a while he composes himself somewhat
and crawls off to his wurley (hut). From then on,
he sickens and frets, refusing to eat and keeping
aloof from the daily affairs of the tribe. Unless
help forthcomes in the shape of a counter-charm
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administered by the Nangarri or medicine man, his
death is only a matter of a comparatively short
time.
(pp. 174-180)
In this particular account by Basedow, a medicine man is called
by the man's relatives, and in their presence, begins to chant
magic verses, locates the evil spell, and extracts it from the man
through a mouth-sucking technique.

Basedow (1925) continues his

account:
The effect is astounding.
The miserable fellow,
until then well on the road to death, raises his
head to gaze in wonderment at the object held by
the Nangarri, which he imagines in all seriousness
has been extracted from within his body. Satisfied
with its reality, he even lifts himself up into a
sitting position and calls for a drink of water.
The crisis is over, and the man's recovery is
speedy and complete. Without the Nangarri's in
tervention, the "boned" fellow would have fretted
himself to death for a certainty; but the sight of
a concrete object, claimed by the authorized leader
of the tribe to be the cause of his complaint,
signifies recovery to him, and with its removal
comes a renewed lease on life.
(pp. 180-182)
Similar happenings such as these continue to be reported from var
ious parts of the world, such as Australia and Melanesia.

Other

Western sorcery accounts, including madness identified during the
Spanish Inquisition of sorcerers and the witchhunts of Northern
Europe and the American colonies appear thematically similar.
Our primary interest, however, is in developing a mythic per
spective of this account which helps us see through the literalness
of the sorcery myth to a madness of Psyche concerned with bone hard
issues of right and wrong and the extraction of good and evil.

This

moral madness of Psyche becomes a literal experience for the madman
and his society in the battle for power between the "black" and
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"white" magic of the sorcerers.
The madman experiences directly the forces within his cultural
context and in his "backward fall" into madness negotiates and ar
ticulates with his group a particular myth of madness or understand
ing which is consistent and congruent with their collective customs,
religions, folklore and general style of consciousness, as well as
in Basedow's account, issues of power and moral concern.

A simple

fundamental psychic theme of good versus evil may become reflected
in the particular "insanity" of a madman living in a particular
culture.
From a mythic perspective, the sorcery myth of madness directs
us to a power over life and death which resides outside of Psyche's
ken, a moral madness of Psyche which reaches the madman from another
world where "right" and "wrong", good and evil are already being
arranged and are now entered into his bones.

This "boned" madness

of Psyche requires an extraction in order to be understood.

In or

der to discover the meaning in the very bones or skeleton of Psyche's
madness, a mouth sucking extraction of meaning must be performed.
The meaning in Psyche's madness may require the powerful suck of the
sorcerer's otherness for its extraction, and for the madman's re
mission.
Object and Spirit Intrusion Myth
Object and spirit intrusion myths both involve the understand
ing that "something" or "someone" has invaded the madman and that his
deviance from his fellows is due specifically to the presence and na
ture of the intruder.

Occasionally it is reported that the presence
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of the intruder is the result of sorcery, that is, the object or
spirit has been shot into the madman by a sorcerer.

In this way a

concrete experience of madness, such as the previous account by Base
dow, may be understood through a combination of myths or through a
perspective of madness which includes both sorcery and intrusion
motifs.
The intrusion myth understands that an individual becomes mad
at the onset of an invasion or after the possession of his being by
object or spirit.

Again, since it is the intruder which "causes" the

madness, the madness becomes literally understood as something which
must be removed from the madman.

Three methods of removal which are

most generally associated with intrusion myths are mechanical expeltion, transference, and exorcism.

In mechanical expeltion, the in

truding object or spirit is removed through blood letting, beatings
and whippings, surgical extraction of a portion of the madman's ana
tomy (fortunately, this was often only a symbolic process practiced
by a shaman), or by means of special noises and smells.

The trans

ference method required that the intruding object or spirit be dis
placed by a shaman into the body of another being (usually a small
animal or inanimate object, but sometimes the shaman, himself.)

The

last, and most common method, exorcism, takes place through the
driving out of the intruding object or spirit by means of special
psychic rituals.
As the most common method of engaging madness understood through
an intrusion myth, exorcism has survived in one form or another to
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this day.

Oesterreich (1930) provides a most thorough analysis of

exorcism and has identified universal features in a wide variety of
intrusion-exorcism accounts.

Although a detailed review of this myth

of madness is beyond our present concern, of special interest are the
sudden changes of identity which accompany possession, often including
changes in physiognomy, voice, and the sudden ability to perform
physically and psychologically in ways more extreme than might nor
mally be expected of the individual prior to the intrusion and his
resulting madness.

One of the most celebrated and most thoroughly

analyzed cases where an intrusion myth was literalized, and an exor
cism performed, was the case of Gottlieben Dittus, as recorded by
the Lutheran pastor Blumhardt in an official report he sent to church
authorities in 1843 (Blumhardt, 1955).
This particular case of spirit intrusion concerned an orphaned
twenty-eight year old female who was possessed by numerous demons
following the reported visions of a previously deceased relative.
Various experiences of possession ensued, including reported periods
of coma, convulsions, changes in facial expression and voice, and
subjective reports of the flights of her soul around the world, which
included her "causing" an earthquake.

Blumhardt understood the coun

try described by Gottlieben to be somewhere in the West Indies.
Several days later, when news reached Europe that such a disaster had
acutally occurred in the West Indies, Blumhardt released reports con
firming that Gottlieben had been losing large amounts of blood through
the vomiting of sand, pieces of glass and other objects.
Throughout this literal enactment of an intrusion myth, Blumhardt's
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own struggle with the demonic world was of central Importance.
Finally, at 2 a. m. one morning, Gottlieben's sister, Katharina,
who had also become possessed, cried out "Jesus is Victor."

By

8 a . m . , the spirits had vanished, Katharina had recovered, "the
power of darkness was broken", and Gottlieben was freed by Blumhardt of spirits and demons.
Although this case has subsequently been interpreted by Michaelis (1949) and others from a psychoanalytic point of view or myth,
it was nevertheless understood as an intrusion myth at the time, and
was literally engaged as such by the exorcist Blumhardt.
In returning to a mythic perspective through which to re-view
the intrusion account of madness, the significance of the invasion
and possession of Psyche by an "other" emerges and presents itself
as an important experience for Psyche which reoccurs in many diff
erent accounts or myths of madness.

This "other", whether literal-

ized as the intrusion of an object, or as the invasion and possess
ion by a spirit or demon, remains the central theme.

This "other"

attracts our attention and the attention of the madman and those
sanctioned to relate with him to the experience of a presence which
images as alien, demonic and with a life or existence of its own,
and at times even an apparent will of its own.

This "other" usuaUy

demonstrates a capacity to relate, in some manner, and also presents
a "need" to be heard.

The "need" is to be heard, and also to engage

both the madman and his keepers in some form of communication, dia
logue or debate.

This "other" appears, within an intrusion myth of

madness, to require a recognition of, and connection with —

life.
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This possessing, intruding, invading madness of Psyche often
images within "primitive" shamanic myths as the voice or presence
calling from afar.

Halifax (1979) writes that in Psyche’s madden

ing process of transformation many voices press for communication
with the madman from unearthly realms,
The voices of gods and ancestors or the shadowy spirits
of the dead, the voice of the mushroom, the songs of
creatures and the elements, the numinous sounds of faroff stars, or echoes from the underworld.
(p. 34)
Van Dusen (1979) in his development of Swedenborg’s understand
ing of the spirit-world in madness also observes the possessing mad
ness of an "other" presence, insistent, invading, not easily exor
cised.

He states,

Our lives may be at the confluence of higher and lower
spiritual hierarchies ... and only seems abnormal, as
in hallucinations, when we become aware of being met by
these forces.
(p. 150)
With the unnerving experience of alien forces, and the possessing in
trusions of the spirit-world, the human Psyche is moved to a madness
which must be engaged until all voices are heard.
Breach of Taboo Myth
Breach of taboo, or the committing of a sin, is a myth of mad
ness which understands an individual's madness as a retribution or
punishment for a voluntary or involuntary violation of an ancestral
or cultural prohibition, or a violation of a certain moral or relig
ious law of the individual's society.

It is interesting and instruc

tive that, at least in many occurances of this myth, the onset of the
individual's madness occurs, not at the time of the violation itself,
but rather, if, and at such a time as, the violation becomes known
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to the individual's group.

It is often the case that the weight of

the prohibition or injunction can be so significant that even for
tuitous events which are identified in connection with an individual
may result in the immediate onset of madness and even psychogenic
death.
The pattern, then, of the breach of taboo myth usually in
cluded a period of protracted madness and suffering by the individ
ual, followed by a period of atonement, when this alternative was
available to the madman, finally ending in confession.

In some cul

tures, for some violations, there was no alternative to continued
madness or death (Ellenberger, 1970).

Confession in "primitive"

cultures appears to have differed primarily in only one respect
from the confessional rituals of many contemporary religions.

It

began with an invocation of the gods, followed by the confession it
self, which unlike current religious confessionals was usually pub
lic, then an exhortation, and finally penitence.

The following in

cident was reported by Ellenberger (1970) from a clinical observa
tion made by a missionary in the French Congo:
In Samkita, a pupil by the name of Onquie was suddenly
seized by convulsions and was carried into the dormi
tory where he fainted. When we came back to see him,
he was surrounded by boys; some were holding his rigid
arms and legs, others were trying vainly to open his
clenched fists at the risk of breaking his fingers.
Frightened as they were, it did not occur to them to
them to remove the foam that was choking him. The
little body was arched, but it soon relaxed. We were
given a few hasty explanations:
"He ate bananas that
were cooked in a pot that had been used previously for
manioc. Manioc is elci for him; his grandparents told
him that if he ever ate any of — even a tiny little
bit — he would die." The violation of the ancestral
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command causes them such fright, such visceral anguish,
such an organic collapse, that the sources of life are
rapidly exhausted.
"Look," they said pointing to the
diaphram that was shaking as if a small
animal were
struggling beneath
the skin, "he has an
evur, which is
getting excited."
There was no doubt about the serious
ness of the case.
Alas! No medication
would pass
through the obstructed throat. The poor child had lost
consciousness and was beginning to rattle. A man of the
tribe ran to the neighboring village to get the medica
tion against evur, an egg mixed with certain other sub
stances. We, in the meantime, were struggling against
asphyxia by performing rhythmic tractions of the chest,
but were unable to get hold of the tongue.
It was all
to no avail. The overtaxed heart ceased to beat, and
the boy died in our arms.
(pp. 24-25)
Madness, and psychogenic death, was the punishment for committ
ing a sin, and the act of confession, when possible, was the necess
ary atonement if there were to be an end to the madness.

Here, the

individual madman and his social group understood, literally, that
to violate an ancestral or god-given prohibition meant madness and
death unless a proper relationship could be re-established between
the madman and his ancestors or his gods.

This same matter of re

establishing relatedness with the divine will be considered again
later in discussions of classical and medieval myths of madness.
From a mythic perspective we may see through Psyche's literal
madness in breaking a taboo, with the concrete requirement of punish
ment for laws violated, to what emerges as a matter of disordered
relationship.

The breach of taboo by Psyche's sinful madness points

to a need for a kind of "re-relating" the madman with his fellows,
with his ancestors, with his gods and with himself.

Hillman (1975a)

has recently provided an interesting account of how a "re-relatedness" may result through the violation of a contemporary taboo, the
masturbation taboo.

In his discussion of the masturbation
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inhibition, he argues that the return of the ability to masturbate
in individuals previously unable may be therapeutic in that it "means
the reunion (psychologically) of the two ends of the instinctual
spectrum.

It means the return of the inhibition as well, in the form

of reawakened fantasy life, and a sense of one's own autonomy, one's
own innate guiding conscience, rather than an imposed superego moral
ity" (Hillman, 1975a, p. 114).

The pattern of Psyche's breach of

taboo madness (violation— punishment— atonement— reinstatement),
holds the possibility of a rebirth and renewal of relatedness.

Re-

relatedness becomes possible for both the madman and his group through
this taboo breaking breach-birth of Psyche.
Soul Loss Myth
The soul loss understanding of Psyche's madness is probably one
of the earliest and most universal myths among "primitive" peoples.
In this account an individual becomes mad when his soul leaves his
body, either spontaneously, by accident, or by sorcery, and remains
mad or perishes unless his soul returns.

The great depth of ideas

about the soul itself is reflected in loss of soul myths of madness.
This soul loss madness has been reported occurring as a result
of the soul separating itself from an individual's physical body
during sleep or fainting or after receiving a fright or as a result
of the soul's losing its way, becoming injured, or becoming detained
by evil spirits during its wanderings.

A variety of possible dangers

and accidents which might befall the soul, and result in an indi
vidual's temporary or permanent madness, have been described by
Frazer (1922), including accounts of forceful subjugation or removal
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of an individual's soul by ghosts, demons or sorcerers.
Also within this myth exists the possibility and promise of
madness for those individuals who, like Faustus, would willingly bar
gain or sell their soul for favors, wealth or immortality.

Inherent

in these accounts of soul loss and madness is the very means of re
storing the madman's "sanity", the recovery of soul.

The bringing

back and restoring of the madman's soul was usually the responsibility
of a shaman.

The shaman was someone who through special training and

experience could track the madman's soul through the world of spirits,
and enter if necessary the realm of the dead.

The mediating nature

of the shaman's presence between the concrete literal world and the
world of spirits and the dead, as he "cares for soul", appears in many
different myths of madness including several contemporary accounts
(Campbell, 1959; Halifax, 1979).
Russian ethnologists such as Ksenofontov have found that in many
Siberian societies today, madness, and many other experiences as well
including some physical ailments, are understood as the result of
soul loss.

One of Ksenofontov's reports translated in Ellenberger

(1970) shows that following the onset of madness, a shaman is called
and
works himself into ecstasy by means of a special tech
nique; while he remains in that state, his soul travels
to the world of the spirits.
Shamans contend to be
able, for instance, to track down the lost soul in the
underworld in the same way as a hunter tracks down game
in the physical world. They must often make a bargain
with the spirits who have stolen the soul, propitiate
them and bring them gifts.
Sometimes they have to fight
the spirits, preferably with the help of other spirits
who are on their side. Even if they are successful,
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they must anticipate the vengeance of the evil spirits.
Once they £shamansj have recaptured the lost soul, they
bring it back and restore it to the deprived body.
(p. 7)
In her review of living shamans and "primitive" shamanic myths,
Halifax (1979) described this connection between the human Psyche's
lost soul madness and the shaman who
May leave his or her body behind like a husk while the
discarnate soul journeys to the celestial realms above
or the under-world of disease and death. The knowledge
of these domains makes it possible for the shaman to
retrieve the souls of those who are sick, to guide the
souls of those who have died, and to direct relations
with a celestial supreme being.
(p. 19)
This soul loss myth of madness, understands a literal displace
ment of a certain essential part of a person which is necessary to
maintain "sanity" and relatedness with others in his social group.
When conditions arise (soul wandering, sorcery, soul-selling) which
result in the loss of this essential part, then the person becomes
mad and can only be restored from madness when his soul is restored,
usually with a shaman's assistance.

A true shaman, it has been said,

is one who has at some point undergone a similar experience of mad
ness, and therefore knows the regions of the soul (Campbell, 1959).
It is the shamans role to somehow mediate the madman's condition of
"soul-lessness" or "soul-lost-ness" within his culture.

Psyche's

"soul-loss" madness required according to Halifax (1979)
The shaman who weaves together the ordinary world
that is lived in and the philosophical world that
is thought of. Human existence, suffering, and
death are rendered by shamans into a system of
philosophical, psychological, spiritual and socio
logical symbols that institutes a moral order by
resolving ontological paradoxes and dissolving
existential barriers, thus eliminating the most pain
ful and unpleasant aspects of human life. (p. 34)
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From a mythic perspective we are able to look deeper into the
nature of soul loss and understand that what is "lost" is not a lit
eral, concrete part of an individual, which must be actually located,
bartered for and returned in order to restore the madman to "sanity".
Rather, the myth directs us to an understanding of the soul-less mad
ness into which an individual can fall, and the consequent nonrelatedness with others in his social group which may result when he becomes
disconnected from the experience of an interior psychic life —

that

"soul" part from which relatedness flows and of which relationship is
made.

Psyche's lost soul madness understands the madman's essence as

having been extracted into a realm beyond relatedness with others
requiring of him a fundamental shift of internal experience and special
shamanic assistance before re-entry and re-relatedness may occur.
A mythic perspective asks us to understand the return of an
individual's soul (after bargaining, fighting and deprivation) as
a reunion of the madman's experiences, a re-connection in Psyche
between a sense of interior self and external happenings, a rerelatedness in Psyche —

by which and through which relatedness with

others again becomes possible.
Perry (1966) has observed that "primitive" people encountered
their psychic depths in the external world and established their
connection with the gods and the spriitual realm by living it out
literally in everyday life, in social relationship and in their mad
ness.

"The world perceived in these primordial images happens to him

^primitive man],

while the society shaped in these forms he makes

by his own creative effort, but both are externalizations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
[literalizationsj of his own interior life."

(Perry, 1966, p. 8),

The mythic themes encountered in "primitive"myths of madness
will be encountered again, in different times and places, but in re
markably similar configurations.

Similarities of image and meaning

in understanding madness emerge when madness is viewed or re-viewed
from a mythic perspective.

This way of viewing Psyche allows a

seeing through of the particular and the literal in Psyche's madness
to the deeper issues and significance the madness may hold for the
individual madman, his social group and his culture.
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CHAPTER III
CLASSICAL MYTHS OF MADNESS
Of madness there are two kinds; one produced
by human infirmity, the other . . . a divine release
of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.
— Socrates
The first well-recorded accounts of madness in Western culture
are found in early Greek literature beginning with the Homeric Hymns
from around 1000 B. C.

At this time, madness

understood as a result of divine intervention.

was almost universally
Only later, toward

the end of the Classical period, following the anatomical dissections
and observations of Alcmaeon (c. 500

B. C. ) and the observation and

classification of the "Sacred" diseases by Hippocrates (c.

400 B. C.)

was Galen (A. D. 131-200), a Greek working and writing in Rome, able
to posit a well-developed naturalistic theory of madness.

He under

stood that an individual's "insanity" was the result of a disease of
the brain, similar to any other sickness of the body.

This natural

istic myth proved somewhat short-lived, however, barely surviving
Galen's own death in A. D. 200.
Later in Medieval and Renaissance periods variations of this
naturalistic, "disease" myth of madness are found reappearing in
accounts of madness reported by Avicenna (A. D. 980-1037) and Para
celsus (A. D. 1493-1547) and later still, near the end of the Enlight
enment period, in the accounts and treatments of "insanity" by Pinel
(1745-1826), and Krepelin (1856-1926) and many others.

Further de

velopment of the "disease" myth florishes today in the current interest

27
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in genetic and biochemical accounts of madness, and the resulting
somatic therapies.
From the Classical period of Western culture we shall re-view
several examples of Psyche’s madness through both divine intervention
and disease perspectives.

Earliest Greek references to madness

generally include three kinds of divine intervention myths —
phetic, initiatory and thanatos.

pro

Interestingly, the later Greek

physicians' understanding of madness through a disease perspective
also identified three kinds of myths —

mania, melancholia and phren

etics .
Divine Intervention Myths
Divine intervention has served as one of the primary myths of
madness influencing, perhaps, more individuals than any other and
persists in its influence to this day, both in organized religions
and in other philosophical and psychological systems which recognize
"divine" influence.

The early Greeks understood the intervention of

the gods as a fact of life, a perennial influence in all their daily
affairs, both sacred and secular.

As Hillman (1975b) and others

have observed, Greek mythology served "less specifically as a re
ligion and more generally as a psychology" (p. 29) and provided
individuals with a way of relating to and understanding all of their
daily experience, including madness.
To be mad, for the early Greeks was to be affected and afflic
ted by their gods, to become a part of their feuds and jealousies
and intrigue.

Understandably, madness was called the "Sacred" dis

ease.
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Plato, in his Phaedrus (c. 387 B. C./1952) reports that
Socrates identified madness as a wisdom higher than the wisdom of
the world.
Madness is superior to the sane mind, for the one is
only human, but the other of divine origin. Again,
where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in certain
families, owing to some, ancient blood guiltiness, there
madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and
by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for
those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift,
and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by
the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and
except from evil, future as well as present, and has a
release from the calamity which was afflicting him ...
the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters
into rivalry with the madman.
(pp. 123-124)
Later in Phaedrus, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss madness as a
divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention,
and Socrates stated that
The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four
gods presiding over them; the first was the inspir
ation of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the
third that of Muses, and the fourth that of Aphro
dite and Eros.
(p. 134)
With this understanding and account of madness, Socrates,
through his doctrine of "recollection", prescribed madness as a
method of retrieving divine influence, inspiration and guidance
for a human Psyche having lost its influence and depth in the world.
Prophetic Myth
One of the first clear written examples of an early Greek account
of madness due to divine intervention comes from Aeschylus'
Choephoroe (458 B. C./1952) where Orestes (son of Agamennon and
Clytaemnestra) and Pylades (Orestes' friend) are standing over the
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dead bodies of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus:
Orestes:

Mark this:
for I know not where it will end,
Dragged like a driver of hot, headlong horses
Quite from the track; beaten and born afar
By break-neck thoughts; fear at my heart, at
stretch
To strike up the grim tune, whereto 'twill dance.
While I am in my senses, I protest
I slew not, friends, my mother save with cause,
My father's blood upon her, and Heacen's hate.
I lay it on the charm that made me bold;
On Pytho's prophet, Loxias [Apollo] , that charged
Me do the deed, and sware to hold me guiltless
If done; if not, I sink the consequence
No bolt ere shot can hit the height of suffering.
Ha! Ha!
Women, they come about me — Gorgon shapes.
Sheeted in grey — clasped round with scaly folds
Of intertwisted snakes, — away! away!
True son to thy father, what fantastic
thoughts are these?
Stand fast!
thou hast triumphed fear for nought.
These fearful torments are no phantasties;
These are the leashed sleuth-hounds my mother slips!
Apollo! Prince! Look, look! —
They come in crowds,
And from their eyeballs blood drips horribly!
Haste thee where clensing is! To Loxias
Hold fast to him and find deliverance!

Orestes:

Apollo!

Ye see them not, but I see them; they turn
Upon me! Hunt me forth! Away! Away!
(p. 80)

In this account, Orestes becomes mad, experiencing many frightening
visions at the hands of his mother's Erinyes (female spirits who
punish offenders against blood kin), in spite of the fact that Apollo,
himself, through the oracle at Delphi, had commanded him to kill his
father's murders, his mother and her lover.
Orestes wanders in his madness back to Delphi seeking help for
his affliction from the god whose command had "caused" his deed his
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madness.

From Delphi, Apollo sends him to Athens, where as re

counted by Aeschylus in his Eumenides, he was tried and, through a
deciding vote cast by the god Athena, herself, was acquitted.

The

Erinye, however, did not entirely cease their persecution of Orestes.
Apollo again intervened on Orestes' behalf and arranged with Athena
that Orestes could regain his "sanity" if he stole the wooden statue
of Artemis that had fallen from Olympus and return it to Attica.
This particular account of Orestes' madness provides an example of a
prophetic myth of madness in the sense intended by Socrates and Plato.
This account of madness may also be found recorded by Sophocles
(c. 435 B. C./1952) and Euripides (c. 430 B. C./1952), in their plays
named for Orestes' sister, Electra.

Orestes, by at least one account,

after further adventures and suffering from his divine madness follows
Apollo's advice, returns the statue of Artemis to Attica, and thereby
becomes "sane" again, later to become king of Mycenae.
Although the Greek tragedies have been reviewed as entertainment,
art or an occasion for the displacement of emotion or catharsis, a
vital psychic link between protagonist and observer was provided by
the chorus.

This connection or relatedness may occur as Simon (1978)

suggests, through mimesis.

In the sense implied by Plato's The

Republic (c. 387 B. C./1952), audience, chorus and protagonist are
linked through mimesis (identification and imitation) and are alto
gether part of a larger enactment of Psyche, within which madness
could become identified, and engaged.
The literal accounts of several other prophetic myths of madness
are also described in an interesting work on ancient incubation
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practices by Meier (1967).

He observes that in many cases of madness,

the madman came or was taken to a temple of the god, Asclepius.

By

understanding his affliction as a "divine" sickness, the madman found
that his madness contained its own way to "healing", a re-relatedness
with the divine.
The two conceptions, madness and its healing, are seen as one.
He (the god) was the "sickness" and the "remedy".
cle of Apollo at Delphi state:

Did not the ora

"He who wounds also heals"?

contact bewteen the madman and his wounder/healer
tated during a process known as incubation.

This

was often facili

The Greek word

incu-

bare , is translated "to sleep in the sacred place", and it was in the
sacred place of the Asclepian temples that the divine contact was
sought.

The temples themselves were usually circular with a basement

in the form of a maze, called the thalos or thymele, usually with an
artificial stream of water running through it.

The madman would

undergo purification and preparation rites and then sleep through the
night on a couch, called a kline (the origin of the word clinic).
While incubating in this abaton or temple, he would receive an
oracle, see visions, have dreams or occasionally experience a direct
encounter with a deity.
Most often, the god encountered was Asclepius, himself,

who

often appeared with his staff and his dog and might speak to the
individual, touch him or bring him a message that would effect an
end to his madness or at least show the way.

"Receiving an oracle"

meant that an individual had received a dream in which he was given
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instructions by a god, and a "Vision" was a dream which gave the mad
man information about events soon to happen.

Another kind of dream,

the "Healing Dream", was the most important experience of all, and
was a direct means of release from any affliction.

The dream brought

relief solely through its occurence, without any interpretation.
This was understood as the result of direct contact between the
dreamer and the deity responsible for the individual's madness.
An expression of this literal understanding of healing contact
with the responsible deity may be found in another account of Ore
stes' madness found in Aeschylus' Libation Bearers (458 B. C./1977).
Here, Orestes, maddened by the bloodhounds of his mother's hate is
advised by the Chorus "There is one way to make you clean:
Loxias

let

{Apollo]] touch you and set you free from these disturbances"

(p. 359).

And it is at this time that Orestes returns in his madness

to the temple at Delphi to regain contact with Apollo.

The "touch"

was understood and experienced personally and directly as the "one
way to make clean" the madman and restore his relatedness with him
self, with those around him, and with his gods.
The early Greeks understood Orestes' madness, as well as their
own, as literally the result of their gods' direct intervention in
their lives.

For a resolution to their madness, they always re

turned in thought and understanding, as did Orestes, to the origin
of their madness, the gods.

Whether through direct, concrete in

tervention in their daily affairs, or with the mediation of an oracle,
or the priest and healing temple, madness could leave only as it had
come - through and by the will of the gods.
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Viewed from a mythic perspective, prophetic madness develops
when Psyche's contact with, and obedience to, the divine places the
madman outside of his former relatedness and relationships within
his social group, even to the point of committing matricide (or
patricide, recalling Oedipus Rex).

Once Psyche accepts for itself

the divine perspective and solution, re-relatedness and re-connection
between the madman and his social group only becomes possible after
full and complete acceptance and enactment of the gods' prophecies.
Orestes can completely recover from his divine madness and reconnect
with his kingdom only after fully cooperating with the gods by re
turning the statue.

To invite divine assistance and involvement is

to accept solution from the divine perspective —

a perspective often

renting and maddening to the human Psyche.
Initiatory Myth
An example of an initiatory myth of madness and the influence
of the god Dionysus may be found in Euripides' Bacchae (406 B. C./
1977), where Pentheus, King of Thebes, refused to honor the god
Dionysus (the son of his aunt Semele and Zeus) and also refused to
allow the women of Cadmeia to join in the frenzied rites of the
baccants who roamed with the god.

His injunction had little effect,

however, and even his own mother and aunts rushed with the others to
Mount Cithaeron and were initiated, converted, and maddened by the
Dionysian rites.

After a futile attempt to imprison the baccants

(Dionysus caused their chains to fall off) Pentheus, in disguise,
tried to spy on the baccants' revels and suffered the god Dionysus'
revenge.

The following is Euripides'

(406 B. C./1977) account,
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offered by Pentheus' messenger, of the nature of "group madness"
which the god Dionysus wrought on Pentheus for his ungrateful and
irreverent attitude:
And there came a great voice out of heaven -Dionysus, crying: "Women, I bring you the man
who has mocked at you and me and at our holy
mysteries.
Take vengence upon him." And as he spoke a
flash of awful fire bound earth and heaven.
The high air hushed, and along the forest glen
the leaves hung still; you could hear no cry
of the beasts.
The Bacchae heard that voice but missed its
words, and leaping up, they stared, peering
everywhere.
Again that voice. And now they knew his cry,
the clear command of god. And breathing loose
like startled doves, through grove and torrent,
over jagged rocks, they flew, their feet maddened
by the breath of god.
And when they saw my master perching in his tree
they climbed a great stone that towered opposite
his perch and showered him with stones and
javelins of fir, while the others hurled their
wands. And yet they missed their target, poor
Pentheus in his perch, barely out of reach of
their eager hands, treed, unable to escape.
Finally they splintered branches from the oaks
and with those bars of wood tried to lever up
the tree by prying at the roots.
But every effort failed. Then Agave cried out:
"Maenads, make a circle about the trunk and grip
it with your hands. Unless we take this climbing
beast, he will reveal the secrets of the god."
With that, thousands of hands tore the fir tree
from the earth, and down, down from his high
perch fell Pentheus, tumbling to the ground,
sobbing and screaming as he fell, for he knew
his end was near.
His own mother, like a priestess with her victim,
fell upon him first. But snatching off his wig
and snood so she would recognize his face, he
touched her cheeks,
screaming, "No, no Mother!
I am Pentheus, your
own son, the child you bore to Echion!
Pity me, spare me, Mother!
I have done a wrong,
but do not kill your own son for my offense."
But she was foaming at the mouth, and her crazed
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eyes rolling with frenzy.
She was mad, stark mad, possessed by Bacchus [bionysusj
Ignoring his cries of pity, she seized his left
arm at the wrist; then, planting her foot upon
his chest, she pulled, wreching away the arm at
the shoulder — not by her own strength, for the
god had put inhuman power in her hands.
Ino, meanwhile, on the other side, was scratching off
his flesh. Then Autonoe and the whole hord
of Bacchae swarmed upon him.
Shouts everywhere, he screamed with what little
breath was left, they shrieked in triumph. One
tore off an arm, another a foot, still warm in
its shoe. His ribs were clawed clean of flesh and
every hand was smeared with blood as they played
ball with the scrapes of Pentheus' body.
The pitiful remains lie scattered,
one piece among the sharp rocks, others lying
lost among the leaves in the depths of the forest.
His mother, picking up his head, impaled it on
her wand.
She seems to think it is some mountain lion's head
which she carries in triumph through the thick
of Cithaeron. Leaving her sisters at the Maenad
dances, she is coming here, gloating over her
grisly price.
She calls upon Bacchus; he is her "fellow-huntsman,"
comrade of the chase, crowned with victory."
But all the victory she carries home is her own
grief.
(p. 361)

.

This example of an initiatory myth experienced in the
context of "group madness", vividly demonstrates how myths of
divine intervention carried fully and literally the potential
destructiveness inherent in direct contact with the gods.

The

possibility of too much contact with the god, Dionysus, and the
resulting intoxicating madness, proving to be just as dangerous
and destructive as distance and denial.

Viewed from a mythic

perspective, initiatory madness may result when relatedness with
the divine reaches too great an extreme; either Psyche becomes
too far removed and cut off from relatedness to divine power, or
achieves identification and relationship so close so as to become
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one with the divine.

That is, Psyche may lose itself (become dis

guised) and move into madness either through disavowing and denying
divine relatedness, or may lose its own sense of self and meaning
(through identification) and move into madness through fusion and
submersion within the divine.

Both extremes ultimately result in

a loss of relatedness or relationship with the divine and may become
experienced as madness until relatedness is restored.
Thanatos Myth
Another Classical myth of madness, thanatos,
madness related to death.

understands a

This madness concerns the obsession and

attraction to images of death, and even literal, physiological death
itself.

Examples of this account or understanding of madness may be

found in Plato's description of the dying Socrates in Phaedo (c. 455
B. C./1952) and as vividly detailed in Sophocles' Ajax (c. 455 B. C./
1952, 1977).

Later this same death myth, or thanatos account of mad

ness, is interpreted psychologically by Freud (1923/1952), as the
"death wish of the id", the death instinct, which he observed as
being responsible for the human Psyche's aggressive and destructive
madness and has been recently reviewed by Hillman (1975b, 1979) from
an archetypal perspective.

In Sophocles' Ajax (c. 455 B. C./1977),

the madness of death may be understood on many different levels;
however, for the early Greeks this was most often, if not always,
understood quite literally and as a result of their gods involvement
in their lives.

In Sophocles' account, Ajax, in the midst of the

battle of Troy, first meets Hector in single combat and they are only
to be parted by the heralds, after which they exchange sword and belt.
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Then Ajax defends the dead body of Patroclus, and later still carries
the dead Achilles from the battle field.

Finally, the gods deny him

the award of the dead Achilles' weapons, which are given to Odysseus
instead.

In the evening following the battle, Tecmessa described the

following events (Sophocles, c.. 455 B. C./1977):
In the depth of the night, after the evening flares
Had all gone out, Ajax, with sword in hand,
Went slowly groping toward the door, intent
Upon some pointless errand.
I objected,
And said, "Ajax, what are you doing? Why
do you stir? No messenger has summoned you:
You have heard no trumpet. Why the whole
army now's asleep!"
He answered briefly in a well-worn phrase,
"Woman, a woman's decency is silence."
I heard, and said no more; he issued forth alone.
I don't know what horrors occurred outside,
But when he came back in, he brought with him
A mass of hobbled bulls and shepherd dogs
And wooly captives.
He struck the heads off
some;
Others' he severed with an upward cut;
And some, held fast in bonds, he kept abusing
With words and blows, as though they were
human beings —
And all the while he was vexing poor dumb
beasts.
At length he darted out the door and spoke
Wild, rending words, directed toward some
phantom,
Exulting with a harsh laugh how he'd paid them,
Odysseus and the sons of Atreus. Then
He sprang back in again, and somehow, slowly,
By painful stages came to his right mind.
(pp. 359-360)
Ajax then learns he has actually slaughtered the Greek's own herds,
and returning to his "death-intoxicated" state literalizes his
thanatos madness with his own death by falling on the sword given him
by Hector.

Even as he falls, the fascination and focus of his exper

ience remains death.

"0 Death, Death, come now and look upon me! ...
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This is the last word that Ajax speaks to you:

henceforth he will

speak in Hades with the dead."
Later, in the same scene (Sophocles,

c. 455 B. C./1952) after

Ajax's body has been discovered, Teucer, Ajax's brother, ironically
observes, in a more mythic understanding of the thanatos experience
of madness,
"Now seeth thou Ajax how Hector, though dead, was
to destroy thee at last?" Consider, I pray you, the
fortune of these two men. With the very girdle that
had been given to him by Ajax, Hector was gripped to
the chariot-rail, and mangled till he gave up the
ghost.
'Twas from Hector that Ajax had this giftfswordj
and by this hath he perished in his deadly fall. Was
it not the Fury who forged this blade, was not his
girdle wrought by Hades, grim artificer?
(p. 151)
Although observing (along with Sophocles' Chorus) that Ajax had
been driven mad by a divinity, Simon (1978) and others have recently
viewed this madness of thanatos through a medical-psychiatric myth
exphasizing Ajax's "delusional and depressive aspects".

(p. 126)

Viewed through a mythic perspective, a thanatos myth of madness
shows Psyche pulled by the gods from

warm, living life-blood

ness with other humans down into icy

below-ground disconnectedness.

related

This madness of darkening death severed the madman's sense of connec
tion and relationship with his social group, with himself and with
the divine.

The madness of psychically dying out of life, out of con

tact with life, this nightfall from Zeus on Olympus to Hades in the
Underworld, especially through suicide (Hillman, 1964), is one of the
most potent images of Psyche's madness.
Hillman (1979) has described this fall from light into dark, the
thanatos myth of madness, as a new "psychic perspective, where one's
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entire mode of being has been desubstantialized, killed of natural
life . . . the underworld perspective radically alters our experience
of life",

(p. 46)

Hades, and the other gods of the Underworld, were often under
stood and engaged literally by madmen and their social group within
a thanatos myth of madness which prescribed a pattern of fascination
and obsession with death including suicide and literal physiological
death.

The instruments of death for both Hector and Ajax were said

to have been made in the House of Hades.
Whether prophetic, initiatory or thanatos, the Classical acc
ounts of madness concerned with divine intervention understood mad
ness as a personally and socially renting experience, as well as a
major disturbance with the gods.

Deliverance from madness often

required a literal re-relatedness with the proper deity.

This new

relatedness with the divine was the way to a new relatedness with
others and to a new relatedness within the madman, himself.

Wien

through his madness he was unable to establish a new relatedness of
some kind, continued madness or death were the only alternatives.
Death, at least, assured the madman some form of reconnection with
the divine in the person of Hades.
Classical Creek myths of madness due to divine intervention
appear to offer one of the richest and most elegant mythologies of
madness found in Western culture.

This polytheistic "psychology"

was able to contain the chaos of individual lives and society with
what Hillman (1975b) has called a fantastic variety of "literal
fantasies" for reflecting Psyche's many possibilities of madness.
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That is, the variety of possible experiences of madness in relation
ship with a pantheon full of such diverse gods as Apollo and Dionysus,
Zeus and Hades, allowed for a great variety of individual experiences
of madness.
From a mythic perspective, these accounts of madness may be seen
as literal, concrete enactments by madmen and their societies in
their attempts to establish new understandings and new relatedness —
a re-relatedness required by once having become unrelated from them
selves and their gods in ways defined by both madmen and society as
"mad".
Within these Classical myths, madmen are moved through their
enactments, as if guided by Hermes, from the concrete Dayworld of
social relatedness and the literal to the mad, nocturnal, non
material Underworld of the imaginal, and sometimes like Orestes,
Odysseus and Persephone, they return.
Natural Disease Myths
The natural disease account of madness presents an alterna
tive classical myth of madness, which, together with both "primitive"
myths and classical myths of divine intervention, forms the beginning
of polymythic understandings of madness within Western societies.
Psyche —

Hie

Soma dialogue and debate over understanding madmen and their

madness have found expression in many forms since the Classical per
iod, most often articulated with some clear reference to the particu
lar myth's origin and foundation in either the "science" or the
"religion" of the period.
Hippocrates (c. 400 B. C./1952) understood that madness had its
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own human "nature", and like all other diseases, arose from "nat
ural" causes, not divine intervention.

In his treatises "On the

Sacred Disease" he observed
It is thus with regard to the disease called Sacred:
it appears to me to be nowise more divine nor more
sacred than other diseases, but has a natural cause
from which it originates like other afflictions. Men
regard its nature and cause as divine from ignorance
and wonder, because it is not at all like to other
diseases. And this notion of its divinity is kept up
by their inability to comprehend it, and the simplicity
of the mode by which it is cured, for men are freed
from it by purifications and incantations ...
And I have seen men become mad and demented from no
manifest cause, and at the same time doing many things
out of place; and I have known many persons in sleep
groaning and crying out, some in a state of suffocation,
some jumping up and fleeing out of doors and deprived
of their reason until they awaken, and afterward becom
ing well and rational as before.
(p. 154)
Although Hippocrates identified three forms of madness:

mania,

melancholia, and phrenetics, it appears that he understood them
as of similar origin.

Hippocrates' natural disease myth understood

madness as disease of the brain, a disease "caused" by natural
hereditary disposition and an imbalance in the four humors within
the body.
But this disease seems to me to be no more divine
than others; but it has its nature such as other
diseases have, and a cause whence it originates,
...and it is curable no less than others, unless
when, from length of time, it is confirmed, and
has become stronger than the remedies applied. Its
origin is hereditary, like that of other diseases.
For if a phlegmatic person be born of a phlegmatic,
and a bilious of a bilious, and a phthisical of a
phthisical . . . what is to hinder it from happening
that where the father and mother were subject to
this disease, certain of their offspring should
be so afflicted also?
(p. 155)
For Hippocrates and also Galen, later, the brain was most
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often the part of human anatomy literalized as the organ "diseased".
That is, his natural disease account of madness was an extension of
the larger Nature myth of literal events and causes which was just
beginning to be developed from careful observation of the concrete,
external human experience of the natural environment.

This new way

of understanding depersonified and "secularized" concrete events and
experiences and allowed Hippocrates (c. 400 B. C./1952) to observe
madness as a natural disturbance of Nature, and yet still part of
Nature.
And by the same organ {brain]] we become mad and delirious, and
fears and terrors assail us, some by night, and some by day,
and dreams and untimely wanderings, and cares that are not
suitable, and ignorance of present circumstances, desuetude,
and unskillfulness.
All these things we endure from the
brain, when it is not healthy, but is more hot, more cold,
more moist, or more dry than natural, or when it suffers
from any other preternatural and unusual affection. And we
become mad from its humidity.
For when it is more moist than
natural, it is necessarily put into motion, and the affection
being moved, neither the sight nor hearing can be at rest, and
the tongue speaks in accordance with the sight and hearing.
As long as the brain is at rest, the man enjoys his reason,
but the depravement of the brain arises from phlegm and bile,
either of which you may recognize in this manner: Those who
are mad from phlegm are quiet, and do not cry out or make
a noise; but those from bile are vociferous, malignant, and
will not be quiet, but are always doing something improper.
If the madness be constant, these are the causes thereof.
But if terrors and fears assail, they are connected with
derangement of the brain, and derangement owing to its being
heated ... In these ways I am of the opinion that the brain
exercises the greatest power in man.
(p. 159)
Since madness was considered in this account a "natural" dis
ease, what was sought through the myth was a "natural" cure, that is,
the cure that Nature, herself, would effect.

"Treatment" to provide

for the "natural" cure differed little from the treatment prescribed
at that time for most other diseases.

The madman would be relieved
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of his affliction by Nature, providing he was allowed a natural diet,
and could be sustained in his natural environment and receive natural
purifications.
Although flatly rejecting that madness was caused by intervention
of the gods, Hippocrates' natural disease myth parallels the Apollon
ian oracle, "l-Ie who wounds, heals" (Meier, 1967, p. 5).

Hippocrates'

understanding was Nature is the cause of the disease of madness, and
Our natures are the physicians of our diseases.

This natural disease

account received additional support from the anatomical observations,
experiments and naturalistic explanations provided by Alcmaeon (c.
500 B. C.), Aristotle (c. 300 B. C.) and Galen

(A. D. 131-200).

Galen has been credited with developing the disease understanding
of madness to a degree unsurpassed until the nineteenth century.

He

understood madness, quite simply, as a natural disruption of man's
"rational soul", with the particular nature of an individual's madness
determined by which part of his "natural soul" had been disrupted.
Galen (c. 175/1952) divided soul or psyche into an external portion,
mainly involving the five senses, and an internal portion, which in
cluded imagination, judgement, perception and movement.

Galen accoun

ted for madness by connecting the particular thoughts, feelings and
behaviors of madmen with anatomical observations and the growing
understanding of physiological functions.

This led him to observa

tions such as the following (one of his few surviving accounts of
madness.)

For Galen, the madness in this example was due to a

disturbance in the "movement" part of the "rational soul" of a child.
The child is treated for his madness with peony root

(Rosen, 1968).
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On the whole its [peony rootj effect is very drying, so
that I do not entirely relish the hope that it may have
been reasonable to rely on it to cure convulsions in child
ren, even if used as an amulet. And I know a child that
had not been attacked at all for eight months since wearing
the root. When, however, somehow the amulet slid off, he
was immediately seized. And when another one had been hung
around his neck, again he felt perfectly well. But for
experiment's sake it seemed better to me to take it off
again; and when I had done so, and he was seized by con
vulsions again, I hung a big fresh part of the root around
his neck. And from that time on the boy was absolutely
healthy and was no longer seized by convulsions.
It was
now logical either that certain particules of the root
fell out, were sucked in by inspiration, and did thus heat
the affected part— or that the air itself was tempered
and changed by the root.
(p. 134)
It was Galen's understanding that the peony root literally
dried and heated the child's brain, thereby restoring the proper
balance among the humors in his body and bringing an end to the
child's madness.

The "Doctrine of the Humors", or a humoral

disease way of viewing madness explains that a disturbance in the
natural balance or quantity of the four humors (blood, phlegm,
yellow bile, black bile) in the human body may produce diseases of
the brain which then result in madness.

Madness developes when

internal or external factors produce an excess or insufficient
amount of one of the four humors.

Each humor was credited with

particular basic qualities such as heat, cold, moisture and dryness,
and each was also identified with particular personality styles as
manic, melancholic, sanguine, and violent.

Thus, when an indivi

dual's madness took the form of violent movement, as in excessive
aggressiveness or convulsions, the "cause" was understood liter
ally to be a disturbance in the madman's bile, in this case probably
the yellow bile.

Since in Galen's humoral disease myth yellow bile
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was associated with dryness, and since the cure for madness was a
return of the natural balance of the humors, he applied an agent
(peony root) which was thought to increase the drying of the brain.
(He apparently determined that the child’s madness was the result
of an insufficient amount of yellow bile, for when the madness was
thought to be the result of an excess of yellow bile a moistening
agent of some kind was prescribed.)

In each case of madness, an

attempt was made to literally understand which humor was out of
natural balance, therefore "causing" the brain to become diseased,
and the individual to become mad.
In spite of the careful observations made by Galen and other
physicians to support this understanding of madness, and despite
their attempts to define and prescribe precise natural remedies or
regimens to re-establish the necessary humoral balance, Rosen (1968)
observed that "a large part of medical practice in antiquity was
based on empiricism"

(p. 134) and he notes that madmen received as

many as forty-five different remedies for convulsions alone.

It

is not easy to separate the "rational" and "scientific" approaches
of this empirical, disease myth of madness from some of the common
popular and magical remedies of the day.

Rosen wrote

Even where the physician sought a rational explanation,
the strange character of mental and emotional disorders
as well as the lack of adequate means, made it difficult
if not impossible to evaluate critically clinical obser
vations and presumed therapeutic results.
(p. 134)
It is interesting that in his treatments for diseases of mad
ness, Galen did occasionally in addition to physical treatment,
also prescribe certain methods of "mental training" to help protect
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the "rational soul" from fits of passion and madness.

In his treatise

"On the Passions of the Soul" (Galen, c. 175/1952) he recommends
treatments borrowed from the Stoic philosophers.

These treatment

methods consisted of having the madman first, abstain from violent
and emotional outbursts; second, apprentice himself to an older, wiser
mentor who could give advice and point out weakness in thought and
behavior; and third, with the aid of his mentor, refrain entirely
from any uncontrolled expression of the passions.
Galen, then, recognized a connection between the "natural" rea
son of man and the "natural" balance of the humors, both contributing
variously to the potential for an unnatural, unreasonable, unbalanced
condition of the human Psyche called madness.

Madness was, however,

viewed by Galen primarily as a disease which required the attention
of a skilled physician.
Whether or not, as Rosen suggests, the Classical disease myths
of madness should properly be considered empirical and scientific, it
nevertheless began a way of articulating and understanding madness as
a natural human affliction, separate from matters divine, a disturb
ance of worldly human nature.

With the departure of the divine in

fluence in the way madness was viewed came a greater sense of human
responsibility and involvement in understanding and arranging for the
madman’s "cure", and for methods of treatment which would return him
to a more natural, "sane" state of mind.

Man, as a part of nature,

was now able and even obliged by the natural disease myth to interact
with the madman to help restore the natural balance which would end
his madness.
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From a mythic perspective the Classical disease myths of madness
understand the human Psyche's madness as an "unnatural" imbalance
which has resulted from either an excess or paucity of some element
natural and essential to the "sanity" of Psyche.

That is, the myth

directs our attention to a madness which may result from an imbalance
of purely natural, mundane qualities and quantities of Psyche, which
are restored or returned to balance through some method of compensation,
or by affecting the source of the disturbance or imbalance directly.
In addition, this myth of madness carries with it the understanding
of a need for more direct interaction and relatedness on the part of
the madman with his social group, and perhaps the need for an in
creased relatedness within his social group itself.
For Hippocrates and Galen, waiting only for divine intervention
to "heal" the madman was both unethical and without empirical justi
fication.

That is, they found the divine intervention way of viewing

madness no longer acceptable.

The new disease myths demanded through

their human, natural causes, that physicians participate and assist
with nature's own treatment and cure.
Simon (1978) observes that both Hippocrates and Galen considered
the first task of the physician
To move the disease from the realm of mythology to
the realm of physiology.
The disease [madness] has
a phusis, a nature, like all other diseases. A great
deal is at stake here ... Much of their argument ... is
aimed at establishing that these conditions belong in
the province of the physician, not of the magician.
(p. 222)
The impersonal physiology of nature becomes substituted, then, for
the personal mythology of the gods.

This "movement" of madness from
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muthos-pathos to phusis-pathos moves the madman and his social group
from a concern with the meaning of Psyche's madness to a concern for
the nature of Psyche's madness.

This same movement of Psyche we shall

find occurring and reoccurring in later periods of Western culture.
Madness, during the Classical period, was understood then
through both divine and disease myths, each of which defined and
prescribed unique patterns of experiencing madness for both the mad
men and those in their group.

Psychopathology, from psyche-pathos-

logos, (literally the telling of the happenings of the soul) was
understood through Classical myths of madness as either a disturb
ance in the madman's relations with his gods, or a disturbance in the
natural balance

of the four humors in his brain.

Ackerknecht (1971) has suggested that this development of a
separation in understandings or myths of madness during this period
was paralleled by a differentiation in the individuals who were
sanctioned to interact with madmen, and also in the methods these in
dividuals employed to effect an end to madness.

He has noted, for ex

ample, that modern physicians have their origin in the practices and
myths of the lay healers or practical doctors, who usually concentra
ted on empirical, physical treatments, while the shaman or medicine
man is the ancestor of the priest and often the physician's antagon
ist.

Thus, the particular myths of madness which form and guide the

experiences of the madmen and their social groups are closely re
lated to the particular myth of madness embraced by the madmen's in
terpreters, be they shamans, bonesetters, priests or physicians.
Ellenberger (1970) has noted that during the development of under
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standing of madness in the Classical period the healing priest and
the physician were the primary spokesmen and interpreters for mad
ness.

Much like today, both priest and physician practiced concur

rently during this period, engaging madmen in their particular mad
ness, through their respective myths.
Alexander and Selesnick (1966) have credited Pythagoras, through
his influence upon both Plato and Hippocrates, with
the separation of psychology from medicine that has
persisted to our present time. . . .the intellectual
turning from the external world to man should have
stimulated curlousity about human personality and the
human body. In this respect the body has an inter
mediary position between the external physical world
and the inner self.
It can be studied both as an ex
ternal object and as part of self-awareness.
It is
part of external reality and psychological reality.
(p. 49)
From a mythic perspective, however, this essentially Cartesian
way of understanding Psyche through its division into phusis and
muthos dissolves.

Once dissolved, we can return the matter of the

particular meaning of a literal experience of madness holds for Psyche
as it is viewed and understood through a particular myth and also
grasp its nature.

That is, we need not have to make the choice be

tween an understanding of the nature of Psyche's madness and meaning
of Psyche's madness.

In Psyche-pathos-logos, we may find both the

imaginal and the literal, both the phusis and the muthos, both the
nature and the meaning.
The particular account or myth of madness which emerges for the
madman and his social group defines and limits and prescribes the
concrete literal pattern of persons, places and objects which are
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required for his individual experience of madness.

The particular

myth also provides the pattern of persons, places and objects
which are required to restore him to relatedness with himself and
with those in his social group.
Whether due to divine intervention, accident, infection, her
edity, or insufficient reason; whether mediated through an incuba
tion, contact with a god, carefully concocted antidote, intellec
tual discipline or application of moisture to the brain, the partic
ular Classical myth of madness carried the madman and his society
from the imaginal world of Psyche and Psyche's madness to specific
personifications and literal enactments of madness within their
daily lives.
We shall return later to Psyche's madness experienced through
its organic nature and its natural experience of organic phusismadness.

However, slowly developing within the disintegration of

Classical Western culture was a reconnection of Psyche with the
Divine, now a single condensed and all powerful Divinity.

This

reconnection of Psyche with the Divine also provided a new connec
tion and container for Psyche's divine madness.
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CHAPTER IV
MEDIEVAL MYTHS OF MADNESS
Every man prefers to grieve in a sane
mind, rather than to be glad in madness.
.
— Augustine
During the Medieval period of Western culture, madness became
viewed and understood as a disturbance in the human Psyche's facul
ties of knowing — faith and reason.

Through the will of God, or

with his permission and through the work of the demons, the souls
and minds of medieval people became either removed from faith and
reason or bewitched and possessed, and thereby given over to madness.
As the civil order provided by Imperial Rome dissolved, secular
"disease" understandings of madness also disappeared.

The Christian

Church tried to provide an ecclesiastical order to counter the in
creasing chaos of daily medieval life.

With the new "holy" order

came canon law and a theological understanding and interpretation of
madness.

In a review of this period, Alexander and Selesnick (1966)

observed that
The first five hundred years of the Middle Ages were
chaotic, confused, and fearful, made so by wars, famines,
and plagues. The Church, with its promise that "the dis
inherited will inherit the world," offered security to the
soul as the Roman law had offered security to the civil
body. Entrusted with all of man's ills, monks treated
both the soul and the body.
(p. 69)
Accounts and explanations of madness by church fathers, such as
the early Christian bishop, Augustine (A. D. 354-430), and later the
philosopher and theologian, Aquinas (1225-1274), provided medieval
madmen and the members of their communities with "sacred" Christian

52
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myths of madness through which to understand and make sense out of
the concrete, literal madness they experienced.

While church author

ities maintained that the human Psyche's suffering of madness respon
ded primarily to faith, exorcism or the destruction of the possessing
demon (and often, unfortunately, its host), some allowance was also
made for "organic" understanding and treatment.
The classical Greek disease accounts and treatments of madness,
although initially all but abandoned by the church, were preserved in
Arabia and eventually found re-interpretation and introduction into
the medieval understanding of madness (Zilboorg and Henry, 1941).
During the middle ages, the efforts of physicians like Avicenna (A. D.
930-1037), succeeded in translating and organizing the most important
works of Hippocrates and Galen.

By adding to this tradition the

empirical methods and procedures recommended by Aristotle, and methods
from their own practical observations and experience, Arabian physic
ians developed a broader "organic" disease myth of madness.

This new

organic or somatic understanding of madness slowly became available
to the "healing" monks (usually of the Fransician order) in monestary
hospitals and only later in the newly developing European schools of
medicine.
However, as the growing influence of Aristotle's secular or
"pagan" philosophy of observation and reason began to threaten the
authority of the Christian church, the basics of Aristotlean thought
and the "rational" empirical understandings of madness were taken and
carefully and thoroughly shown to be deducible from Christian dogma.
This incorporation of a "rational" understanding of the human Psyche
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and its madness into a theological interpretation based on Christian
dogma set the stage for the development of a demonic myth of madness.
This myth understood madmen to be either witches or sorcerers who
were in league with the devil, or persons who were bewitched or
possessed by demons.
This demonic myth of madness was crystalized through a treatise
by Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928), Malleus Maleficarum (The Wit
ches' Hammer).

This document outlined the theological arguments

supporting the literal existence of witches and the proper methods
of detection and punishment for those found to be witches or those
found to be bewitched or possessed.

Mien their work was finally

approved by Pope Innocent VIII., King Maximilian of Rome, and the
theological faculty at the University of Cologne, the fusion of
insanity, witchcraft and heresey into the one true myth of madness
was complete.
civil law.

Demonic madness became a violation of both canon and

Malleus Maleficarum. the textbook of the Inquisition,

provided an understanding and interpretation of madness which domin
ated Western culture for over three hundred years.

Alexander and

Selesnick (1966) comment on this forced fusion of "rational" and
"spiritual" understandings of madness, where
The mentally ill were caught up in the witch hunt.
Theological rationalizations and magical explana
tions served as foundations for burning at the
stake thousands of the mentally ill as well as
many other unfortunates.
Those who had written
about the mind now wrote death warrants as the
tradition of scholastic reasoning in defense of
dogma gave way to bloody persecution, (p. 70)
During the Medieval period, madness appeared as one of the
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dominant themes of the human Psyche's experience.

Medieval madness

carried within extremes of its enactment the extremes experienced by
those living during the confusing and chaotic times called the
Middle Ages.

Alexander and Selesnick (1966), in viewing this period

from a psychiatric perspective, wrote
One can readily admire the charitable accomplish
ments of the monasteries, the erection of the
first hospitals in Europe, the foundation of the
first universtiies, the psychological genius of
St. Augustine, the encyclopedic scholarship and
deductive finesse of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the
enlightened outlook of Avicenna and Maimonides,
which stands out sharply against a background of
prevailing obscurantism.
But one can deplore
the intellectual sterility of the scholastics,
the return to prehistoric demonology, and the
institutionalization of the vital principles of
Christain ethics that led in time to unparalleled
excesses of intolerance and injury committed in
the name of those principles.
(p. 69)
From the Medieval period of Western culture we shall review several
examples of Psyche's madness through both early and late Christian
perspectives and through perspectives provided by medieval physicians
and the inquisitors.
Early Christian Myth
For St. Augustine (A. D. 354-430), and for most individuals liv
ing in Christendom during his time, madness had become understood
primarily as an internalized conflict between the particular madman
and God.

Although Christian dogma had not yet become fully deter

mined, doctrine held that an individual was endowed with an absolutely
free will, which required him to constantly resist the temptation to
sin.

In his City of God, Augustine (426/1952) wrote
What shall I say of the fundamental blessings of the
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soul, sense and Intellect, of which the one is given
for the perception, and the other for the comprehension
of truth?..."The compatible body weigheth down the soul,
and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things" . . . Virtue, itself . . .holds
the highest place among human good things, what is its
occupation save to wage perpetual war with vices — not
those that are outside of us, but within; not other men's
but our own — a war which is waged especially by that
virtue . . . we call temperance, and which bridles carnal
lusts, and prevents them from winning the consent of the
spirit to wicked deeds.
(p. 511)
For Augustine, mankind was so inherently weak and corruptible that
having once become mad through loss of sense or reason due to sin
fulness or possible possession by the Devil, a madman could only
be relieved of his suffering through faith, and through understand
ing his soul's proper relationship to God.
of action, observed Augustine,

Eagerness, or desire

(426/1952),

Is reckoned among the primary advantages of nature;
and yet is it not this which produces those pitiable
movements of the insane, and those actions which we
shudder to see, when sense is deceived and reason
deranged? . . . We can scarcely, or not at all, refrain
from tears, when we think of or see the actions and words
of such frantic persons, and consider how different from
and even opposed to their own sober judgement and ordin
ary conduct their present demeanor is.
What shall I say for those who suffer from demoni
cal possession? Where is their intelligence hidden
and buried while the malignant spirit is using their
body and soul according to his own will?
(p. 511)
By striving for a proper understanding of himself and the know
ledge of God's will, Augustine understood that a madman might
correct his behavior through faith in redemption and the experience
of Divine Grace.

For the madman, and those relating with him,

faith, piety and prayer were central to regaining sanity.

"We

are saved by hope . . . salvation such as it shall be in the world
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to come, shall itself be our final happiness" (Augustine, 426/1952,
p. 513).
"Human" weakness, then, by Augustine’s account could result in
a fall from grace and possible possession, leading to a state of
madness.

The madman was lost as an individual, and held personally

accountable as a sinner.
the grace and will of God.

His only hope to be restored was through
Augustine (426/1952) recorded a series

of accounts of madness, including the following account of the
possession of an entire farm family and their servants who were
suffering from the madness of evil spirits.
The former, Hesperius, asked our presbyters, during my
absence, that one of them would go with him and banish
the spirits by his prayers. One went, offered there
the sacrifice of the body of Christ, praying with all
his might that the vexation might cease.
It did cease
forthwith, through God's mercy. Now he had received
from a friend of his own some holy earth brought from
Jerusalem, where Christ, having been buried, rose again
the third day. This earth he had hung up in his bedroom
to preserve himself from harm. But when his house was
purged of that demoniacal invasion, he began to consider
what should be done with the earth; for his reverence for
it made him unwilling to have it any longer in his bed
room.
It so happened that I and Maximinus bishop of
Synita, and then my colleague, were in the neighborhood.
Hesperius asked us to visit him, and we did so. When
he had related all the circumstances, he begged that the
earth might be buried somewhere, and that the spot should
be made a place of prayer where Christians might assemble
for the worship of God. We made no objection:
it was
done as he desired. There was in that neighborhood a
young countryman who was paralytic, who, when he heard
of this, begged his parents to take him without delay
to that holy place. When he had been brought there,
he prayed, and forthwith went away on his own feet per
fectly cured.
(p. 594)
In another early Christian account or understanding of madness
Augustine (426/1952) observed how a sinner, having become mad and
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possessed by a devil, appealed to God for forgiveness of his sins
and the restoration of his sense and reason.

He was then taken to a

holy monument where
Near death, or even quite like a dead person, the
lady of the manor, with her maids and religious
attendants, entered the place for evening prayer
and praise, as her custom was, and they began to
sing hymns. At this sound the young man, as if
electrified, was thoroughly aroused, and with
frightful screaming seized the alter, and held
it as if he did not dare or were not able to let
it go, and as if he were fixed or tied to it; and
the devil in him with loud lamentation, besought
that he might be spared, and confessed where and
when and how he took possession of the youth. At
last, declaring that he would go out of him, he
named one by one the parts of his body which he
threatened to mutilate as he went out and with
these words he departed from the man. But his
eye, falling out on his cheek, hung by a slender
vein as by a root, and the whole of the pupil
which had been black became white. Wien this was
witnessed by those present (others too had now gath
ered to his cries, and all joined in prayer for
him), although they were delighted that he had
recovered his sanity of mind, yet, on the other
hand, they were grieved about his eye, and said he
should seek medical advice. But his sister’s
husband, who had brought him there, said "God,
who has banished the devil, is able to restore
his eye at the prayers of His saints." Therewith
he replaced the eye that was fallen out and hang
ing, and bound it in its place with his handker
chief as well as he could, and advised him not to
loose the bandage for seven days. When he did so,
he found it quite healthy. Others also were cured
there, but of them it were tedious to speak.
(p. 595)
Augustine (426/1952) also related two brief Christian understandings
of Psyche's madness and its deliverance in which two young people,
fallen from faith and God's grace, were restored to the Faith and
to reason through prayer.
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A woman of Hippo was immediately dispossessed of a devil
on annointing hefs.elf with oil, mixed with the tears of
the presbyter who had been praying for her.
I know
also that a bishop once prayed for a demoniacyoung man
whom he never saw, and that he was cured on the spot.
(p. 595)
For Augustine, beyond any personal relief for the madman, the
events and experiences of Psyche's madness and its remission were
more significant as a demonstration of the will and power of God.
He wrote
To what do these miracles witness, but to this
faith which preaches Christ risen in the flesh,
and ascended with the same into heaven? . . .
He exerts an invisible, immutable, incorporeal
sway, so that what is said to be done. . .is
done, not by their (human) operation, but only
by their prayer and request; or whether, finally
some things are done in one way, others in an
other, and so that man cannot at all comprehend
them— nevertheless these miracles attest this
faith which preaches the resurrection of the
flesh to eternal life.
(p. 593)
From a mythic perspective, obvious parallels in image and mean
ing appear between the early Christian myth of madness and previously
reviewed divine intervention myths of the early Greeks.

Both perspec

tives or myths point to Psyche's madness suffered in, or out of, re
lationship to the divine.

In Augustine's myth, however, the madman

must suffer, literally, the wages of sin when by fault of reason or
faith he fails to live the virtuous life.
Having once sinned, however, the course of madness was prescribed.
Whether through resisting temptations, wrestling demons and fighting
possession by a devil, or through suffering the alienation of his
fellows, the madman's enactment followed the "Way of the Cross,"
imitatio Christ!.

The pattern of Christ's Passion (alienation-trech-
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ery-denial-suffering-humiliation-death-resurrection) provided a model
for the literal experiences of Psyche’s madness understood through
Augustine's Christian myth.
The suffering, sacrifices and return to faith experienced by
madmen through this myth could lead to Divine Grace, the forgiveness
of sins and the restoration of sanity.

Within Augustine's myth,

failure to reverse an individual's madness also had its place and
was understood as God's Will.

That is, a madman could fail in achie

ving the correct attitude of repentence and faith or fail in his
attempt to abstain from further sinning.

And the Devil could also

maintain too great a power and control over the madman to permit his
restoration.

In these experiences of interminable madness, the

Passion of Christ became literalized still further, as Psyche's
deliverance from madness became possible, only through corporeal
death.

In a later Christian myth of madness, and also in a demon-

ology account, this literalization of Christ's purification through
death and resurrection reaches its most concrete literal

express

ion in the burning of individuals maddened by demonic possession.
From a mythic perspective, this early Christian myth of Psyche's
madness provides for a process of psychic resurrection and renewal,
of psychological rebirth.

Augustine understood, through an early

Christian perspective, the capacity of the human Psyche for a process
of reorganization, restoration, and renewal which could follow an
individual's disconnection from the literal object world.

The

"suffering of madness" in this myth could lead the madman, through
faith, to suffering a new meaning in life, to suffering a death and
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rebirth, and thereby to achieve a new connection to the world and
to those in his social group.
Organic Myth of Madness
For the medieval physician Avicenna (980-1037) and his organic
account of madness, the natural disease myths of the classical
Greeks provided a perspective to be elaborated and developed within
an Islamic world view, and then introduced through monestary hospitals
into Christian medieval Europe.

Madness was viewed by Avicenna as an

internalized organic problem, within man, resulting from natural or
ganic imbalances within the body.

These humoral and temperamental

imbalances could result from genetic predispositions and unnatural,
unhealthy living.
The "treatment" indicated for madness by Avicenna included
practical organic methods such as blood-letting, prepared medica
ments, and improved, healthier living conditions and personal hy
giene.

Specific treatments for Psyche's experience of madness, as

prescribed through this myth, were derived from the disease "laws"
of Hippocrates, the empirical methods and observations of Galen and
the writings of Aristotle, as they were preserved and expanded by
Avicenna.
Around A. D. 1020, Avicenna recorded his understandings of mad
ness, as well as other diseases, in his treatise the Canon (Qanun),
which according to Campbell (1926) "was the final codification of
all Graeco-Arabic Medicine, and formed half of the medical curriculum
of European Universities . . .

up to about A. D. 1650." (p. 79)

It

was this treatise of Avicenna's which slowly found its way into
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Christian monestaries where madmen had generally been coming to be
treated humanely, in a supportive, healthy setting.

Later Christian

theologians and scholastics, and physicians from "organized" medical
schools became influenced by Avicenna's interpretations of Aristotle's
philosophy and methods.
Just as Socrates had recognized the passion of love (Eros) as a
possible source of madness, Avicenna classified its influence (in a
section devoted solely to love) under cerebral or brain diseases,
along with somnolence, insomnia, amnesia, mania, hydrophobia and
melancholia (Browne, 1921, p. 85).

Along with the passion of love,

Avicenna (1020/1970) identified anger and fear as also arising from
the "natural" faculty which he defined as "that which is concerned
in nutrition whether for the preservation of the individual or the
race . . . and admittedly arises from the senses, the judgment and
the apprehensive faculties."

(p. 121)

Avicenna identified the

apprehensive (perceptive) and the ratiocinative (understanding) fac
ulties as the primary natural faculties whose disturbance might
result in madness.
A medieval Arabian account of Psyche's madness, translated by
Balfour and recorded in Alexander and Selesnick (1966), described
the madness of Souda a Tabee and a resulting state of Janoon where
the madman
Shows great carelessness as regards clothing,
attention to bodily requirements and the calls
of nature . . . childish memories of heart, and
unprovoked laughter . . . the madman manifests
intense anxiety, and suffers from a constant
dread of something unknown . . . being associa
ted with extraordinary movements of the hands
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and feet, leaping, beating the ground . . .
he is
extremely restless, sleepless, taciturn, shows great
antipathy to mankind, is violent.
(p. 123)
Avicenna and the physicians of his time generally understood this
madness as a condition arising secondarily to an organic disease,
usually of the brain.

Avicenna (1020/1970) advised physicians who

could treat the madman not to concern themselves with disturbances
in the natural faculties themselves, since
It is only necessary to consider those faculties the
disturbances of whose functions bring on disease. It
is enough to know that the lesions in one which are in
terfering with the other arise in the temperamental
state of the member or in depravity of its constitution.
For on this knowledge depends the selection of the rem
edy and how to guard against the disease. Not to know
about the state of a faculty which is affected only in
directly is of less moment compared with accurate know
ledge about a faculty which is affected directly . . .
To the physician . . . the same noxa, be it an intemper
ament or a depraved constitution, would affect both and
in either case the seat of disease would be in the same
region of the brain.
(p. 138-139)
Avicenna therefore recommended a variety of organic treatments, in
cluding cupping, blood-letting, opium medicaments, physical rest
and hygiene which would all aid in curing the organic disease
responsible for disturbing a particular natural faculty.
Madness itself was understood through Avicenna's organic myth
as a "sign" of disease, in a way similar to how the psychiatric
syndrome of depression

might be understood through a "modern"

disease myth of madness today.

In his Canon, Avicenna (1020/1970)

observed that "a 'sign' is that which guides the physician to a
knowledge of the real essential nature of a disease." (p. 158)
Avicenna described Psyche's madness as disturbances in the madman's
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natural faculties, signs of these disturbances were sought and
were literally understood as evidence of organic disease in the
madman's brain.
Viewed from a mythic perspective, Avicenna's organic myth of
madness returns our attention to nature, to the underlying natural
causes of madness, to the imaginal hidden movements of the humors
and the temperaments in the human Psyche's madness.

We are even

directed perhaps to the madness in Psyche's "humorous" and "temp
eramental" movements.
Understood through a mythic perspective, the passion of Love,
literalized by Avicenna as an organic cerebral disease, becomes a
natural imbalance, a "losing one's head in passion."

Natural

organic accounts of madness, reviewed mythically, also help us
understand the natural "organ" of Psyche's madness, the sexual
experience of nature found in almost every enactment of madness.
I am not referring here to concrete sexual expression of "acting
out" by a madman, although this too may be literally present in the
madman's experience, but rather I am interested here in Psyche's
movement, through madness, to express its "organ" naturally, with
out psychic restriction, according to its own temperamental and
humorous nature —

a natural loosening.

Viewed from a mythic perspective, a natural, organic disease
myth of madness may also provide a reconnection for the human
Psyche with a sense of that uneasiness (dis-ease) inherent in all
of living organic nature —

death.

A natural organic disease myth

of madness returns Psyche to nature, to the nature of death, to its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
underground organic place in nature.

Even in the treatment of

bloodletting, we may understand Avicenna's literal presentation as
a reconnection of Psyche, through madness, to the natural flow of its
"life blood", a natural connecting flow of Psyche from life to death
and, perhaps, back to life.
Late Christian Myth of Madness
During the latter part of the middle ages, the influence of
Aristotle's natural philosophy, translated and preserved by Arab
ian scholars, began to influence Western culture and the Christian
understanding of madness.
Aquinas (1225-1274) was the principle Christian scholar and
theologian responsible for meeting the potential threat posed by
this "rational" movement against ecclesiastical authority and rule.
Aquinas succeeded in helping preserve the Church's dominance,
its ordered society, ordinata civitas, and its view of madness, by
asserting that Aristotle's philosophy was inherent in and con
tained by Christian dogma.

"The order by which the cosmos is

governed is reasonable because the divine Ruler himself is Reason,
Mind, Intellect . . . God is 'the most perfect object of under
standing', perfectissimum intelligibile . . . The being and exis
tence of God consists essentially in his thinking, understanding,
and contemplating."

(Ileer, 1952/1966, p. 154)

Aquinas argued, therefore, that nothing could exist outside
of reason in God or the Church, and madness, therefore, was in
neither God nor the Church.

He "established reason as the faculty

by which that particular world-order achieved self realization."
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(Heer, 1952/1966, p. 155)
By adopting Aristotle's separation of "rational soul" from
earthly body, Aquinas developed the Christian understanding of Psyche's
madness as an externalized problem in the relationship between the
madman's rational soul and God, a defect in the proper act of reason.
In his major work, Summa Theologica, Aquinas (1273/1952) stated
In this present state of life in which the soul is
united to a passable body, it is impossible for our
intellect to understand anything actually except
by turning to the phantasma [images^ . . .the in
tellect, being a power that does not make use of a
corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its
acts through the lesion of a corporeal organ.
(I., Q. 84, A. 7)
The madman's "loss of reason" was understood through this
Christian myth of madness as a result of either the madman's reason
having been overpowered either by a passion or by the devil, or
through organic defects which, although not affecting the madman's
reason directly, could effect other faculties upon which his reason
depended for its practical operation (Summa Theologica, I., Q. 84,
A. 7).

With regard madness which resulted from an excess of passion

Aquinas (1273/1952) wrote
Man through being disposed in such and such a
way by a passion, judges something to be fitting
and good, which he would not judge thus were it
not for the passion. . .his reason is wholly
bound, so that he has not the use of reason,
as happens in those who through a violent ex
cess of anger or concupiscence become furious
or insane. . .Sometimes man is disposed in a
certain way uniformly in respect of his whole
soul. , .because his reason is entirely en
grossed by passion as in the madman.
(II., Q.
10, A. 3,4)
Included in this later Christian myth of madness was also the
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madness of sin, where the madman's reason became corrupted.

Aquinas

understood Psyche's madness of sin as the madman's violation of
God's rational (canon) laws, as reconciled with Aristotle, and
derived from the gospels and the newly refined Christian dogma.

In

Summa Theologica he continued
If the defect of reason be about something which
a man is able and ought to know, he is not ex
cused from sin, and the defect is imputed to
him as sin. . . is found in the reason either
through being a voluntary defect of the reason,
or through the reason being the principal of the
will's act.
(II. , Q. 74, A. 5)
Individuals having become mad through defects in their process of
reasoning, through misunderstanding the Revelation of God, and through
becoming vulnerable to passions, could also rather easily come under
the influence of the Devil and become possessed.

Aquinas (1273/1952)

understood that men retained "the power of following the passions or
repressing them", and that madmen followed passions "in which move
ments the heavenly bodies can influence.

Demons according to phases

of the moon, can harass and possess men, who are on that account
called lunatics, . . .

in order to lead men into error"

A. 4), sin and perpetual loss of reason.

(I., Q. 115,

He also understood a mad

ness of Psyche which could result from the excessive passion of fear
and anger,:and which could cause great harm "by reason of the sorrow
which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing de
sired."

This could then "deprive man of reason, as may be seen in

those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy and madness"
(Aquinas, 1273/1952, II., Q. 37, A. 4).
Canon law, modeled as it was after Roman civil law, presumed
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judgement on all forms of madness, holding individual

madmen

accountable as deviants, sinners, heretics, and persons possessed.
The Church, through quasi-legal procedures, offered madmen penance,
exorcism and punishment so that they might be restored to reason.
Tuke (1882) records a Christian account of madness provided by
the medieval English clergyman, St. Thomas More.
officially been found to be a sinner, heretic.

Here, a madman has
More (Tuke, 1882) ob

served that the madman was
One which after that he had fallen into these
frantick heresies, fell soon after into plaine
open franzye beside. And all beit that he had
therefore bene put up in Bedelem, and afterward
by beating and correccion gathered his remembraance to him and beganne to come again to himselfe, being thereupon set at liberty, and walkinge aboute abrode, his old fransies beganne to
fall againe in his heade.
I was fro dyvers good
holy places advertised, that he used in his
wandering about to come into the churche, and
there make many mad toies and trifles, to the
trouble of good people in the divine service,
and especially woulde he be most busye in the
time of most silence, while the priest was at
the secrets of the masse aboute the levacion. . .
whereupon I beinge advertised of these pageauntes, and beinge sent unto and required by
the very devout relygious follce, to take some
other order with him, caused him, as he came
wanderinge by my doore, to be taken by the
counstables and bounden to a tree in the
streets before the whole towne, and ther they
stripped (striped) him with roddes therefore
till he waxed weary and somewhat lenger. And
it appeared well that hys remembraunce was
goode ineoughe save that it went about in
grazing (wool-gathering!)
til it was beaten
home. For he coulde then verye wel reherse
his fautes himselfe, and spealce and treate
very well, and promise to doe afterward as
well. And verylye God be thanked I heare none
harme of him now.
(pp. 56-58)
In the climate of growing political unrest and change which
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characterized the end of the Medieval period, the Church, in its
attempt to maintain civil order, identified an increasing number of
individuals from the swelling ranks of sinners, heretics and other
unfortunates as madmen who had all "lost their reason."

It was

during this period that the practice of "exporting" or expelling
fools and madmen became a common practice throughout much of Chris
tendom —

the ships of fools began their voyages.

Heer (1952/1966)

observed that within the medieval Christian society for which Aquinas
was a primary spokesman, deviants like madmen
Might have to be sentenced to perpetual banishment
for the purification and cleansing of society . . . .
As for the opinion that they might be salvaged,
Aquinas dismissed it as frivoulous.
The danger
[madmen] . . . created as long as they were alive
was greater and more certain (ma.jus et certius) than
the good which could be expected to result from their
cure. Since man was one of the noblest creations of
an aristocratic God, he was obliged to purify him
self by asceticism and intellectual discipline.
If
he refused penance and purification, the official
administrators of the Spirit of God and of right
thinking had no choice but to purge him. (p. 156)
When Aquinas' Christian understanding of madness is viewed myth
ically, or through a mythic perspective, our attention is directed
to a suffering of madness which places one "outside oneself," and out
side one's social order.

Previous myths, such as Socrates' under

standing of the "higher wisdom" of madness may also become reflected
in Aquinas' account, as he describes the madman as being "placed out
side himself when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him ...
when he is overcome by violent passion or madness" (Summa Theologica,
1273/1952, II., Q. 28, A. 3).
In Aquinas' myth we are informed of an alienation in Psyche's
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madness, a madness of separation and alienation, both within the
madman himself and between the madman and his group.

For the madman

experiencing too much passion in his soul (psuke), the result could
be his falling out of reason, falling out of reason and "order" and
into sin.

Letting passion into the reason of his soul, into Psyche's

reason, moves the madman to find a reason and order in his passion,
a reason beyond the reason of the current order, beyond the current
order in himself, beyond the current order in his society.

From a

mythic perspective we may see through a literal "loss of reason" to
Psyche's falling out of reason's order through the passion of mad
ness, and into a new order, a new reason.

This madness of falling

out, of alienating, and of separating from current reason and order
in Psyche places the madman "outside the knowledge proper to him"
(Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II., Q. 28, A. 3), and may result in his
falling into a new reason for Psyche in the outside order.
Viewed mythically, madness understood through Aquinas' Chris
tian myth is a madness of the disintegrating of reason and order in
Psyche.

Madness viewed from a monotheistic, Christian perspective of

Psyche emerges as a falling out of reason and order into passion and
sin, a disintegrating process through the suffering of passion.

Mad

ness becomes the human Psyche's experience of the disintegration of
reason and order into passion and suffering (or perhaps into the
suffering of passion.)

This metaphore of Psyche "falling into a

passion" may provide a re-view of Christian understanding of Psyche's
madness through Christ's suffering of passion and the passion in
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Christ's suffering.
Just prior to his death in 1274, Aquinas abruptly stopped his
life long work on Summa Theologica, and in a state of rapture which
Von Franz (Aquinas, c. 1274/1966) considered an "invasion from the
unconscious (]a Jungian myth of madness]] . . .

a prodromal symptom

of death" (pp. 428-429), some believe he dictated an apocryphal
treatise Aurora Consurgens (The Rising Dawn.)

The passion and

intensity of the visionary experience which preceded his alchemi
cal work prompted him to remark that by comparison "everything I
have written IfSumma]] seems like straw."

(Walz, 1951, p. 157)

This last work of Aquinas, Aurora Consurgens (c. 1274/1966)
when viewed itself through a mythic perspective of madness, might
be understood as an experience describing a fall into a "higher
knowledge.

. . outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and

reason . . . raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense
and reason", a knowledge made possible after having become mad through
"loss of reason".

It is interesting that this preceding experience

and understanding of a "higher knowledge" in madness, was written by
Aquinas, not in the later alchemical work, Aurora Consurgens, but
earlier in his Summa Theologica (II., Q. 28, A. 3).
Demonic Myths of Madness
As general political unrest and religious disaffection and doubt
continued to threaten the institutions responsible for maintaining
medieval social order (the Catholic Church and the feudal states),
individuals who deviated from the strict canon and civil laws of the
period met with increasingly severe consequences.

Efforts to
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systematically suppress and purge anyone who threatened the moral
and rational social order reached their most elaborate codification
in 1487, when two Dominican monks, Sprenger and Kraemer, received
academic, papal and state support for their treatise Malleus
Maleficarum (The Witches' Hammer) .
In their work, all understanding of madness and deviance was
reduced to "the work of the devil."

This demonic myth understood

Psyche's madness as a problem resulting from the relationship be
tween the soul of the witch or the possessed madman and the devil
or his introjected demons.

The "Princes of Darkness", or the

Devil's Incubi, invaded the bodies of those who were constitutionally
weak or sinful (usually women), and thereby inspire satanic madness
and misdeeds.
Sprenger and Kreamer's demonic myth understood that certain men
and women, seduced by the devil into madness thus becoming sorcerers
and

witches, used the devil's power to bewitch, possess and madden

others.

All forms of deviation experienced by the human Psyche

during this late medieval period therefore ran the considerable risk
of being understood as demonic madness, a madness of Psyche against
order and, therefore, against God (Zilboorg and Henry 1941).

In

Malleus Maleficarum, Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928) described in
simple, cold certainty that
The power of the devil is stronger than any human
power.
There is no power on earth which can be
compared to him.. . .The authority of the Holy
Scriptures says that devils have power over the
bodies and minds of men. Therefore those err who
say there is no such thing as witchcraft, but
that it is purely imaginary . . . this is contrary
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to true faith, which teaches us that certain angels fell
from heaven and are now devils, and we are bound to ack
nowledge that by their very nature they can do many won
derful things which we cannot do. And those who try to
induce others to perform such evil wonders are called
witches.
(p. 2)
In gaining scholastic and ecclesiastical support for their
treatise, and sanctioned now as an official part of Christian doc
trine, Sprenger and Kraemer reduced any likelihood that an alterna
tive understanding of madness could co-exist during this period of
Western culture.

Natural or organic theories or accounts of mad

ness were discouraged since madness was an "affliction of the
soul", and consequently natural or medical interventions in cases of
demonic madness was likewise questioned, since "no witchcraft can
removed by any natural power"
161).

(Sprenger and Kraemer,1487/1928,

be

p.

Most physicians of the period were prudently cautious in rec

ommending any remedy for madmen, lest they be implicated as sorcerers,
themselves.

Anyone who didn't understand and believe in the demonic

myth was himself by definition a heretic and a madman, possessed.
Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928) were able to substantiate their
doctrine to anyone's satisfaction by citing many passages from the
Holy Scriptures and they concluded
It would be the height of folly for any man to
contradict these j_ Scriptures^ , and he could not
be held clear of the guilt of heresey, For any
man who gravely errs in an exposition of Holy
Scriptures is rightly considered to be a
heretic.. . . That to deny the existence of witches
is contrary to the obvious sense of the Canon is
shown by ecclesiastical law.. . . Whosoever thinks
otherwise concerning these matters which touch the
faith that the Holy Roman Church holds is a
heretic. There is the Faith.
(p. 4)
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Demonic madness was no longer merely a popular superstition,
it was an authoritative principle of faith and law.

Having once

developed this theoretical and legal foundation for their account of
madness, Sprenger and Kraemer began to detail how women were more
susceptable to demons than men, how devils through the operation of
witches sometimes actually possessed men, and how devils, through
witches, enticed and allured the innocent to the "increase of that
horried craft and company."
In the patently misogynic attitude which characterized not only
the late medieval period, but much of Western culture's understanding
of madness (Hillman, 1972), Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928) wrote
that witches are far more likely to be women since they
Are more credulous [than men] ; and since the
chief aim of the devil is to corrupt faith,
therefore he rather attacks them.. . . Women
are naturally more impressionable, and more
ready to receive the influence of a disem
bodied spirit... .They have slippery tongues,
and are unable to conceal from their fellowwomen those things which by evil arts they
know; and since they are weak, they find an
easy and secret manner of vindicating them
selves by witchcraft... .All witchcraft comes
from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable.
Wherefore for the sake of fulfilling their
lusts they consort
even with devils... . It
is no matter for wonder that there are more
women than men found infect with the heresey
of witchcraft.
(pp. 43-47)
The inquisitors also tried through their demonic myth to dis
tinguish between a general madness of being bewitched and a madness
where, as prescribed by Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928),
The devil can alsoessentially possess a man,
as is clear in the
case of frantic men . . .
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substantially inhabited by devils at the instance of
witches. . .sometimes in their bodies and in their
inner faculties; sometimes they only tempt them in
wardly and outwardly; others they at times deprive
them of their use of reason; others they change into
the appearance of irrational beast.. ..Let no one doubt
that God allows such things to be done by devils at
the instance of witches.
(p. 129)
As the understanding of Psyche's madness through this demonic
myth spread throughout Western culture, the number of individuals
identified as madmen and witches increased greatly.

The inquisi

tors explained that the increase in demonic madness was due to the
devil's increasing influence through the agency of other witches,
mainly by capitalizing upon human weaknesses such as:

the lack

of will to resist harassment and affliction, the inability to re
sist the temptation of carnal lust, and the temptation to madness
and deviance by way of sadness and poverty.

An example of this

latter explanation for the increase observed in the number of
witches and demonic madmen, is Faust's madness which resulted from
selling his soul to the devil in an attempt to improve his temporal
lot in life.
Devils, and the witches in their service, were credited with
responsibility for both the necessary conditions, and the sufficient
causes for all demonic madness and affliction.

The madman himself,

however, was thoroughly implicated as well, through his cooperation
and participation (Sprenger and Kraemer, 1487/1928, pp. 96-98).
Zilboorg and Henry (1941) devote an entire chapter to a review
of this demonic account of madness, and observe that the result of
combining Christian belief in the free will of the human soul with
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the power of the demonic resulted in a
Most terrifying, although most preposterous, con
clusion. Man, whatever he does, even if he succumbs
to an illness which perverts his perceptions, imagin
ation, and intellectual functions, does it of his own
free will; he voluntarily bows to the wishes of the Evil
one. The devil does not lure and trap man; man chooses
to succumb to the devil and he must be eliminated from
the community. More than that, his soul, held in such
sinful captivity by the corrupted, criminal will within
the body, must set free again; it must be delivered.
The body must be burned.
(p. 156)
Although Malleus Maliflcarum included detailed instructions
for the inquisitors of both civil and ecclesiastical courts
(Sprenger and Kraemer, 1487/1928, pp. 194-271), the methods
of inquisition, the examination and trial procedures, and the
sentences given to madmen, bewitched and possessed, varied with the
madman's sex, religious views and position in society (Herr, 1961,
p. 254).

The inquisitors occasionally permitted attempts at exorcism

prior to the madman's trial, but even if the exorcism proved success
ful they usually insisted on the need for the destruction of the
madman's body as "an act of mercy, a solemn and invigorating salvage
of something pure and immortal from the clutches of evil and dark
ness.

. .the supreme purification by fire.

. .the will of God"

(Zilboorg and Henry, 1941, p. 156).
Sprenger and Kraemer (1487/1928) reported the following case
where a priest, from the diocese of Marburg in Hesse, became possess
ed by a demon as the result of witchcraft, and thereby was besieged
with horrible visions, loss of reason and speech, and bodily torture.
In this case exorcism was permitted prior to trial and
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During the exorcism the devil was asked for how long
he had inhabited that priest. He answered - For seven
years. And when the exorcist objected, But you have
tormented him for hardly three years; where were you
for the rest of the time? He answered, I was hiding in
his body. And when he asked in what part of the body,
he answered, Generally in his head. And when he was
again asked where he was when the priest was celebrating
the Sacrament, he said, I hid myself under his tongue.
And the other said: Wretch! How were you so bold as
not to flee from the presence of your Creator? Then
the devil said: Anyone may hide under a bridge while
a holy man is crossing, as long as he does not pause in
his walk. But with the help of Divine Grace the
priest was delivered. . .And so the devil occupied the
body of the priest in three ways. First, as he could
enter his body within its physical limits, so he
occupied his head by substantially inhabiting it.
Secondly, he could extrinsically work upon his soul
so as to darken his understanding and deprive him of
the use of his reason. And he could have so tormented
him without any intermission or respite; but we may
say that the priest had this gift from God, that he
should not be tormented by the Devil without inter
mission.
Thirdly, that although he was deprived of
the power of the sane use of words, yet he was
always conscious of his words, though not of their
meaning. And this differs from the other methods of
obsession, for we generally read that those who are
possessed are afflicted by devils without intermission;
as is clear in the case of the lunatic
(pp. 133-134)
Although it is not clear from their account whether this madman
was burned, decapitated or tortured to death, most were.

A final

confession of witchcraft by the madman was usually allowed, since
this could prevent formal excommunication and eternal damnation,
but as Harsnet (Kocher, 1952) has reported regarding the general
attitude during this period of Western culture
The pulpets also rang of nothing but Divels, and
witches werewith men, women and children were so
affrighted, as many of them durst not stir in the
night, nor so much as a servant almost go into his
maysters celler about his businesse without company.
Fewe grewe to be siclce or evil at ease, but straight
way they were deemed to be possessed.
(p. 134)
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The last witch found guilty of demonic madness in Europe, was
decapitated in Switzerland in the town of Glarus in 1782, almost
three hundred years after the Theological Faculty of Cologne had
endorsed Malleus Maleficarum.

Alexander and Selesnick (1966), in

appreciation of the literal horror which was associated with demonic
madness write, "This huntsman’s bible directed against heretics, the
mentally ill and women of all stations of life, was responsible for
hundreds of thousands of women and children being burned at the
stake'-', (p. 68)
When this demonic understanding of madness is re-viewed from a
mythic perspective, however, a concern and connection of the human
Psyche with seduction and possession by dark forces from below
emerges as a central image.

A dark madness of bodily passion and

lust moves within the human Psyche in response to increasingly ra
tional, orderly and anti-erotic literal enactmenus in the external
object-world.

We are reminded here of the Greek's thanatos madness

with Hade's unexpected intrusion from the Underworld into the Dayworld, and his subsequent possession and rape of Persephone, carrying
her away to be one of his own.
From a mythic point of view, a demonic account of madness points
to the demonic underworld connection of the human Psyche, maddened by
the over-controlling and over-ordering of dayworld divinity.

This

chthonic madness of Psyche bewitches and possesses a spirit too ra
tional, too orderly and too removed from its earthy experience to
understand its possessions.

This madness of Psyche which emerges

when reason and order are identified with "all that is divine,"
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personifies "Princes of Darkness" to hold and carry all of Psyche
which is neither rational, orderly, nor divine.
This demonic madness of Psyche within a patriarchal medieval
society also directs us to a madness in the patriarchal Psyche, or
perhaps to a patriarchal madness of Psyche.

Here in patriarchal mad

ness we find "masculine" characteristics of Psyche’s authority and
righteousness expressed, its male-god trinity becomes "incarnated",
or literalized in the authority and
monarch.

rightness of pope, academic and

In re-viewing Psyche's demonic madness, we are reminded

that inspite of the presence and influence of the "feminine" in
Christian mythology, the myth became concretely interpreted through
a masculine, patriarchal perspective of Psyche (not until 1854 was
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception completely accepted by the
Roman Catholic Church, and the corporal assumption of Mary into
Heaven not until 1950.)
Viewed mythically, this patriarchal, rational, "order-loving"
perspective of Psyche defines madness, misogynically.

That is,

a masculine perspective and experience of Psyche defines madness in
terms of the irrational, anarchic, underground "feminine" movement
of Psyche, the psychic movement of witches, demons, and madmen, full
of lust and passion, having lost both reason and faith, and faith in
reason.

In Malleus Maleficarum (Sprenger and Kraemer, 1487/1928),

the word femina was specifically (and quite artificially) derived
from fe (faith) and minus (less).

Inquisitors who searched for mad

men who were faithless, found instead a faithless madness, or rather
they found their madness to be faithless.
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This demonic myth of madness may be understood as Psyche’s move
ment through "loss of faith", movement through Psyche's "feminine", a
mad movement of Psyche by way of its feminine perspective and by way
of its contact with the irrational, erotic, underground experience of
itself.

In the fire of purefication, Psyche recognizes and is moved

through the demonic myth of madness back to the Underworld heat of
its passion, back into Underworld fires of desire and lust for life—
back to an experience of itself including femina.
During the period of Western culture known as the Middle Ages,
the human experience of madness became increasingly understood in
terms of loss of faith and reason, a loss which resulted in separation
from the grace of God and alienation from the social order.

This de

parture of madmen from Dayworld faith and reason so threatened the
guardians of medieval culture that a careful campaign of widespread
destruction was spawned in reaction to Psyche's faithless, unreason
able, demonic madness.
When madness experienced during this medieval period is viewed
mythically, what appears is the human Psyche jin movement, in the mad
ness of movement.

The madness in this movement is the perception by

the human Psyche of_ movement, that is, an awareness, acknowledgement,
and engagement of an "other" movement, an alien "other" perspective.
An "other" perspective of demonic-divine proportions, threatening and
yet spellbinding in its attraction.

This perspective Hillman (1979)

has sometimes called Hades' perspective, an Underworld perspective of
Psyche quite different from that of our Dayworld consciousness of or
der and reason.

We are also re-minded or re-turned by these medieval
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myths of Psyche's madness to earlier "primitive" shamanic myths of
sorcery, spirit intrusion, breach of taboo and soul loss, which also
understood the presence of this alien "other" perspective.
Within these literal enactments of Psyche's madness and move
ment during the medieval period there arose, however, an opportunity
for a kind of psychological relativism, a loosening of Psyche, an
uncertain possibility for imaginal thinking by individuals like
Montaigne (1580/1952) who wrote
The lives of the witches in my neighborhood are
in danger whenever a new writer appears who takes
their dreams for fact. Other tools than we have
are needed to digest the examples offered us by
the Divine Word... .1 agree with St. Augustine
that it is better to tend toward doubt than toward
certainty in things which are difficult to prove
and dangerous to believe... .After all, it is setting
a high value on one's conjectures, if for their
sake one is willing to burn a human being alive.
(Essays III. 11, pp. 500-501)
Although the echoes of Psyche's madness during themedieval
period continue in the experiences of Psyche to

thisday,

there

arose from the fiery chthonic madness of this period imaginal
understandings of the human Psyche which returned
to its own depths, and to

Psyche toitself,

renewed movement during aRenaissance and

Enlightenment period of Western culture.

Again with intuitive under

standing of this mad movement of Psyche and culture, Montaigne (1580/
1952), in his essay Apology for Raymond Sebond, wrote
As great enemies are born of great friendships,
and mortal maladies of rigorous health, so are
the greatest and wildest manias born of the race
and lively stirrings
of the soul; it is only a
half turn of the peg to pass from one to the
other.
In the actions of the insane we see how
neatly madness combines with the most rigorous
operations of our soul.
(Essays II. 12, p. 235)
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RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT MYTHS OF MADNESS
"It is not by confining one's neighbors
that one is convinced of one's own sanity."
— Dostoevsky
In our review of Western culture through the post-Medieval
period, the primary focus of the human Psyche becomes the "human
experience."

With the Renaissance came a re-focus which led away

from an experience of a God above and of demons below, to an earthly
human experience and concern with nature.

The human Psyche became

captivated and fascinated by Nature, the nature around humans, the
nature c)f humans, and the nature in humans.

This "humanism" and

the renewed interest in the relationship between humans and nature
also appears in the understanding of madness during this period of
"re-birth" and "awakening" and continues to this day.

Natural

sciences, natural philosophy, and natural medicine all provide
accounts or myths of madness through which madmen and those in
their group might understand their experiences.
Alexander and Selesniclc (1966) regard the early part of this
period as a time of plagues, civil strife, corrupt clerical practices
and disunity between popes and emperors, noting that this led to
Movement away from the rigid doctrines of the
scholastics toward a reawakening of respect for
the writings of the Romans and Greeks. Study of
classics of antiquity in the original, rather
than dogmatic commentaries on them, became the
ideal of the humanists. . .the consequent revival
of Greek learning went hand in hand with a growing
contempt for medieval scholasticism, which empha-

82
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sized the other world of the supernatural.

(p. 71)

The understanding of madness and madmen was also moved by this
humanism away from a single demonic perspective, to a variety of
different perspectives paralleling many of the earlier myths or
images of madness previously reviewed.

Russell (1945) observed that

many humanists early in this period of Western culture had the same
Reverance for the authority that medieval philo
sophers had had, but they substituted the authority
of the ancients for that of the Church. This was,
of course, a step towards emancipation, since the
ancients disagreed with each ocher and individual
judgement was required to decide which of them to
follow.
(p. 495)
During the period of the Renaissance through the Enlightenment, under
standings of madness were increasingly defined by the human Psyche's
senses and direct external experience rather than by the written word
of authority, or the internal experience of images.
Through early appeals for reliance upon empirical observation
and reason by individuals like Paracelsus (1493-1541) and Weyer (15151588) blows were struck against the Witches' Hammer and its demonic
myth of madness, and also, therefore, indirectly against the authority
of the Church, and its authority over madness.

Even within the Church

protests and reformation efforts re-directed Western culture

to ex

ternal sense experience as the source of Psyche's understanding of
its madness.
The "psychological" philosophies of Hume (1711-1776) and Locke
(1632-1704) developed during this period provided another alternative
to theology for engaging the "aberrations" of madness.

Zilboorg and

Henry (1941) wrote
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Here at last was a system of thought, or a group of
systems of thought, which dealt with the minutest
details of human nature and even with the soul —
without recourse to dogma or to any definite re
ligious faith. Human reason itself with breadth
and depth could penetrate into the obscure recesses
of man's mind, correlate man's mind with his body
and central nervous system and make a synthesis
without having to consult the revealed and the
miraculous.
The combination of philosophical sen
sualism, narrowly conceived but not a little in
flated rationalism, and mechanistic, mathematical
psychophysiology brought about a certain monotony
of views on mental diseases. Mental diseases were
differentiated and classified in accordance with
their external manifestations . . . Introspection
of the observer, his sensations, and empirical des
criptions of various details of human behavior
became the substance of psychiatry.
(pp. 274-275)
As medicine and philosophy returned to direct human experience
and reliance upon reason, empiricism and its resulting Western
Science perspective became the only method which could be trusted
to yield accurate understandings of humans or nature, or of human
nature.

The "psychological" or sense philosophies of Locke (1690/

1952) and Hume (1748/1952) understood that natural deficits of sense
and reason were responsible for the deviations of the madman.

The

phenomena of madness was in this way returned to the realm of nature
and humanness, and the natural science of human madness or unreason
was born.
From these empirical understandings of human nature, rational,
scientific and "humane" perspectives of irrationality and madness
were then derived.

Rosen (1968) observed that beginning in this

period
Reason provided the norm; any divergence from the
norm was irrational. . .A sharp line was drawn be
tween reason and unreason . . . Thus, unreason and
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madness were exiled in thought on the basis of
conscious decision. From this viewpoint, irra
tionality took on a new aspect; it could be re
garded as a matter of choice, as a matter of
volition. Unreason, and with it insanity, were
related primarily to the quality of volition and
not to the integrity of the rational mind. En
dowed with reason, man was expected to behave
rationally, that is, according to accepted social
standards. Rational choice was his to make by
virtue of his nature.
Eccentric or irrational
behaviour, actions which diverged from accepted
norms, were considered as rooted in error or as
derangements of the will and therefore subject
to correction.
(p. 165)
Irrationality and its madness became understood as the separation
of humans from nature, from their nature, and from their natural
reason.

This derangement in human sensibilities, this unreason

ableness, arose from a loss of the human Psyche's contact with its
rightful, rational nature.

We are reminded here of the natural

disease myths of madness, as interpreted and elaborated by Hippoc
rates and Galen over fourteen hundred years earlier.

In viewing

madness from either a natural science or philosophical psychologi
cal perspective, the "loss of rational truth" or an "error in will",
demand intervention and disciplinary action to rectify the distortion
of madness.

This interest in reestablishing a more natural, reason

to Psyche "naturally" lead to what Rosen (1968), in his social analy
sis, has called
A form of tyranny depriving such individuals [madmen]
of their natural liberties . . .Society created in
stitutions to deal with irrational and disturbed be
havior in its own image. Their creation was the
product of a social order, characterized by certain
dominant attitudes. As the society underwent change,
these institutions came to be seen in another light
and were ultimately changed into something considered
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more appropriate. Yet that which was new bore tell-tale
characteristics of its ancestry.
It was within this
context that the concept of mental illness began to be
defined.
(pp. 170-171)
While holding madmen morally responsible for thier deviance,
"reformers” like Pinel (1745-1826), Tuke (1732-1819) and Rush
(1745-1813) began to operationalize and institutionalize these natur
al, humanistic and scientific accounts of madness.

Once conceptuali

zed as resulting from a deficit in human nature, madmen and madness
became increasingly confined to "safe" and "humane" institutions or
hospitals.

Deviance, irrationality and madness, when understood as

natural deficits in human functioning, could now become viewed as a
natural illness of the mind.

Those found to be mad must be empiri

cally observed and studied in prisons, asylums and hospitals.
development of an empirical "scientific"

The

understanding of madness

as mental illness became refined by physicians including Cullen
(1712-1790), Pinel (1745-1826), Charcot (1825-1893) and finally
Kraepelin (1855-1926), near the end of the Enlightenment period into
elaborate medical myths of madness.
These "scientific" medical accounts of madness, and the empiri
cal understanding of unreason, determined that the madman and his
madness should be safely removed and isolated from society, lest
society become infected.

This mental illness understanding of mad

ness which developed within this humanistic and rationalistic period
provides a perspective of madness which has remained dominant in
Western culture through the present.

Alexander and Selesniclc (1966)

in their review of this period find the origins

of their own
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psychiatric myth of madness noting that
Empiricism and rationalism, along with more sophisti
cated methods of observation and classification,
brought the problems of mental illness into sharper
focus and enabled men to regard the mentally ill with
more compassion.
(P. .132)
In re-viewing the following Renaissance and Enlightenment ac
counts of madness from a mythic perspective, we may find not only
the origins and development of our own "modern" myths of madness,
but also an occasion to re-view, understand and see through our
contemporary accounts of Psyche’s madness.
Alchemical Myth of Madness
Paracelsus (1493-1541), the itinerant Renaissance healer and
philosopher, understood through his alchemical account of madness
a natural disorder due to unhealthy changes in an individual's
spiritus vitae, the natural life spirit.

As Paracelsus was engaged

with the transmutation of natural forces and elements, he searched
for a method of access to the archeus, the all-pervading principle
directing individual life.

Paracelsus considered direct experience

of nature the only acceptable method of access to this knowledge, and
relentlessly attacked anyone who would not face the "reality" of
nature and its laws.

Heer (1966) observed that Paracelsus

had become convinced of the uselessness of ab
stract general principles in the face of the
concrete individual circumstances of life. Men
tal health, physical health, spiritual health...
were matters which were intimately united and for
this reason he did all he could to reconcile
man to that fearful, terrible thing - nature.
(p. 238)
Paracelsus considered nature much more than man, writing that more
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than three-quarters of the world was beyond human contact.

Heer

(1966) wrote that for Paracelsus
nature was a dark and mighty power pregnant with
secrets, a power in which good and evil, God and
the devil, freedom and necessity, cosmos and cha
os, were all intimately united. Man must submit
in suffering obedience to this deadly world of
fearful forces and to its intervention in his
affairs.
This terrible thing, nature, is ultim
ately nothing less than the dark side of God
himself, in which he is pleased to hide himself
completely. Nature, and through nature, God, is
revealed to man in the struggle waged by all
living things.
The "order of nature" is pre
served only by constant stresses. . . He had dis
covered that nature was not to be rifled of her
secrets and that the human mind was bound up
with nature . . .Paracelsus believed that the
human mind can experience nature, and the human
soul can experience God, only through a process
of obedient service.
(p. 238)
Since madness, for Paracelsus, could no longer be understood
through a demonic account, due to possession, witchcraft or any
thing unnatural or supernatural, the madman must then be carefully
observed and examined for any natural signs which would reveal the
specific "nature" of his malady.

(Even today it is common for a

therapist to inquire into the "nature" of a madman's problem or com
plaint. )
Paracelsus also saw a connection between the natural movement of
the stars and planets and certain forms of madness, however, he ob
served that madness, such as "lunacy" effected
not others.

some individuals and

In his De Natura Rerum (Concerning the Nature of Things),

Paracelsus (1616/1894) explained
The stars compel one and do not compel another...
The wise man can dominate the stars, and is not
subject to them...The stars compel and coerce the
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animal man, so that where they lead he must follow...
Man does not know or estimate himself or his powers,
or reflect that he is a lesser universe, and has the
whole firmament with its powers hidden within himself
...In order to grasp these things it must be remembered
that stars are of two kinds - terrestrial and celestial.
The former belong to folly jmadness} , the later to wis
dom. And these are two worlds, the lesser and the
larger, and the lesser rules the larger, so also the
Star of the Microcosm govern and subdues the celestial
star. God did not create the planets and stars with
the intention that they should dominant man, but that
they, like other creatures, should obey him and serve
him. And although the higher stars do give the inclin
ation, and as it were, sign man and other earthly bodies
for the manner of their birth, yet the power and that
dominion are nothing, save only a predestined mandate
and office, in which there is nothing occult or abstruse
remaining, but the inner force and power is put forth
through the external signs.
(p. 176)
It has been suggested by Zilboorg and Henry (1941) that what
Paracelsus was attempting to articulate here was the biological or
instinctual origin of madness, perhaps a precurser of the contem
porary psychoanalytic myth of madness Ttfhere id impulses must be
properly understood and controlled lest the individual succumb to
animal forces and lose control over his life and destiny through the
weakening of his rational forces or ego processes.

Indeed, Freud's

discussion of the relationships between id impulses and ego pro
cesses in his The Ego and the Id (1923/1952), although written al
most four-hundred years later,

concerns this same experience of

mad

ness to which Paracelsus seems to refer.
The ego develops from perceiving instincts, to con
trolling them, from obeying instincts to curbing them.
In this achievement a large share is...partly a reactionformation against the instinctual processes in the id.
Psychoanalysis is an instrument to enable the ego to
push its conquest of the id further still, (p. 715)
Freud's use of ideas such

as controlling or obeying the instincts
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do parallel Paracelsus' thinking and, although Freud used words
like "reaction-formation" metaphorically, and certainly much less
literally than Paracelsus' laboratory usage implied, these too have
their origin and usage in alchemical practice.

Our interest here,

however, is not to derive current thought or theory from earlier
periods but through abduction to observe similarity of meaning in
the process through which Psyche proceeds to understand its madness.
For Paracelsus, madness occurred when an individual's divine spirit
(noble reason) was subjugated by his lower animal instincts,
especially lust, covetousness and the passions of the soul in general.
Eros, this same sexual instinct also unquestionably provides the
dominant theme within most psychoanalytic theory and practice.
his

In

Liber De Lunatics (The Lives of Lunatics), translated in Pagel

(1951), Paracelsus explained how
Each star corresponds to an animal with its charac
teristic emotional behavior and also to a single
passion of man. When he falls prey to these passions,
the star awakens in him the one that corresponds to
its own animal nature...Lunacy spells the victory of
"animal nature" over the divine spirit in man...that
spirit by which he is raised above and protected from
the stars.
(p. 150)
In Paracelsus' understanding of Psyche's madness, this con
stitutional weakness to the influence

of the stars, we may find a

certain "likeness" with present day biogenetic myths of madness
(Wynne, et al., 1978; Kidd, 1973) which find in genes the literal
cause of Psyche's madness, an unnatural metabolism and disordered
chemical reactions in the madman's brain.

This connection of mean

ing between external astrological constitutions of the madman and
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his internal genetic constitution,

this confluence in meaning of

constitutional madness, "stars" and "genes", the "microcosm in the
madman", reaches also to Jung’s archetypal myth of Psyche's madness.
Here we find Paracelsus' animal-star madness carried by psychoid
entities, both biogenetic and astro-divine, the archetypes (Jung,
1952/1969).
Even as Paracelsus warned of the dangers during the treatment of
madness of the effects of excessive action of his alchemical elements
such as Sulphur, today we find concern within biological psychiatry
for toxic levels of Lithium (another element) and the ever-present
danger of extra-pyramidal side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia
which may occur in the course of treating a madman's disordered, un
balanced constitution (Gunderson, 1977; Kline, 1977; Gerlach, et al.,
1974).

I-Iere we are returned to Paracelsus' interest in restoring a

more natural balance of the elements within the human microcosm, to
the animal-star/animal-man constitution within the madman.
For Paracelsus, this interaction between the animal-star and
the animal-man forces within the madman was an application of the
principle of "Sympathy" which he understood as the main force in the
cosmos.

Paracelsus undei'stood through this principle a concept very

similar to that of epistrophe proposed by Plotinus

over twelve

hundred years earlier, that in Psyche's madness "like unites with
like".

The madman must now be carefully observed and studied in

order to determine his own particular constitutional "inclinations"
or diagnosis, that is, the particular passions to which his madness
conforms and, therefore, the star or planet with which his madness
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is sympathetic and corresponds.

Further in Liber De Lunatics, for

example, Paracelsus writes of a madman who being "prone to meanness
has chosen Saturn as his wife . . .Hence in this case the cure must
be directed against Saturn" (Pagel, 1951, p. 150).
Jung, himself a Paracelsean scholar and an expert in the field
of alchemy, found considerable use within his own psychoanalytic
theory and practice for many of Paracelsus' ideas and concepts.
In what may be considered an archetypal account or myth of
madness, Jung (1948/1969) wrote
The chief danger is that of succumbing to the fascin
ating influence of the archetypes, and this is most
likely to happen when the archetypal images are not
made conscious.
If there is already a predisposition
to psychosis [madness] , it may even happen that the
archetypal figures, which are endowed with a certain
autonomy anyway on account of their natural numinosity,
will escape from conscious control altogether and be
come completely independent. . .(p. 39) Under certain
conditions the unconscious is capable of taking over the
role of the ego. The consequences of this exchange is
insanity and confusion. . .The autonomy of the arche
types therefore begins where emotions are generated.
Emotions are instinctive, voluntary reations which
upset the rational order of consciousness by their
elemental outbursts.
(p. 278)
Here again, as with Freud, we find an understanding of the human
Psyche and its madness which has a similar pattern to Paracelsus'
alchemical understandings.

Although understood, perhaps, less

concretely and literally, Jung presents through his archetypal myth
a similar kind of force and power which can overwhelm Psyche into
madness.

Alchemical language is present also as the archetypes re

place stars with their "natural numerousity" and "elemental out
bursts ."
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This autonomous instinctual and potentially overwhelming power of
the archetypes and the further development of Paracelsus' notion of
cosmic "sympathy" within his concept of "synchronicity" may help us
connect another similarity of meaning between Renaissance and current
understandings of Psyche's madness.
In his Liber De Lunatics,

Paracelsus explained that an indivi

dual who becomes mad when his spirits vitae is overcome by his animal
passion and the influence

of the stars

must be talked to, admonished and encouraged to
confess in church; his disease must be explained
to him.
If he is not accessible to advice, he
must be taken into custody lest he lead astray
with his animal spirits, the whole town, his
house and the country.
(Pagel, 1958, p. 150)
Jung (1948/1969) over four hundred years later wrote from a simi
lar perspective of madness
Love and hate, joy and grief, are often
enough to
make the ego and the unconscious change
places.
Very strange ideas indeed can take possession of
otherwise healthy people on such occasions. Groups,
communities, and even whole nations can be seized
in this way by psychic epidemics.
(p. 278)
This idea and fear that the madman in his madness might precipitate
a

psychic infection in others was supported,

phenomena

at least in part,by the

of group madness called St. Vitus' dance.

This "epidemic"

of protracted group dancing to the point of exhaustion swept through
Western culture during Paracelsus' time.

He understood this group

madness through his alchemical myth as a particular disturbance of
spiritus vitae he termed chorea lasciva.

With the first part of

his diagnosis "chorea", Paracelsus affirms his chemicoastrological
understanding of this phenomena of madness as a natural disorder which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
required the application of a sulphur agent to sedate the brain,
support the healing power of the soul, and aid the establishment
of a proper relationship to the sun and moon.
Again, literally viewed, Paracelsus' alchemical myth or per
spective provides a parallel understanding to the current psychopharmacological myth of madness with its concern for blood level
titrations, therapeutic windows and indexes, for the balancing of
electrolytes, and achieving the desired sedative effects.

Just as

Paracelsus' empirically adjusted for the right balance and transmu
tation of elements in the brain, so now do the biologically orien
ted psychiatrists, in their engagement of Psyche's madness through
their psychopharmacological myths (Baldessarini, 1977a, 1977b;
Hollister, 1973, 1975).
Paracelsus also recognizes in the second part of his diagnosis
"lasciva" , a psycho-sexual nature to this hysterical group madness,
a sexual meaning which as mentioned above would later become a welldeveloped theme within the psychoanalytic myth of madness.
Zilboorg and Henry (1941) outline Paracelsus' intuitions, found
in his Von Den Krankheiten (1616/1894) regarding the role played by
imagination in various forms of madness.

Paracelsus developed

strikingly similar conclusions to those proposed by Freud (1917/1952)
in his General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis.

Zilboorg and Henry

(1941) wrote
He [Paracelsus] states that children do possess imagination,
in spite of all the assertions of the scholastic professors.
"Thus, the cause of the disease chorea lasciva is a mere
opinion and idea, assumed by imagination, affecting those
who believe in such a thing. This opinion and idea are the
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origin of the disease both in children and adults.
In
children the cause is also imagination, based not on
thinking, but on perceiving, because they have heard
or seen something. The reason is this: their sight
and hearing are so strong that unconsciously they have
fantasies about what they have seen or heard." As far
as is known this is the first reference to . . .uncon
scious motivaton. (p. 200)
Again, our interest here is not the conceptual or theoretical
development of an alchemical myth of madness into a psychoanalytic
or psychopharmacologic. myth, but rather the opportunity to view
and understand thematic connections based upon similarities of
meaning as they arise in various accounts of Psyche's madness.
Our concern with Psyche's experience of its madness takes
us away from linear, historical logical views of madness into
circular, reoccuring images, themes and myths of madness.

Similari

ties in the meaning of different myths of madness may occur within a
non-literal mythic perspective of Psyche.

That is, although per

haps concretely similar in appearance, purely literal accounts will
not necessarily yield meaningful connections for Psyche's experience
of its madness.

Understood only literally, alchemical and psychoana

lytic myths of madness appear to have little in common.

Paracelsus,

perhaps understanding a madman's spirits vitae in a very literal,
chemical and materialistic way, appears to have little in common
with more "psychological" myths of a madman's Psyche.

His literal

alchemical operations and treatments, his way of engaging madmen,
would be considered, through current myths of Psyche's madness, as
psychosomatic or psychopharmacological methods, not at all like the
metaphoric, imaginal or "psychological" understandings of Freud and
Jung.
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Viewed from a mythic perspective, however, similarities and
"likenesses" emerge.

Paracelsus' alchemical myth of madness directs

us first to the transmutation and transformation of Psyche's natural
elements.

When this alchemical process is viewed mythically its

significance for Psyche and its madness remains in the realm of im
agination.

Paracelsus' alchemical operations on the elements of

salt, sulphur and lead during his engagement of madmen and their
madness was more importantly his operation on the bitterness, sul
phuric combustion and depressive slowness of the elements of mad
ness, his engagement of the stinking, smoking, disolving, character
istics of the human Psyche's madness.

The sulphuric sedation of

mania in the madness of St. Vitus dance, viewed mythically becomes
the transmutation or transformation of the imprisoned physical
natural material of Psyche's expressions into a less material,
less natural, less physical experience and expression of itself.
The alchemist's opus contra naturam, a work against Psyche's natural
material, viewed through a mythic perspective moves Psyche from a
natural material madness to a madness which naturally matters.
Alchemically engaged, the madman and his madness are exposed to all
the terrible freeing processes of putrefaction, mortification, pul
verizing and dissolution.

Through madness understood from this

perspective all the natural material aspects of the madman's impri
sonment and stuckness in the animal-star natural world can be made to
dissolve, evaporate or be ground or rubbed away. Paracelsus searched
for the precise alchemical methods, both chemical and astrological,
which were needed to dissolve, purify, and recrystalize Psyche,
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to transmute and transform Psyche from its natural leaden madness,
a madness trapped in and by nature and by its nature, into a firery
gold unnatural experience of Psyche, contra naturam, true not to a
material nature of Psyche, but rather true to what naturally matters
to Psyche, an experience, if necessary, of Psyche against Nature.
It is interesting that in his last major work, Mysterium Coniunctionis, Jung (1956/1970) from the perspective of his own
archetypal myth of madness wrote
The physical goal of alchemy was gold. . .the
spiritual one was the rebirth of the (spiritual)
light from the darkness of Physis: healing selfknowledge and the deliverance of the pneumatic
body from the corruption of the flesh.
(p. 90)
Beginning, perhaps, with Paracelsus and continuing through the
present, Psyche's madness was increasingly identified and understood
through its relationships to the external, material, natural world.
As reason began to identify the laws of nature, the experiences of
madmen, Psyche's experience of its madness, were increasingly iden
tified as lacking any natural law and as lacking any reason.
Philosophical Myths of Madness
For Locke (1632-1704), and for many others since him who have
viewed madness from a philosophical or rational-empirical perspective,
madmen are understood to be suffering from a natural deficit in their
ability to think and therefore act properly.

Madness is understood

through this myth as a problem of disordered reasoning and behaving.
Since all Psyche's knowledge of itself and the external world is
acquired through reason from direct observation and experience, any
unreasonable thoughts or actions (madness) are flaws in Psyche to be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

corrected through proper management and re-training.

With the

beginning of this total reliance upon reason aid empiricism as the
source of all knowledge, the scientific period in Western culture
began and with it the scientific understanding of madness.
This philosophical or scientific perspective, with its combin
ation of inductive methods (empirical observation) and deductive
methods (rationalistic hypothesizing), interpreted madness or unrea
son as the result of a cessation of reason, a disruption in the
ordering process which naturally guides the human Psyche.

Reason

is recovered or re-established within this perspective through en
couraging or compelling the return of reason to Psyche.

This return

of reason then allows, once again, the application of rational thought
to the external world.
Locke (1690/1952), a primary spokesman for this perspective,
understood that all knowledge originated in experience, from sense
perceptions, and he differentiated between external perceptions
(sensation of objects) and internal perceptions (sensations of
feelings and desires).

Much like many contemporary behaviorists,

Locke proclaimed
I must appeal to experience and observation . . .the
best way to come to truth being to examine things as
they really are, and not to conclude they are, as we
fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to
imagine, (p. 147)
Whenever possible, but especially with regard to madness, Locke attem
pted to avoid any recourse to "fancy" and "imagination" in order to
understand Psyche's experience of itself.
Heer (1966) observed that the growing authority of mathematics
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and science during the Enlightenment period was considered by Hobbes,
Locke and their contemporaries as "the pure science which would rescue
man from barbarism, darkness and passions by throwing a bridge over
the chaos of the instinctual drives" (p. 369).

This is, perhaps, more

Locke's philosophical myth of madness viewed through the later psycho
analytic myth of I-leer's time, but it jus Locke's renounciation of the
older physical, cosmological and

theological systems of the medieval

period, his exhaultation of reason, and his ideas regarding the moti
vation of pleasure and pain which laid much of the foundation for
Freud's later psychoanalytic myth of madness.

For Locke, the human

Psyche is, at birth, a blank white paper void of all character.

Indi

viduals learn to reason by dealing directly with their environment,
learning about the external world and asserting themselves in their
own self-interest.

In his essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke

1690/1952) observed
Things then are good or evil, only in reference to
pleasure or pain.
That we call good, which is apt to
cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us;
or else to procure or preserve us the possession of
any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the
contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce
or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in
us; or else to procure any evil, or deprive us of
any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be under
stood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly
distinguished; though in truth they be only differ
ent constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned
by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of
the mind.
Pleasure and pain and that which causes them...are
the hinges on which our passions turn. And if we
reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under
various considerations, operate in us; what modi
fications, or. . .internal sensations they produce
in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of
our passions.
(p. 176)
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Although here again, with Locke, our primary interest is in
the meaningful connections between thematically similar myths of
madness rather than historical derivation, we may find in Locke's
position the origin of two dominant contemporary psychological myths
of madness.

The first is the psychoanalytic myth with its internal

focus on the role of the pleasure principle as outlined by Freud
(1920/1952) in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
In the psycho-analytic theory of the mind, we
take it for granted that the course of mental
processes is automatically regulated by the
pleasure-principle: that is to say, we be
lieve that any given process originates in
an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon
determines for itself such a path that its
ultimate issue coincides with a relaxation
of this tension, i.e., with avoidance of
"pain" or with production of pleasure.
(p. 639)
The second is the behavioral myth
role

with its external focus upon the

of reinforcing and punishing consequences (Skinner, 1969, 1971;

Bandura, 1969, 1971; Allyon et al., 1962, 1965).

Skinner (1969) from

his operant perspective of madness wrote
An experimental analysis permits us to relate be
havior to a history of I'einforcement and to other
variables such as deprivation . . . When a re
sponse occurs and is reinforced, the probability
that it will occur again in the presence of simi
lar stimuli is increased . . . Anxiety involves
emotional responses [passions) to a conditioned
aversive stimulus [pain or punishment), anticipa
tion to a conditioned positive reinforcer [pleasure
or reward] . (pp. 126-134)
Both of these contemporary psychological myths of madness rely
heavily upon not only Locke's literal understanding of the effects
of pleasure and pain within human experience, but also upon his
priniciples of empirical observation and the primacy of the human
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Psyche's own language-logic operations.

Thematic similarities

or parallels also exist with contemporary cognitive myths of mad
ness, where madness and unreason is identified and engaged in order
to strengthen and restore the proper rational operations of the
madman through re-training and persuasion.

Locke (1690/1952) wrote

Madmen. . .do not appear to me to have lost the
faculty of reasoning, but having joined together
some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for
truths; and they err as men do that argue right
from wrong principles. For, by the violence of
their imaginations, having taken their fancies
for realities, they make right deductions from
them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fan
cying himself a king, with a right inference re
quire suitable attendance, respect, and obed
ience: others who have thought themselves made
of glass, have used the caution necessary to
preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to
pass that a man who is very sober, and of a
right understanding in all other things, may
in one particular be as frantic as any in Bed
lam; if either by any sudden very strong im
pression, or long fixing his fancy upon one
sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been
cemented together so powerfully, as to remain
united.
(p. 146)
In cognitive myths or accounts similar to Locke's above, Bandler and
Grinder (1975, 1976), Ellis (1962, 1977).

Goldstein et al., (1966),

and Lazarus (1971, 1976) each provide contemporary rationalistic un
derstandings through which to engage Psyche's unreason.

These

philosophical myths of madness present and prescribe a variety of
similar interventions into Psyche's madness of unreason through which
to restore the madman including metacommunication, rational-behavior
training, and cognitive dissonance or restructuring.
externalization and treatment of Psyche's "irrational"

This rational
madness
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reaches Its most literal development in Skinner's (1957) dissection
and analysis of Psyche's "acoustic utterances" in terms of operant
theory, and in Bandler and Grinder's (1975, 1976) psycholinguistic
analysis of Psyche's "metacommunications" (including non-verbal) by
way of an external reference system of logical patterns derived from
transformational grammar theory and the logical positivistic philo
sophy of Wittgenstein (1922, 1953).
Here, as with Locke's myth, the rationalistic philosophical per
spective towards madness understands a madness of Psyche due to lapses
in the proper and correct operation of Psyche's rational, logical,
sensing functions.

In his Concerning Human Understanding Locke (1690/

1952) wrote
Those madmen who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract,
would hardly be able to understand and make use of langu
age, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree; but only
a little and imperfectly about things present, and very
familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the fore
mentioned faculties, if wanting or out of order, produce
suitable defects in men's understandings and knowledge.
(p. 146)
Through his philosophical myth, Locke understood a madness where
Psyche's reason, understanding, and therefore knowledge about itself
and the external world was inhibited by natural deficits in percep
tion and cognition.
Within Western culture the locus of supreme Reason (now enthron
ed) was found neither in the devine reason of God above, nor in the
demonic regions of the Underworld, but rather was now discovered within
the natural human Psyche itself.

This re-location of reason (and

unreason) required a corresponding shift or change in how the disrup
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tion of Psyche's natural reason and its remedy were to be imagined.
Increasingly, this highly "reasonable" attitude of the Enlightenment
period resulted in identifying all madmen found bereft of reason for
the purpose of segregating these individuals from those with their
reason as yet intact.

Locke (1690/1952) wrote

I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh
a name as madness, when it is considered that
opposition to reason deserves that name, and
is really madness; and there is scarce a man so
free from it, but that if he should always, on
all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he
constantly does, would not be thought fitter
for Bedlam than civil conversation.
If this [madness} be a weakness to which all men
are so liable, if this be a taint which so
universally infects mankind, the greater care
should be taken to lay it open under its due
name, thereby to excite the greater care in
its prevention and cure.
(p. 248)
Locke's philosophical myth established madness as a natural
distortion and aberration of Psyche's reason which could befall almost
anyone.

This condition of Psyche could be understood fully and

completely through its external manifestations in nature and there
fore required the natural psychological and physical interventions
common to the period.

As empirical science based on Locke's ra

tional philosophies increasingly understood and defined madness as
mental disease, Zilboorg and Henry (1941) observe that this new
"mental disease" of reason became
ascribed to the faulty functioning of body juices, par
ticularly in the blood and the brain, or of the fluid
which was supposed to flow through the nerves. Conseq
uently the treatment of mental diseases was character
ized by the same monotony in its methods, and the cen
tury distinguished itself by its addiction not only to
therapeutic bloodletting but also to blood transfusions.
(p. 275)
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Thus the cessation in the madman's natural flow of logic and reason
was understood quite literally as a circulation problem within his
head.

Although individuals by virtue of their endowment with reason

were expected to behave rationally (from their culture's perspective),
when maddened through derangement of the rational functions of Psyche,
madmen could now receive "corrective assistance and treatment" in
order to recover their rationality.

By the end of the Enlightenment

period Locke's philosophical, natural science myth of madness pre
scribed, according to Tulce (1882), a variety of physical "treatment"
such as blood letting and transfusions, and general acceptance that
confinement or restraint may be imposed as a punish
ment with some advantage, and on the whole, fear [was
considered] the most effectual principle by which to
reduce the insane to orderly conduct, (p. 99)
Viewing Locke's philosophical myth of madness from a mythic
perspective, we are first directed to the philosophy

and jin Psyche's

madness, or rather the madness of Psyche's philo-sophia, or love of
reason and wisdom.
of

Especially, we are shown the potential madness

Psyche's senses,Psyche's sense of madness, and even of Psyche's

sense jin madness.

Although understood literally, and engaged con

cretely, as a madness due to loss of reason, we may understand
Locke's perspective mythically as Psyche's sense of reason in mad
ness.

Locke (1690/1952) had a certain sense himself, of Psyche's

potential for understanding its madness when he observed
The ideas that are in a man's mind, simply considered
cannot be wrong. . .ideas are in themselves right,
and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge
...when we come to refer them to anything, as to their
patterns and archetypes.
(p. 248)
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We must not in passing miss an interesting philosophical twist here,
which momentarily places Locke in the tradition of imagination, an
almost neo-platonic. position (where Psyche's images and thoughts
are taken seriously as the primary

given).

From a mythic perspec

tive, Locke is pointing to a validity and "rightness" within Psyche's
unreason, a valid madness imagined right within Psyche's own reason
ableness, rather than just externally as a literalized perspective
of madness within the material object-world.

As with other earlier

myths of madness we are to see through Locke's myth to a sense of
reason in the madman's experience, a sense of reason within Psyche's
unreason, the aperception of logos within pathos, the pathology it
self .
Viewed from a mythic perspective, the pleasure-pain logic and
contingencies in the material object-world become fused within Psy
che's experience of its madness.

The

madness of pleasure and mad

ness of pain can, for example, unite at an imaginal level, as in the
human Psyche's experience of masochism.

Here in an alchemical opus

contra naturam, Psyche reverses the basic "opposites" of its ex
ternal literal experience of life into an Eros of suffering, a
pleasure in pain —

a pain in pleasure.

This painful pleasure of

Psyche in its unreason does not eliminate the experience of punish
ment and reinforcement, but rather places them and their maddening
sensations within a new reason of Psyche, a novum philosophorum a
new, renewed love of reason —

a new reason to love.

Just as Galen's earlier natural disease myth of madness returned
madness from the gods to Psyche, returned Psyche's madness to its
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natural dis-ease, so too Locke's philosophical myth returns madness
from God to Psyche, aid returned Psyche to the madness of reason, its
own reason, the reason in its own madness.

More importantly Locke's

philosophical myth directs us to a renewal in the madness of the
human Psyche's love of reason (philo-sophia), and to the madman's
renewal.of his reason to love.
As Psyche's madness of reason became further described and
understood as a disorder of thinking and reason, and as the safety
of society demanded that this unreason be engaged only in controlled
surroundings, the stage was set in Western culture for the birth of
the insane asylum, "that happy age when madness was finally recogni
zed and treated according to a truth to which we had too long re
mained blind" (Foucault, 1961/1965, p. 241).
Moral Myth of Madness
During the Enlightenment period in Western culture, empirical
observation, description and cataloging of nature became the primary
activities within the natural sciences.

This empirical, and material

natural science perspective also proved to provide a concrete means of
separating Psyche's reason from unreason, Psyche's sanity from in
sanity.

With methods for establishing a natural science of Psyche's

deviance and abnormality, madness became understood primarily as a
mental illness, and the province of medicine.

Increasingly under

stood as suffering from diseases of the mind, madmen were placed in
large prison-like hospitals and carefully observed.

Containment and

segregation from society were not alone sufficient to engage and
treat Psyche's madness, however, and as Foucault (1961/1965) wrote
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the meaning of exclusion and of confinement begins to
alter: it slowly assumes positive values, and the
neutral, empty, nocturnal space in which unreason was
formerly restored to its nothingness begins to be
peopled by a nature to which madness, liberated, is
obliged to submit.
Confinement, as the separation
of reason from unreason, is not suppressed; but at
the very heart of its intention, the space it occupies
reveals natural powers, more constraining for madness,
more likely to subjugate it in its essence, than the
whole of the old limiting and repressive system. Mad
ness must be liberated from that system so that, in
the space of confinement, now endowed with a positive
efficacity, it will be free to slough off its savage
freedom, and to welcome the demands of nature that
are for it both truth and law.
(pp. 195-196)
Madmen, now understood as depraved and mentally ill, required
firm moral guidance, direction and "humane" treatment within the
safety of a hospital or asylum.
Pinel (1745-1826) understood Psyche's "mental illness" through
a moral myth which recognized the madman's problems as a result of
the power of Psyche's passions to overthrow reason.

Although he

also considered that in some cases the severity of the madman's af
fliction might be increased by lesions in the brain, Pinel, himself,
found no empirical grounds to support a purely physical understanding
of madness, a more physical disease myth required the physiological
observations of the next century.

One only had to observe Psyche's

madness in captivity to appreciate this excess of passion as the dom
inant factor in the madman's mental illness.

In his Traite Medico-

philosphique (A Treatise on Insanity) translated in Zilboorg and
Henry (1941), Pinel wrote
it would be making a bad choice indeed to start
a vague discussion on the seat of reason and on
the nature of its diverse aberrations; nothing
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Is more obscure and Impenetrable. But If one wisely
confines one's self to the study of the distinctive
characteristics which manifest themselves by outward
signs and if one adopts as a principle only a con
sideration of the results of enlightened experience,
only then does one enter a path which is generally
followed by natural history; moreover, if in doubtful
cases one proceeds with reserve, one should have no
fear of going astray.
(p. 329)
Regarding his understanding of the origin of Psyche’s madness Pinel
(Zilboorg and Henry, 1941) further observed that
I leave it to others to decide whether the analysis
of the functions of human understanding has added
much to our knowledge of mental disturbances.
But
another analysis,, . .of human understanding is that
of the passions, of their undertones, their varying
degrees, their violent outbreak, their varied com
binations. . .Derangement of the understanding is
generally regarded as the result of an organic lesion
of the brain and therefore as incurable— which in
many cases is contrary to anatomic observations„
Public mental asylums have been considered places
of confinement and isolation for dangerous patients
and pariahs. Therefore their custodians, who in
most cases are inhuman and unenlightened, have
taken the liberty of treating these mentally sick in
a most despotic, cruel, and violent manner, though
experience continually shows the happy results of a
concilating attitude, of a kind and compassionate
firmness. . .the blind routine of a great number of
medical men has moved always within the narrow circle
of numerous bloodlettings, cold baths, and violent
and repeated showers, with almost no attention paid
to the moral side of the treatment. (pp. 336-337)
In rejecting as he did both a purely philosophical or cognitive
understanding of madness and a purely medical or physical disease
myth of madness, Pinel argued for a concrete empirical understanding
of Psyche's madness ba.sed on direct contact with the madman and on

careful description of the unique system of "amoral" habits within
which the madman operated.

By refusing a philosophical or cognitive

way of relating to Psyche's madness, Pinel attempted to understand
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the specific literal details of the madman's immediate experience
and his unique way of becoming deranged.
Pinel's interest in more immediate and direct contact with the
madman's "amoral" condition and the specific deviance of his personal
characteristics provides an example of an "understanding", verstehen,
attitude toward Psyche's madness.

Although quite literal and con

crete in its expression, Pinel’s idiopathic approach to the madman's
experience appears similar to and is reflected in the later more imaginal and eloquent myths of madness developed by Jaspers (1963),
Laing (1962) and others.
Again, in his Treatise, Pinel

(Zilboorg and Henry, 1941) wrote

I abandoned the dogmatic tone of the physician; fre
quent visits, sometimes lasting several hours a day,
helped me to familiarize myself with the deviations,
shouting,: and madness of the most violent maniacs. I
held repeated conversations with whftever men know best
their former condition and their delirious ideas. Extreme
care is necessary to avoid all pretentions of self-esteem
and many questions on the same subject if the answers are
obscure.
I never object if patients make equivocal or im
probable remarks but postpone my questions to a later
examination, for the purpose of enlightenment and correc
tion.
I take careful notes on the facts observed with
the sole object of having as many accurate data as
possible. . . .
The habit of living constantly in the midst of the in
sane, of studying their habits, their different person
alities, the objects of their pleasure or their dis
likes, the advantage of following the course of their
alienation day and night during the various seasons of
the year, the art of directing them without effort
and sparing them excitement and grumbling, the gift
of being able to assume at the right time a tone of
kindness or of authority, of being able to subdue them
by force if methods of kindness fail, the constant pic
ture of all the phenomena of mental alienation, and
finally the functions of supervision itself — the com
bination of all these must give an intelligent and zea
lous man an immense number of facts and minute details
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usually lacking in the narrow-minded physician
unless he has taken a special interest during
fleeting visits to asylums, (pp. 339-340)
Through Pinel's interest in developing a direct understanding of
Psyche's "human" madness, rather than merely explaining or describ
ing it, we may also find similarity with

contemporary "humanistic"

moral myths of madness, such as those by Arieti, Dabrowski, Ellis,
Lidz, Maslow, Mosher, Perry, Peris, Rogers and Wynne.
There is also a hint

here, in Pinel's understanding of Psyche's

madness (though, again, quite concrete in its expression) of what
Bateson (1972, 1979) has come to call "context", or pattern through
time, which is very close to my meaning of myth (after Hillman, 1975b,
1979).

Pinel, in his devotion to the particular literal enactments

of Psyche's "human" madness, enters the madman's specific "amoral"
context or myth, for the purpose of guiding him back to sanity
through humane "moral" treatment.

We are reminded here of earlier

"primitive" shamanic myths which emphasized direct involvement by a
shaman within the madman's particular "disordered" realm of exper
ience, and the need for intervention by a shaman to return the mad
man's lost soul to his "human" body and to his group.
Both Arieti (1974) and Dabrowski (1964), for example, under
stand through their respective developmental myths a madness of the
human Psyche which, when engaged directly by "well-trained" empathic psychotherapists (who are trying to understand human unreason),
can progress and develop from decompensation and disintegration to
levels of psychological functioning superior to that prior to the
onset of madness, including the re-establishment of human relatedness
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within their group and the reorganization of the madman's person
ality.

Mosher (1975) and Perry (1976) have both established special

"humane" therapeutic centers where, like Pinel, they are able to
directly observe and engage Psyche's literal human enactments of
madness.

They have both described the possibility of Psyche's re

birth and renewal through natural healing processes which the madman
might experience when in close relationship with non-judgemental
supportive "guides".

Lidz (1973) and Wynne et al. (1978) in their

familial myths of Psyche's madness have also described how madmen,
regressed and out of communication within their families' context,
may be "reached" and

achieve re-entry to their families and their

groups following careful, detailed attention to and analysis of
their particular literal patterns of human communication and exper
ience.

These similarities of pattern between moral and developmen

tal-familial accounts of madness may help us see through the literal
details of a particular "humanistic" myth or account to a more gener
al theme or concern of Psyche's madness for the "human" madman and
those in his group.
Pinel (Shershow, 1977) considered "human nature" the provence
of both madness and its cure.

He stated

insanity was curable in many instances, by mildness
of treatment and attention to the state of the mind
exclusively. . .To give all their value to the facts
which I had the opportunity of observing, I made it
an object of interest to trace their alliance with the
functions of understanding. . .as well as perusal of
those authors who have written on the influence of the
passions upon the pathology of the human minds. . .1
saw with wonder, the resources of nature when left to
herself, or skillfully assisted in her efforts, (p. 27)
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Pinel’s moral understanding of the human Psyche expands
and broadens the range of Enlightenment myths of Psyche's madness
through adding morality to reason as the second essential element
of human sanity.

In addition to the criterion of human reason, Psy

che must now also meet moral standards to avoid madness.

The essen

ce of Western culture's "humanism", this "humanistic" movement of
Psyche, culminated in the "sane" human Psyche personified as homo
rationalis moralis (H. R. M.).

Similarly, reflected explicitly

in

contemporary "humanistic" psychologies (Ellis, 1973, 1979; Maslow,
1968, 1971; Peris, 1966; Rogers, 1961, 1977), we again find an ex
pression of the Royal

Majesty of Psyche's human reason and morality,

interpreted within an individually human perspective of Psyche, at
ego's "gut" level.

Fagen and Shepherd (1970) have summarized this

contemporary "humanistic" understanding of Psyche's madness by
stating
with the development of the "third force" in psy
chology [humanistic^ , which concerns itself with
man in his humanness. . .and view problems in living
as difficulties in relating and communicating, there
has been a marked shift in interest toward positive
aspects [more moral] of personality and living. . .
Now we use words such as enhancement, intimacy, ac
tualization, creativity, ecstasy, and transcendence
to describe what we wish for ourselves and for others.

(p. 1)
Pinel's view of Psyche's madness stressed morally positive en
hancement of the madman's potential for transcending

his "unactual

ized" condition and also wished his patients to become "more humane",
that is, more sane.

This perspective which equates more human with

more sane will be viewed in relation to contemporary socio-political
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myths of madness as well, but becomes fully developed in Pinel's
(Shershow, 1977) account of madness where
a young man, already depressed by misfortune, lost
his father, and in a few months after a mother,
whom he tenderly loved. The consequence, was,
that he sunk into a profound melancholy; and his
sleep and appetite forsook him. To these symptoms
succeeded a most violent paroxysm of insanity. At
a lunatic hospital, whether he was conveyed, he was
treated in the usual way, by copious and repeated
blood-letting, water and shower baths, low diet,
and a rigorous system of coercion. Little or no
change appeared in the state of the symptoms. The
same routine was repeated, and even tried a third
time without success, or rather with an exaspera
tion of the symptoms. He was at length transferred
to the Asylum deBicetre, and with him the character
of a dangerous maniac. The. governor, far from plac
ing implicit confidence in the accuracy of this re
port, allowed him to remain at liberty in his own
apartment, in order more effectually to study his
character and the nature of his derangement.
The
sombrous taciturnity of this young man, his great
depression, his pensive air, together with some
broken sentences which were heard to escape him on the
subject of his misfortunes, afforded some insight in
to the nature of his insanity.
The treatment most
suitable to his case was evidently to console him, to
sympathize with his misfortunes, and, after having
gradually obtained his esteem and confidence, to
dwell upon such circumstances as were calculated to
cheer his prospects and to encourage his hopes.
These means having been tried with some success, a
circumstance happened which appeared at once, to
give countenance and efficiency to the consolatory
conversations of the governor. His guardian, with a
view to make his life more comfortable, now thought
proper to make small remittances for his use; which
he promised to repeat monthly. The first payment
dispelled, in a great measure, his melancholy, and
encouraged him to look forward to better days. At
length, he gradually recovered his strength. The
signs of general health appeared in his countenance.
His bodily functions were performed with regularity,
and reason resumed her empire over his mind. His
esteem for the governor was unbounded. This patient,
who had been so egregiously ill treated in another
hospital, and consequently delivered to that of
Bicetre as a furious and dangerous maniac, is now
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become not only very manageable, but, from his affectionate
disposition and sensibility, a very interesting young man.
In the moral treatment of insanity, lunatics are not
to be considered as absolutely devoid of reason, i.e., as
inaccessible by motives of fear and hope, and sentiments
of honour. . .In the first instance it is proper to gain
an ascendancy over them, and afterwards to encourage them.
(pp. 23-24)
Pinel, through his direct experience in reorganizing, natural
izing, and institutionalizing the large Bicetre and Salpetriere hos
pitals of Paris during the French Revolution, developed an under
standing of the social and political dimensions of Psyche's madness.
From Foucault's (1961/1965) contemporary perspective of Pinel's moral
myth
nature constrains the violence of desire; insofar as it
is truth, it reduces anti-nature, and all the hallucin
ations of the imaginary „ . . The return to the immediate
literal and concrete is effective against unreason only
insofar as the immediate is controlled— and divided against
itself; an immediate in which violence is isolated from
truth, savagery separated from liberty, in which nature
can no longer recognize itself in the fantastic figures
of antinature.
In short, an immediate in which nature
is mediatized by morality.
In a space so arranged, mad
ness will never again be able to speak the language of
unreason, with all that in it transcends the natural
phenomena of disease. It will be entirely enclosed in
a pathology. A transformation which later periods have
received as a positive acquisition, the accession, if
not a truth, at least of what would make the recogni
tion of truth possible.
(pp. 196-197)
Pinel also provides one of the earliest observations, within
Western culture, of the intimate relationship between the madman's
particular understanding of his experience and the particular way the
madman is understood and engaged by his social group.

In his Treatise,

Pinel (Zilboorg and Henry, 1941) directs our attention to the signifi
cance of context in Psyche's experience of madness.
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The mental patients had previously been treated
with traditional methods one or many times at
the Hotel-Dieu, and they were afterwards brought
to the Bicetre so that the complete, permanent
re-establishment of their reason might be achie
ved — a fact which could not fail to impair my
results. The use of chains to restrain a great
number of mental patients was still widely ac
cepted — they were not removed until three years
later. How were we to distinguish between the
exasperation caused by the chains, and the
symptoms peculiar to the illness?
(p. 341)
This appreciation for the influence and the effect of "diagnosis"
and "treatment" upon Psyche's own experience and understanding of
its madness also finds a similarity and reflection in contemporary
socio-political myths of madness, such as those provided by
Foucault (1961/1965), Scheff (1966, 1967), Szasz (1970a, 1970b)
and Laing (1967, 1969).

As previously mentioned Ackerknecht

(1971) and Hillman (1975b) have, in their contemporary understand
ings of madness, provided accounts perhaps even more relativistic.
Foucault (1961/1965), however, has articulated this socio-political
perspective or myth of Psyche's moral madness most succinctly.
Madness, entirely confined within a moral intuition,
was nothing more than a disease . . .madness was now
detached from its truth which was unreason and. . .
henceforth nothing but a phenomenon adrift, insigni
ficant upon the undefined surface of nature, (p. 198)
Life in the asylum. . .permitted the birth of that
delicate structure which would become the essential
nucleus of madness — a structure that formed a kind
of microcosm in which were symbolized the massive
structures of bourgeois society and its values: Familychild relations, centered on the theme of paternal
authority; Transgression-Punchment relations, centered
on the theme of immediate justice; Madness-Disorder re
lations, centered on the theme of social and moral or
der.
It is from these that the physician derives his
power to cure.
(p. 274)
Pinel attempted through his moral myth to remain free of
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theoretical speculation and prejudice concerning the nature of
madness through complete reliance upon the objective empirical
methods of natural science and natural history.

In his Treatise

(Zilboorg and Henry, 1941) he wrote
The chief object of my research in the Bicetre has
been the history of the individual pheonmena of
mental alienation, and I have tried to determine
the various kinds of distinctive symptoms, the
differences between continuous and intermittent
mania, the rules to follow in the moral treatment
of mental disease, the supervision and intramural
regulations in similar hospitals, and finally cer
tain fundamentals for a medical treatment based
only on observation and experience. A medical work
published in France at the end of the eighteenth
century should have a character different from that of
a work produced at any other time; it should be
distinguished by a certain free play of ideas, by
a tempered frankness, and above all by the orderly
spirit of reserach which rules in all parts of
natural history.
(p. 341)
Shershow (1977, 1978) provides an interesting contemporary re
view and elaboration of this "moral" perspective of Psyche's
madness in which he argues that this approach should be revived
and integrated within current community mental treatment practices.
In his Schizophrenia:

Science and Practice (1978), he observed sim

ply that
Moral treatment stressed that the goal of treatment
is to encourage and facilitate the use by the patient
of his remaining healthy faculties.
The "insanity"
was taken for granted, and focus of the patient's
experience in the moral treatment centers was on
education, manual labor, and physical exercise.
Often repeated was the belief that the illness is in
timately bound to the personal life of the patient;
although it perhaps could not be cured, the moral
treatment could allow the person to live a useful
life.
(p. 6-7)
Shershow considered Pinel's methods of moral treatment the
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precursor of modern rehabilitation methods and noted that the pers
pective toward Psyche's madness is solidly
based on the assumption that one is in the presence
of a permanent impairment of functioning, and seeks
to nurture and develop those strengths that remain
relatively intact despite the impairment.
In parti
cular, the rehabilitative approach attempts to deal
with those secondary areas of impairment which,
rather than deriving from the primary pathology,
are rather sequelae of the hypothetical primary
pathologic process, (p. 14)
Boclcoven (1963, 1972), however, has identified many similari
ties (in his view already quite literally possible and extant)
bewteen Pinel's moral myth and treatment, and present practices
which may arise from within the community mental perspective or
myth of madness.

Bockoven (1972) wrote

The word "moral" in moral treatment and moral causes
bears within it an implication, too, about moral
responsibility, namely, that the mentally ill were not
morally responsible for their acts which were assumed to
result either from ignorance or incorrect understanding.
Indeed, to its founders, moral treatment of the mentally
ill was considered to be a moral mandate on those who
were more fortunate.
(p. 12) The events leading to what
are now called mental health services delivery system
bear sufficient similarity to the early history of
moral treatment to warrant referring to developments
since 1960 as the New Moral Treatment Era in American
psychiatry.
(p. 114)
. . .our present mental health
programs include the responsibility of attempting to
improve society's bungling efforts to compensate for
the cruelties of biological mishap, on the one hand,
and the aging process on the other, to the degree that
they affect the human nervous system. Nature does not
permit even the most socially and economically favored
of us to escape both. (p. 194)
In an attitude of moral concern again quite similar to Pinel's,
Bockoven (1972) further commented that
It is of great importance to the understanding of
forces with which modern psychiatry must contend
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to determine why moral treatment did not become an
enduring basic principle of psychiatric care rather
than a soon forgotten temporary success. A success
ful technique in whatever field of endeavor is not
ordinarily abandoned unless displaced by a still more
effective technique. Moral treatment, however, simply
passed out of existence.
It was followed by the void
of custodial care. (p. 20)
We cannot escape the conclusion that our society had,
until very recently, become less and less concerned
about the fate of its mentally ill during the very
years that its standard of living was increasing at
an ever more rapid tempo, (p. 31)
These similarities of pattern and understanding which arise
between Ninel's moral myth of madness and contemporary understand
ings or perspectives provide us less interest for their possible
use in an ontological analysis of mental health care than to help
us to see through these accounts to a moral concern of Psyche for
human madness, perhaps even to a moral within Psyche’s human madness.
From a mythic perspective, Pinel's moral myth of Psyche's mad
ness

directs us through the literal enactments of a madmen's "amor

al"human experience to

an amoral nature in Psyche's human madness,

and even an amoral madness of human nature.

This "break" of moral

madness, by way of the Latin morales, points to a break with "cus
tom", that is, with natural human custom.

Pinel's effort to bring

moral treatment to the madman, when viewed imaginally, reflects a
concern of society for returning Psyche from its uncustomary madness
to what is customary, and more usual and natural, returning Psyche
to its social custom, to what the madman's society understands to be
its usual and customary and natural madness.

This "uncustomary"

experience occurs when a madman becomes too passionate (from the
Greek pathos, or happenings), and points to an experience of madness
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whe r e too much is happening beyond what is customary,

an amoral

human experience of Psyche beyond custom and tradition.

A madness which is literally defined and understood to be un
reasonable, amoral and uncustomary requires separation and seg
regation from that which is human reason, morality and custom.
From a mythic perspective, this disconnection and segregation of
Psyche from its human custom and its human reason, now "detached
from its truth which was unreason.

. .nothing but a:phenomenon adrift,

insignificant upon the undefined surface of nature"

(Foucault, 1961/

1965,p.198) suggests an experience of Psyche outside of human
custom, beyond human reason, not "significant" to what is naturally
human.

We are asked by this moral myth of madness to consider the

unnatural and amoral customs and reasons of Psyche's human madness,
and the reason for Psyche's morals which are customary to its nature,
a nature which is outside of and beyond natural human nature, a
nature which is literally outside of and beyond human reason.
In reviewing Psyche's moral myth of human madness imaginally, we
begin to view Psyche's myth of human morality.

We also are moved to

review Psyche's myths of human custom, reason and nature, that is,
we are moved into an amoral perspective of human morality, reason
and nature, which for Psyche is customary.

Our move away from Pinel's

literal myth of Psyche's moral madness is then a move toward a review
of Psyche's image of human morality

La Pinel, a review of the

Enlightenment's "humanistic" moral of madness.
Pinel's faith and reliance upon empiricism, with its commitment
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to the direct observation and analysis of literal human events,
was and is a perspective which "by nature" required a moral res
ponsibility to provide moral ("mental health") "humane" treatment
to those who were "mentally ill".

This natural humanistic myth

dominated Western culture's perspective of Psyche's madness and
unreason, culminating at last in a carefully documented (DSM-III)
and logically developed medical myth of madness, a myth which
morally required the madman's social group to provide "humane"
care and treatment in order to return him from Psyche's madness
to human custom and human reason.

From his socio-political per

spective Foucault (1961/1965) wrote
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man
no longer communicates with the madman; on one
hand, the man of reason delegates the physician to
madness, thereby authorizing a relation only through
the abstract universality of disease; on the other,
the man of madness communicates with society only by
the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which
is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous
pressure of the group, the requirements of conformity.
As for a common language, there is no such thing; or
rather, there is no such thing any longer; the con
stitution of madness as a mental illness, at the
end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence
of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as already
effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered
imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the ex
change between madness and reason was made. The
language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason
about madness, has been established only on the basis
of such a silence.
(pp. x-xi)
Medical Myth of Madness
By the end of the Enlightenment period of Western culture,
the human Psyche's madness was understood almost exclusively within
a medical-science perspective, the

madman's experiences, itself,
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being identified as merely part of his mental illness.

This was,

of course, not a novel perspective of madness within Western culture,
we have already re-viewed the medical myths of Paracelsus, Avicenna,
Galen and Hippocrates.

However, following the development of the

infectious disease theory of illness, by Pasteur around 1865, and
with the support of Koch's new science of bacteriology, Bayle, Fourn
ier, and Kraft-Ebbing, near the close of the nineteenth century, were
able to establish the clear "casual" connection between the spiro
chete, Tre£onema_padJ1i d ™ , and the madness of general paresis
(syphilis).

With this connection, Psyche's madness was now "clearly"

demonstrated to be mnetal illness, a human disease of the mind.

The

madman's experience was understood as merely one of the results of a
disease in his brain.
These brain diseases had etiologies, ontologies and prognoses
which were largely knowable and predictable, and
madman's "symptoms" were sometimes

although the

.-.treatable, the diseases them

selves were often considered terminal.

The course of the madman's

illness could, for the most part, only be carefully observed, cate
gorized, and monitored until its inevitable conclusion.

The impor

tance of descriptive and diagnostic accuracy (the scientific method)
regarding Psyche's illness was, therefore, at times valued above any
particular attempt to treat the madman beyond providing him with some
manner of custodial care.
The responsibility for the observation, diagnosis and treatment
of Psyche's madness of the brain fell naturally to physicians like
Kraepelin (1855-1926), who, in the style of the medieval scholastics,
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methodically and meticulously sifted through the great quantities
of empirical data acquired from institutionalized madmen in order
to establish their elaborate, "scientific" nosological systems for
organizing Psyche's madness.

In his Lectures on Clinical Psychia

try, Kraepelin (1913) now considered by many the father of modern
psychiatry, stated that
The Science of Psychiatry, which, as its name
implies, is that of the treatment of mental
disease...From the medical point of view, it
is disturbances in the physical foundations
of mental life which should occupy most of
our attention...Insanity, even in its mildest
forms, involves the greatest suffering that
physicians have to meet. Only a comparatively
small percentage of mental cases are perman
ently and completely cured. . .And the insane
are dangerous, in some degree, to their neigh
bors , and even more so to themselves. . .
while sexual crimes and arson, and, to a less
extent, dangerous assaults, thefts and impos
tures are often committed by those whose minds
are diseased...
For all these reasons it is one of the physi
cian's most important duties to make himself,
as far as possible, acquainted with the nature
and phenomena of insanity. . .the endless misery
annually engendered by mental disease, (pp. 1-3)
Kraepelin's work, based on the observations of the many physicians
who treated Psyche's madness in the asylums of the nineteenth cen
tury, brought "organizational and conceptual clarity out of what
previously had been much diagnostic disarray and confusion" (Shershow, 1978, p. 9).

The medical-scientific myth of madness, having

once documented a characteristic onset, clinical course, and "in
evitable outcome" for a madman, could postulate an etiology of Psyche’s
madness exclusively observable and material, that is, organic.
Psyche's madness, understood literally as a disease of the
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brain, was therefore engaged literally through methods designed to
document and reveal the abnormalities in his brain.
constitutional,

Whether due to

infectious or metabolic causes, this certainty of

"disease brain" madness prompted Kraepelin's

(1917/1962) observation

A prime obstacle to understanding psychic processes
was until recently the insurmountable difficulty of
illuminating the delicate cerebral changes responsible
for them.
Postmortem examinations contributed signif
icantly to the advancement of the art of healing. . .
Revealed by p o st-mortem examinations were deviations
in the skull bones and meninges, vascular disease,
different degrees o f cerebral plethora, changes in
the weight, size and density of the brain, dilation
of brain cavities, brain damage, mollification, pus,
tumors, inflammations.
Particular attention was paid
to calcaceous deposits around the pineal gland, for
mations of bubbles in the vascular plexuses in brain
cavities, variations in color, softening or hardening
of brain tissue.
Physical changes — bleeding, palor,
p u trefaction — were doubtlessly often associated with
manifestations of p a rticular diseases.
(pp. 121-123)

Kraepelin, through his medical myth, identified three major groups of
diseases responsible for Psyche's madness, dementia praecox (now
schizophrenia after Bleuler), manical-depressive conditions, and
paranoia.

He wrote (1913), for example, regarding dementia praecox

The peculiar and fundamental want of any strong feeling
of the impressions of life, with impaired ability to
understand and to remember, is really the diagnostic
symptom of the disease. . . leave no doubt that, bes
ides the emotional barrenness, there is also a high de
gree of weakness of judgement and flightiness, although
the pure memory has suffered little, if at all. We
have a mental and emotional infirmity to deal with,
which reminds us only outwardly of the states of de
pression previously described. This infirmity is the
incurable outcome of a very common history of disease,
to which we will provisionally give the name Dementia
Praecox. . .
Besides the mental and emotional weakness, we meet with
other very significant features in the case before us.
The first of these is the silly, vacant laugh, which is
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constantly observed in dementia praecox. There is
no joyous humour corresponding to this laugh; indeed,
some patients complain that they cannot help laugh
ing, without feeling at all inclined to laugh. Other
important symptoms are making faces, or grimacing,
and the fine muscular twitching in the face which is
also very characteristic of dementia praecox. Then we
must notice the tendency to peculiar, distorted turns
of speech — senseless playing with syllables and words
— as it often assumes very extraordinary forms in this
disease. Lastly, I may call your attention to the fact
that, when you offer him your hand, the patient does
not grasp it, but only stretches his own hand out
stiffly to meet it. Here we have the first sign of a
disturbance which is often developed in dementia prae
cox in the most astounding way.
(pp. 22-24)
Kraepelin (1913) also provided an excellent descriptive account of a
twenty-two year old madman brought to an asylum with a "mental" dis
ease, which through today's psychiatric myth, might be initially dia
gnosed "acute schizophrenic episode", and later, perhaps diagnosed as
a case of "simple schizophrenia."
He belongs, it is said, to a healthy family, and did
well at school. A few weeks before his admission he
had some attacks of apprehension, and then became
disturbed, ill-balanced and absent-minded, stared in
front of him, spoke in a confused way, and expressed
vague ideas of sin and persecution. On admission, he
gave hesitating, broken answers, did sums and obeyed
orders, but did not know where he was. He hardly
spoke at all of his own accord, or at most muttered a
few almost incomprehensible words:
there was a war,
he could not eat, lived by the word of God; there
was a raven at the window that wished to eat his flesh,
and so on. Although he understood what was said to
him quite well, and even let his attention be easily
diverted, he did not trouble at all about his surround
ings, had no desire to make himself clear about his
position, and expressed neither apprehension nor de
sires. He generally lay in bed with a rigid, vacant
expression, but:often got up to kneel down or go about
slowly. All his movements showed a certain constraint
and want of freedom. His limbs remained for some
time in the position in which you placed them. If
you raised your arms quickly in front of him, he
imitated the movement, and he also clapped his hands
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when it was done before him. . .The patient's condition
improved in the course of the next few months. He be
came clearer, his behaviour was more natural, and he
had a distinct feeling of illness, but he remained
strikingly dull, apathetic, and devoid of ideas.
Nevertheless, he found employment outside, and only
came back to the hospital a year ago. He had thrown
himself in front of a train, losing his right foot and
breaking his left arm. This time he was collected
and clear about his surroundings. . .but spoke to none
of his own accord, and lay in bed dully, with a
vacant expression, without occupying himself or paying
attention to what went on around him. He alleged as
the reason for his attempted suicide that he was ill;
his brain had burst out a year before.
Since then he
could not think by himself; others knew his thoughts,
spoke about them, and heard if he read the newspaper.
The patient is still in the same condition today. He
stares apathetically in front of him, does not glance
round at his surroundings, although they are strange to
him, and does not look up when he is spoken to. Yet
it is possible to get a few relevant answers by ques
tioning him urgently.
(pp. 25-26)
In Kraepelin's (1913) analysis, Psyche's madness is understood
and contained by careful descriptions of the observations of the
madman's literal, concrete enactments, as they occurred within
his social group, and particularly within the asylum.

Kraepelin

further explained the madman's condition as
a state of dementia (the patient has now spent five
years in a nursing asylum, and has become quite
affected and demented). . .in which the faculty of
comprehension and the recollection of knowledge
previously acquired are much less affected than the
judgement, and especially than the emotional impulses
and the acts of volition which stand in closest re
lation to those impulses. . .The complete loss of
mental activity, and of interest in particular, and
the failure of every impulse to energy, are such
characteristic and fundamental indications that they
give a very definite stamp to the condition. . .To
gether with the weakness of judgement, they are in
variable and permanent fundamental features of de
mentia praecox.
(p. 26)
The physician was responsible to carefully and accurate identify
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which particular disease might be producing the symptoms observed
in a particular madman.

Arieti (1974), considered by many the

greatest living expert on Psyche's madness as viewed through a
medical perspective, wrote
Thus there is no doubt that Kraepelin deserves to
be considered the first author who differentiated
the disorder. Once he defined this syndrome,
Kraepelin tried his best to give an accurate descrip
tion of it. Like a man working at a microscope, he
described as many minute details as possible. His
monograph Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia (1919) re
mains. . .the most complete description of the symp
toms. . .Kraepelin considered dementia praecox an en
dogenous illness, that is, one not due to external
causes. At first he thought it was due to organic
pathology of the brain; later he felt that it might
be due to a metabolic disorder.
(p. 11)
Once Psyche's mental disease was carefully identified, this naturally
lead, where possible, to particular treatments, appropriate to the
particular prognosis which in turn had been derived from the madman's
diagnosis.

Kraepelin's medical myth of Psyche's madness most often

prescribed a "benevolent" form of treatment, provided this did not
interfere with the primary responsibility of the physician to provide
continual observation and analysis of the course of the madman's
disease.

Kraepelin (1917/1962) stated that regarding the advances

in psychiatric medical treatment,
An important step toward proper treatment was the
practice of keeping patients under constant sur
veillance. . .and confining newly admitted patients
to their beds. . .The result was that the most
offensive symptoms vanished almost altogether.
Illhumored patients were less resentful; excitable
patients became calm; stubborn patients became more
tractable; they gained weight.
These experiences
clearly proved to the doctor that the sick brain,
like every other unhealthy organ, needs rest above all

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127
else. Patients became calmer and less obstructive;
the atmosphere of the insane asylum became more like
that of a regular hospital. . .Once bed treatment
had significantly restricted seclusion of patients, a
further step forward could be accomplished. This was
the increased use of warm baths and especially of
protracted baths. . .After experience during the last
decade had shown that protracted baths, even if con
tinued for several days or weeks, had few adverse
effects of patients, they became indispensable ther
apeutic adjuvants. . .and therefore facilitate the
constant supervision of all patients.
They effectively
control stormy outbursts and greatly reduce the evil
of uncleanliness and the urge to destroy. . .We should
not fail to note that the solution of many difficul
ties faced by the older doctors is the contribution
of the chemical industry which in the last decade has
created an imposing list of new soporifics and seda
tives. The first sedative was chloral hydrate, rec
ommended by Liebreich. . .Such agents are rightly con
sidered expedients. . .for countless patients they are
An immeasurable blessing, and they are mainly respon
sible for bringing the quiet atmosphere of the hospital
into wards for the insane and removing much of the
horror that still feeds the imagination of the lay
public. Finally we should note that the overall prog
ress scored by medical science has contributed in
many different ways to the improvement of medical
practice in institutions for the insane, (p. 141-144)
Kraepelin's fundamental assumption was that Psyche's mental dis
eases were predetermined.

As Zilboorg and Henry (1941) have observed,

"not only the outcome of a mental disease is predetermined, but its
course as well.

. .There is a natural law governing mental disease

and it is this law which is to be the subject of psychiatric curio
sity" (p. 455).

For Kraepelin, this natural law of madness (per

haps in his sense of the Hippocratic tradition), closely connected
the madman's diagnosis with his prognosis.

Kraepelin (1917/1962)

Careful attention to the progress and termination
of mental disorders, information gleaned in some
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instances from autopsies, and insight into underlying
causes have made possible the juxtaposition of a
vast array of evidence and often diagnosis on the
basis of symptom pattern. . .We know now that the fate
of our patient is determined mainly by the develop
ment of the disease. We can often mitigate symp
toms and establish conditions that will favor recovery
but we can rarely alter the course of the disease.
Against this, our ability frequently to predict what
will happen keeps us from falsely assuming, as did
the older doctors, that our treatment will appreciably
influence the outcome of the disease, (p. 117)
Further, in an appraisal of the possibility for a successful
treatment from his medical-scientific perspective of Psyche's mad
ness Kraepelin wrote
We must openly admit that the vast majority of the
patients placed in our institutions are according
to what we know forever lost, that even the best
of care can never restore them to perfect health.
Our treatment probably makes life, endurable for
a vast number of mental cripples whose plight would
otherwise be intolerable, but only rarely does it
effect a cure. . .the best psychiatric therapy can
not eradicate the scourge of mental disease, (pp. 150-151)
His conclusion was that, like any other disease, Psyche's mental
illness must run its course.

Kraepelin's system (essentially the

same clinical nosology presently in use in Western culture today) re
quired an attitude toward the madman which was consistent with his
diagnosis.

From his personal biosocial perspective or myth of

Psyche's madness Millon (1969) has criticized that
Despite Kraepelin's rigorous application of the
disease concept...and his impressive synthesis
of biology and clinical description which gave
psychiatric medicine a tremendous impetus, his
view that inherent bodidy defects caused most
disorders encouraged a fatalistic attitude to
ward treatment, (p. 12)
This new disease myth of Psyche's madness offered the madman,
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in addition to symptom relief through sedation, baths and surgery,
"the kindly custody of a well-organized and well-conducted hospital
where he could await his [predetermined^ fate with the maximum com
fort his psychological condition, social position, and financial
ability would allow"

(Zilboorg and Henry, 1941, pp. 461-462).

When more "active" strategies of intervention were available and
provided for the madman, Kraepelin's medical-science myth still
reminded the physician of "the assumption that one is in the presence
of a permanent impairment of functioning, and seeks to nurture and
develop those strengths that remain relatively intact" (Shershow,
1978, p. 14), rather than attempt to engage the primary pathologic
process itself.
The medical-scientific myth of madness, dominant during our
present period in Western culture, offers us a view of Psyche's
madness,

not surprisingly,

quite similar to that of Kraepelin's.

Through noticing these similarities, and in some cases continuations,
of Kraepelin's myth of madness, we may move deeper into the signif
icance of this image of a mental disease of Psyche for the madman
within our own social groups.
With Kraepelin's localization

(and literalization) of Psyche's

madness within the madman's brain we find a "likeness" with many
contemporary somatic understandings and treatments as well as with
earlier primitive, classical and medieval myths which have under
stood Psyche's mad need for exorcism, extraction, humoral balancing
and chemical manipulation of the madman's brain.
Developed initially by the neurologist Moniz (1936) and

later
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by Freeman and Watts (1950) to "minimize emotional preoccupations",
the surgical theories and methods of severing or removing brain
tissue, leucotomy and lobotomy, have enjoyed renewed interest and
at least partial acceptance in the form of "psychiatric" or "cere
bral" surgery by individuals such as Knight (1965) and Sweet (1973),
and may also be found in recent research by Mark and Ervin (1970),
Valenstein (1973) and others.

Here the medical-scientific myth

directs us to a continued interest in literally modifying and al
tering the madman's diseased brain.

Attempts to reverse the pro

duction of Psyche's "abnormal" brain function also include the
insulin coma treatments by Sakel in the mid 1930's and the electroconvulsive therapies (ECT) of Cerletti and Bini (1938).

These

"somatic" treatments for the madman's diseased brain have found
continued acceptance within the psychiatric profession where re
newed interest has recently been focused upon new inhalation meth
ods of convulsive induction (Small, 1974), as well as new techni
ques of applying low-voltage, unilateral electrical stimulation to
the madman's brain (Erman et al., 1979; Fink, 1974).
In Kraepelin's efforts to return Psyche's madness to the mad
man's physical body, we may also find a "likeness" with "body myths"
which locate psyche's 'diseases, literally within the physical body
of the madman.

Techniques of breathing and movement, structural

integration and muscle massage, and other special bioenergetic
physical exercises developed by Lowen (1971), Reich (1969), and Rolf
(1958), work to release Psyche's madness from its body, thus freeing
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specific "dis-eases" trapped within Psyche's material body, in
order to establish within the madman more "normal" mind-body
functioning.
Within Kraepelin's medical-science myth we also find reflec
ted the many contemporary biochemical and genetic myths of madness
such as

those proposed by Creese et al., (1976), Frohmgn et al.,

(1971, 1973), Gottesman (1973), Kety (1959, 1979), and Kidd (1973).
Here attempts are made to combine, like Kraepelin, clusters of
symptoms into syndromes which are understood as the result of
specific "toxins", which eventaully will be literally discovered,
located, and identified within the madman's brain.

These "toxins",

often understood as resulting from genetic abnormalities, are con
sidered to be something literally physically present within the
madman, and which are responsible not only for damaging his brain,
often beyond repair, but also for directly "causing" his madness.
The present field of clinical psychopharmacology, with its
commitment to ascribe and prescribe specific drugs to treat specific
diseases, is considered by many (Baldessarini, 1977a, 1977b; Hollis
ter, 1973, 1975; Snyder, 1976) to be the only successful means of
engaging Psyche's diseased madness.

Hollister (1978), a well known

spokesman for the pharmacological perspective for engaging madness
has observed that no other treatment has proven as effective in
controlling Psyche's madness.
the symptoms.

"However, while these drugs control

. .they do not cure the disorder.

ients who are better, but none who are well"

We have many pat

(p. 152).

Kraepelin understood that physical and/or metabolic abnormality
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within the madman's brain could be carefully observed and classi
fied by means of their outward symptoms which, together with the
observed course of disease, could lead to an exact scientific dia
gnostic-prognostic system of Psyche's madness.
There have been, of course, numerous well-organized, interes
ting and apparently insightful criticisms which have recently been
leveled against this medical myth of madness and its limitations
(Ackerknecht, 1971; Frank, 1973; Hillman, 1975b; Mosher, 1975;
Perry, 1976; Savodnik, 1978; Sheff, 1967; Szasz, 1970b).

Hillman

(1975b), for example has written most eloquently from his arche
typal perspective of the primacy of the image of pathologizing and
how
The soul's fantasy of sickness necessitates subsequently
the persons and systems and materia medica for meeting
the fantasy. The medical model is merely one of the
modes for engaging the pathologizing fantasy, (p. 80).
Arieti (1974), also with characteristic insight, noted that
A great deal of resentment toward Kraepelinian
psychiatry, which may be noted in some circles,
is due, actually, not to an attempt to minimize
Kraepelin's accomplishments, but rather to a dis
pleasure with the tenacity with which his concepts
have been retained, [from Arieti's psychoanalytic
perspective]] even long after more penetrating ones
have been formulated.
(p. 12)
At the same time, however, there has been a continual development,
and recently a significant revival,of "Neo-Kraepelinian"methods of
understanding and engaging madmen.

Klerman (1977a, 1977b),

a

contemporary spokesman for "Neo-Kraepelinian" psychiatry, has iden
tified the importance and validity of the three components of the
"medical model".
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"The disease concept, the sick role, and the health care system,
are considered essential in society’s attempt to make sense of and
deal with the real phenomena of pain, distress, anguish and disability
experienced by certain individuals (madmen^' (Klerman, 1978, p. 107).
In an attitude which appears unmistakenly "Neo-Kraepelinian",
Klerman (1978) also envisions a medical-scientific myth of Psyche's
madness which will find common acceptance and application "throughout
the world", in the body of the newly revised and official Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition) (A. P. A . ,
1980).

He has observed in language derived directly form Kraepelin

The current revival of scientific approach to
psychiatry in general and to schizophrenia in
particular has lead to a systematic attempt to
define schizophrenia on the basis of a symptoms
syndrome and to apply operational criteria to the
syndrome. This is part of an overall view that
sees mental illness, like other illnesses, as
having causes and delineations. The conviction is
that in the absence of etiological knowledge, the
most fruitful way to proceed is to define, on des
criptive clinical grounds, the various syndromes.
This will allow us to bring together groups that
are relatively homogeneous from a clinical point
of view and to examine them for response to
treatment or to subject them to genetic or bio
chemical investigation. . .those investigators
who have attempted to apply these procedures
most vigorously have had a biological bias to
the etiology of schizophrenia and an interest
in biological treatments.
(p. 115)
Like Kraepelin's myth of madness, these present day "NeoKraepelinian" accounts seek the "cause" of the madman's disease
independent from any contextual influence beyond his brain and
central nervous system proper.

Similarly, the treatment and "cure",

when possible, is also literally directed toward this same organ and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134
system.

It is from the madman's diseased brain and body that

specific symptoms of madness literally rise, and it is toward his
brain and body that treatment and possible cure is literally directed.
The brain, as Psyche's diseased organ, becomes the organic disease
of Psyche's madness.
From a mythic perspective, we are interested in trying to see
through these literal concrete understandings of Psyche's diseased
brain madness to their originals.

Like Plotinus, we would attempt

to get under these "scientific" and "medical" enactments of madmen
and their physicians.

This is difficult, first because these myths

are the most literal and concrete accounts we know of Psyche's mad
ness and

second because we are still very much within the rational

istic and materialistic cultural matrix which supports a medicalscientific perspective of madness.

Therefore, let us return to

Kraepelin's own vocabulary, and those of his decendents for the
assistance we need.
Within Kraepelin's close application of the medical-scientific
perspective toward Psyche's madness, and his attempt to tightly
connect each madman's symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment
we may find the very way through this tightly constricted literal
understanding this myth requires.

"Symptom" comes to us from the

Greek sumpiptein, to fall together, to fall upon, or to happen;
"diagnosis", from the Greek diagignoslcein, meaning discernment, to
perceive apart; "prognosis", from the Greek progignoskein, to know
before, predict; and "treatment", from the Latin tractare, to drag
or handle.
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By returning to the origin of Kraepelin's words we may gain a
mythic perspective of the "originals" from which Psyche's diseased
madness arises.

When we are informed by this medical myth that the

madman's symptoms lead to diagnosis we may understand that Psyche's
"falling together" may lead to "discernment" and "perception apart"
from usual sensation.

When we are advised that a madman's diagnosis

is also his prognosis and treatment, are we directed to a madness of
Psyche's "discernment" and "knowledge" of what "happened before";
or to what happened when the madman handled the knowledge he per
ceived when he was dragged into discernment?

Perhaps this knowledge

of how Psyche's experience can "happen" or "fall together" may drag
a madman back to "discernment", or even help him to predict and
handle knowledge he might happen upon or fall into.
We are also reminded of Kraepelin's natural law of brain dis
eases which must flow along their own course, to their own destination.
Here Psyche's madness of "dis-ease" reverses the madman's natural
ease, establishing a new flow, a new flow within his "seat of reason",
and perhaps he is eased into a seat within a new flow of Psyche's
reason carrying him and his social group to a new destination.

This

destination as Kraepelin suggests may well be predetermined, that is,
inherent in the pattern of Psyche's madness may well be predetermined
"flow" plans prescribing alien destinations for both the madman and
his group.
Those physicians whose responsibility it was to engage madmen
while on their predetermined courses were even called "alienists",
which may remind us of early primitive shamanic myths of Psyche's
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madness where the shaman, as guide, would assist the madman on his
journey to alien destinations where "falling together" and discern
ment" of what "happened before" could be "perceived" with new (rever
sed) ease.

The medical myth of madness directs us as well to the

phusis in psyche.

Perhaps as Hillman (1975b) suggests "the body has

its home in the soul and every organic pathology is a cooperation be
tween pathogenic agent and the human person as host" (p. 80).

The

shocking truths of Psyche's madness might be understood, he suggests,
without literalizing the violence and excess of madness through
physical treatments.

"An excessively strong pathological image

that does violence to our nature might better be understood as the
psyche's self-induced shock treatment, preferable to courser modes
of its clinical enactment" (p. 244).
When Psyche's body is viewed, as well, from a mythic perspec
tive, deliteralized, losing its skin, bone and flesh, the psychesoma debate ceases, Psyche and Soma lose their borders.

Then soma

tic therapy and body therapy become the "care of soul's body" or
the work on the body of Psyche's madness.

This mythic perspective

of Soma may also help us to see through the surgical, electrical, and
chemical interventions by physicians into the body of Psyche's mad
ness, through the literal collage of scalpels, electrodes, and phenothiazines, to a deeper and more general concern of the madman, his
physician, and his group with the care and work on the body of Psy
che's movement.

This alchemical opus contra naturum, becomes the work

to move the body of Psyche's madness toward its new alien destina
tion, a matter of the utmost importance for both the madman and his
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group.
This "rebirth" and "awakening" period of Western culture found
Psyche's movement directed away from the

supernatural and back to

nature, away from the divine and back toward the human, away from
interest in the inner experience of Psyche with muthos to an exter
nal, literal, and material concern with the phusis of Psyche, and
with the reason, description, and logic of human nature.
ment of natural philosophy, natural science, and

The develop

natural medicine

perspectives through which to view Psyche's human nature resulted in
a natural "humanistic" experience of Psyche through which to define
and to understand Psyche's madness and unreason.

With the descrip

tive thoroughness which so well served the medieval scholastics in
their attempts to contain Psyche's super-natural madness, scientists
and physicians now used their empirical-logical methods of observing,
classifying and ordering in an attempt to contain the natural madness
of Psyche's mental diseases.

Culminating in a medical-scientific

perspective of Psyche's madness, madmen were engaged through rational,
moral and physical methods of treatment in order to produce the
required moral changes in their "real" external-world adjustment and
in order to achieve a proper cure of their brain disease.

The

socially sanctioned physician was morally obligated and required to
provide for the natural medical treatment of Psyche's madness in or
der to restore, when this was possible, the madman's reason and men
tal health, or when this was impossible, at least to reduce the
interference caused by his symptoms.

Ellenberger (1970) in his
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review stated that by the end of this period in Western culture
two main principles apparently presided over the
treatment of mental patients. First, a humani
tarian principal issued from Pinel and his contem
poraries: mental patients must be treated as hum
anely as possible.
The second was the principle that
"mental diseases are brain diseases"; therefore, the
best thing a psychiatrist could do for his patients
was to study brain anatomy and pathology, with the
hope that this investigation would eventually lead to
the discovery of specific treatments for mental dis
eases.
(p. 284)
A mythic perspective of Psyche's experience of madness from the
Renaissance and Enlightenment period into our own require that we
see through the literal enactments of madmen and their physicians
and society to Psyche's maddening experience of human science and
nature, of the nature of human science, and of the science of human
nature.

It is, after all, during this period of Western culture

that psychology (psyche-logos, the telling of the soul) first
emerges with an identity separate from philosophy, medicine, and
religion.

Within this new natural science of the human Psyche

developed a natural science of Psyche's madness.

From this, per

haps, we may now begin to see through to a madness in this natural
science of Psyche.

In returning to the root meaning of "science"

in the Latin scientia, to know, we are led to Psyche's natural mad
ness of knowing —

a madness which comes from knowing its own nature,

and from knowing of its own natural movement.

Perhaps if it is in

Psyche's nature to be mad, or moving (from gemaden), then the
science of Psyche, psychology, is properly concerned with this
telling of Psyche's movement and with knowing the movements of the
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human Psyche..
From this re-view of Western culture myths of madness we may now
consider more generally the nature and science of Psyche's human move
ment.

The pattern and image of these accounts may provide our "data"

for understanding madness through a mythic perspective, as part of
and within Psyche's myth-making experience of being human.
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CHAPTER VI

MYTH OF MADNESS

Men are so necessarily mad that
not to be mad would amount to
another form of madness.
— Pascal

The human Psyche's experience of madness, when viewed from a
mythic perspective, takes us into Psyche's understanding of the
events of its change and movement.

From this perspective, our

attention is focused on the significance of general patterns or
images of madness rather than the particulars of the literal enact
ment; we are concerned more with the contexts and relationships
which emerge in psyche's madness and which are the "carriers of
meaning" for the madman, his social group and for Psyche.

We would

attempt to see through apparent discontinuities of experience between
the madman and himself, and the madman and his social group, to the
connections, relationships, and patterns within Psyche's madness which
include and "make sense out of" the entire experience of madness in a
particular case.
Within the dialectic process which often occurs between the mad
man and those in his group we find a "myth-making" process of Psyche
which attempts to "bridge" or connect the apparent discontinuities of
experience to seek "the meaning in the madness".
discussed this process in terms of logical typing.

Bateson

(1979) has

In Psyche's exper

ience of madness, we find different levels of perception and experience

140
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occurring simultaneously.

The process of communication and relation

ship between individual madmen and their fellows forms a matrix or
container on or in which Psyche's experience of madness may occur.
Psyche's image of madness, then moves both the madman and his group,
into a connecting field where different perspectives or images of
experience may enter into dialogue and find common ground.
Staying within our contemporary interest in a science of Psyche's
madness, "knowing the movements of the Soul", we must avoid a perspec
tive itself.

Despite the formal similarity of the preceding chapters'

structure and content to that of a history of madness or psychopathology,
my chronological ordering of myths through geologic time has been a
matter of convention and convenience and an attempt to encourage an
appreciation for reoccurring patterns of enactment of Psyche's madness
within particular cultural contexts.

Although the similarity of certain

cultural periods may help us to appreciate the dialectic process which
becomes expressed within particular myths or images of madness during
similar periods, a mythic perspective encourages us to avoid the tempta
tion to understand Psyche's madness purely in terms of a historical,
developmental series of literal enactments.

We are also to avoid a

linear evolution of images of Psyche's madness and even asked to be
skeptical of the circular emergence of myths

of madness within

cultures, since these too are perspectives from outside Psyche.

Instead,

we are returned to Psyche's myth of its madness, often moving unseen
and unheard, "the slow and arduous work of internalizing that which had
been externalized, of realizing on the spiritual plane that which had
been naively lived out on the gross"

(Perry, 1966, p. 9).
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Comparative Psychopathology
Within accounts of Psychopathology (literally the telling of the
happenings of the Soul) Psyche's madness is often understood as move
ment, movement away from others and away from one's self, suicidal
movement toward death, movement out of reason or into sin, even move
ment into "dis-ease".

This mad movement of Psyche through diverse

enactments of madness has, as previously noted, prompted a good many
observers to develop a relativistic myth of madness which then leaves
very little of Psyche behind to examine beyond "movement" itself.
Zilboorg and Henry (1941) ovserved that "The madman

. . .

all from time immemorial, had never really puzzled anyone.

known to
For each

period of history the question of mental disease {madness} seems to
have been settled in a manner corresponding to the spirit of the age"
(pp. 459-460).

Foucault

(1969/1972) has also observed that "state

ments belonging to psychopathology all seem to refer to an object that
emerges in various ways in individual and social experience and which
may be called madness", and stated that Psyche's experience of madness
shifts so that from one cultural period to another "we are not dealing
with the same madness"

(p. 32).

Blum (1978) has also recently reported

a significant shift or movement in the pattern of psychiatric diagnoses
of madness in the United States during the last twenty-five years.
In spite of this continual movement in Psyche's madness we are
able, from a mythic perspective, to understand reoccurring images or
myths of madness which carry characteristics and attributes beyond
that of motion.

In our review of madness from various cultural periods

we have observed Psyche's re-enactments of thematically similar myths.
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Remembering previous cautions concerning "causal" evolutionary under
standings of madness through time, we shall talk of re-enactments
which are similar or alike, rather than developmentally linked or
derivative.

There are myths, first of all, which understand Psyche's

madness as a literal disruption of the madman's physical body.
Primitive object or spirit intrusion, classical Greek and medie
val humoral imbalance, and Enlightenment and modern genetic and bio
chemical myths all attempt to locate and remedy this instrusive, un
balanced and disordered condition of Psyche's body.

These myths in

their understanding of a literal physical "agent" of madness in Psyche
require and prescribe enactments for the madmen and their social group
which seek out these agents and remove or neutralize their maddening
effects.

Whether the intruding "agent" is a spirit to be exorcised,

a lesion to be cauterized, or neural pathways to be energized, we are
inevitably led to Psyche's experience and awareness of an alien "other",
an "other" maddening perspective of Psyche which must be recognized,
engaged and related to in order for Psyche's mad alien movement to
cease.
In primitive soul-loss, classical Greek divine intervention,
medieval Christian and demonic, and Enlightenment and "modern" moral
myths we find similar attempts to directly engage Psyche's madness in
order to help restore the necessary moral and spiritual attitudes which
will allow for a new and proper relatedness to take place between mad
men and their fellows, their gods, and themselves.

Often what Psyche

requires in these myths is guidance and a search for recontact and
relatedness with the divine or supernatural forces, with the risk of
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death and re-birth a common central theme or image.

These transfor

mations of Psyche's mad movement sometimes required of madmen their
literal physical death in order to secure their renewal and rebirth
to a higher spiritual and moral relatedness with "Divine Reason", and
with the reasons of the supernatural.

Whether the madman1s soul was

lost in another realm, at odds with a god, possessed by a demon, or
just "de-moralized', we are returned by these myths to Psyche's
maddening experience of disconnection and loss of relatedness, to
trial by fire and threat of death and dismemberment, a madness of
disintegration.

This image of madness requires the madman's plunge

into despair, a plunge to the depths, and possibly to his death, in
order to recover Soul, in order to achieve rebirth and re-integration,
in order to discover the moral in Psyche's mad movement.
We are informed through these myths of Psyche's movement through
reoccurring central images such as alien "other", "death-rebirthtransformation", "re-relatedness", "new morals" and "new reasons".
These images or myths are obviously not exhaustive, but rather point
to Psyche's movement through madness by way of central images; central
images or myths become expressed through and enacted by particular
madmen within particular cultures at particular times.

These express

ions or enactments of Psyche's central images or myths may as Hillman
and Foucault have observed never have permanence or find exact repeti
tion.

Foucault (1969/1972) has observed that the substance of psycho

pathology is "based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an
object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are constant
ly transformed"

(p. 32).
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Foucault's position that Psyche's madness must be understood
in terms of rules which define the transformation of the external
objects of madness requires (like Bateson, 1979) that Psyche's
madness have a meaning which can be understood by rules outside
itself, and second that this meaning in Psyche's madness can only
be discovered externally within "the space in which various objects
of

madness

or context.

emerge", quite similar to Bateson's notion of matrix
Both argue for a meaning of Psyche's madness which

may be found "between the surfaces on which they appear, on which
they can be delimited, on which they can be analyzed and specified"
(Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 47).

Although I have also previously fall

en into talking about the "meaning" of Psyche's madness, as if it
were a dependable external fact; from a mythic perspective, the
perspective b^ Psyche

of_

Psyche, there can be no luxury of external,

proven, consensual meaning.

Psyche's meaning (Pathos) is in its

movement (madness, from gemaden), and this moving meaning within
which Psyche is, never slows for our easy outside "analysis and
specification".
Myths of Meaning
Myths of meaning of Psyche's madness do, however, provide us
with further development of Psyche's central images of its madness
and their review may provide us an opportunity for imagining new
meanings as well, thereby deepening our understanding of Psyche's
madness.

Madness has been viewed as Psyche's method of producing

abrupt variations or shifts in perspective toward the world and to
ward itself, and also, of course, as a "meaningless" degenerative
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regressive disease, without cure.
Psyche's myths of meaning of madness may be somewhat arbitra
rily divided into three psychological categories, ego-destructive
(regressive), ego-constructive (developmental), and cultural-evolu
tional (apocalyptic).

Ego-destructive myths of meaning are viewed

as disconnecting images of Psyche, personified as thanatos with a
destructive psychic energy, "mortido".

Illustrative of this regres

sive meaning of Psyche's madness are accounts by Baldessarini,
Arieti and the newly released DSM-III.

Baldessarini (1977b) has

stated
Common features include misinterpretation or idio
syncratic distortions of reality, and sometimes
frank delusions and hallucinations. Mood in the
chronic phase of the illness is usually described
as flat, apathetic and joyless, or inappropriate
to the situation. Behavior and appearance are
often odd or even bizarre.
The illness typically
follows a chronic course including rather quiescent
phases interrupted by exacerbations of profound
anxiety, florid psychotic symptoms and disorganized
behavior. . .At times, because of severe psychotic
decompensation, imminent risk of injury or suicide
or severe management problems in the community, it
becomes necessary to hospitalize schizophrenic pat
ients and to intensify their medical treatment.
Modern psychiatric management. . .has much to offer
in helping schizophrenic patients and their fami
lies to cope with what often represents a lifetime
of at least partial and unremediable disability.
(pp. 988-991)
Arieti (1974) has observed that
Psychosis. . .suggests a person who is so incompetent
that he may require special control or supervision.
However, psychosis indicates not only actual or po
tential severity, but also connotes that an unrealis
tic way of appreciating the self and the world is
accepted or tends to be accepted by the sufferer as
a normal way of living.
(p. 4)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147
Finally, in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis
orders (Third Edition)

(A. P. A., 1980) we find outlined

The term "psychotic" as used in this manual, denotes
the existence of any of the following: delusions,
hallucinations, incoherence, repeated derailment,
marked poverty of content of thought, marked illo
gicality and behavior that is grossly disorganized
or catatonic. . .During the active phase of illness,
the symptoms are associated with significant impair
ment in two or more areas of routine daily function
ing, e. g., work, social relations, self-care.
Ego-constructive myths of meaning of madness are viewed as con
necting images of Psyche, personified as eros with a constructive
psychic energy, "libido".

Illustrating this developmental meaning

attributed to Psyche's madness are contemporary accounts by Camp
bell and Bowers.

Campbell (1972) has written that

When the return of remission occurs, it is exper
ienced as a rebirth:
the birth, that is to say,
of a "twice-born" ego, no longer bound in by its
daylight-world horizon.
It is now known to be but
the reflex of a larger self, its proper function
being to carry the energies of an archetypal in
stinct system into fruitful play in a contemporary
space-time daylight situation. One is now no longer
afraid of nature; nor of nature's child, society —
which is monstrous too, and in fact cannot be other
wise; it would otherwise not survive. The new ego
is in accord with all this, in harmony, at peace;
and, as those who have returned from the journey tell,
life is then richer, stronger, and more joyous.
The whole problem, it would seem is somehow to go
through it, even time and again, without shipwreck:
the answer being not that one should not be permitted
to go crazy; but that one should have been taught
something already of the scenery to be entered and
powers likely to be met, given a formula of some kind
by which to recognize, subdue them, and incorporate
their energies.
(p. 237)
Bowers (1971) wrote that
The abruption in growth which a psychotic episode re
presents may ultimately promote continuing personality
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development if the individual ego does not abandon
the struggle, (p. 159)
A case can be made for viewing psychotic episodes as
essentially maturational struggles, (p. 163)
Cultural-evolutional myths of meaning attributed to Psyche's
madness are viewed as compensating or adjusting mechanisms for
restricted or limited cultural perspectives or conditions.

This

meaning attributed to the role of madness was present in early
primitive societies and continues to the present in the apocalyptic
accounts offered by individuals like Foucault, Neumann, and Perry.
Madness, in this myth of meaning is viewed as culture's method of
breaking through its confines to achieve a needed new perspective
different from the prevailing cultural view.

Newmann (1949/1954)

has written that
As we know, among primitive peoples, unless corr
espondingly gifted "psychopathic" personages are
present, this state may be artificially induced by
driving a member of the tribe mad and thus making
him a medicine man.
In this way he becomes a mouth
piece of the transpersonal and conveys to the group
the contents it needs.
(p. 425)
Foucault (1961/1965) found that
Through the mediation of madness, it is the world that
becomes culpable. . .obliged to order itself by its
language, compelled by it to a task of recognition,
of separation, to the task of restoring reason from
that unreason and jto that unreason. . .Madness. . .
is the space of our enterprise, it is the endless
path to fulfillment, it is our mixed vocation of
apostle and exegete. . .Ruse and new triumph of
madness:
the world that thought to measure and jus
tify madness through psychology must justify itself
before madness.
(pp. 288-289)
Madness, as discussed earlier, has been understood as an ex
pression of Psyche's different levels of relatedness and the exper
ience of a tension between levels.

That is, what appears valid or
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sane within an individual (satisfactory relatedness) may appear
invalid or mad from the perspective of a family system (not sat
isfactory relatedness).

Likewise, what appears as valid or sane

and a satisfactory relatedness within a family system, may appear
invalid or mad and not satisfactory within a larger system such as
a community or a country.

This myth may even suggest a kind of

ecological meaning of Psyche's madness.

If, as Hillman (1975b) has

suggested, relationships and relatedness offer containers for mad
ness, then perhaps Psyche's madness offers an occasion for new
relationships and new relatedness.
Myth of Madness
Just as a mythic perspective allows for seeing through the
literal, concrete experiences of madness to deeper more general
concerns of Psyche's madness, so too can this perspective help in
understanding Psyche's manifest interest in experiencing particu
lar patterns or myths of madness.

That

is, we can begin to ex

amine Psyche's myth of its own madness.
When viewed from a mythic perspective, Psyche's interest in
experiencing particular enactments of madness may be seen as the
powerful attraction madness itself holds as a perspective toward
understanding the world and Psyche itself.

Madness becomes one of

Psyche's most important myths about itself.

Psyche's concern and

attraction to various myths of madness then becomes Psyche's under
standing through the perspective of madness —
madness itself.

knowing by way of

This shift from reviewing myths of Psyche's mad

ness to reviewing Psyche's myth of madness requires an imaginal,
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mythic perspective of both Psyche and its madness, a perspective
where Psyche may see through its own myth of madness to itself.
The following perspective of Psyche is provided to illustrate
this shift from a myth of Psyche's madness to Psyche's myth of mad
ness, and thereby to illustrate Psyche's use of madness as a power
ful image in its process of moving to become engaged, involved and
related in the world.

This psychological perspective (Psyche-Logos) ,

which takes psychology seriously as the science of the Soul, re
quires a kind of scientific (knowing) attitude which is appropriate
to Psyche, and will therefore differ in many formal respects from
the natural material scientific attitude more familiar in Western
culture (Christou, 1963; Hillman, 1972, 1975b).
This psychological perspective understands a human Psyche with
"at least" three dimensions, each possessing attributes of structure
and process.

From a structural point of view, these may be called 1)

primordial or archetypal dimension, 2) self or will dimension, and 3)
ego or conscious dimension.

Viewed in terms of process these may

be labeled respectively as 1) instinctual, 2) willful, and 3) re
flective.
From this perspective, ego processes represent Psyche's capacity
to become engaged in particular reflective and functional styles of
awareness with the imaginal and object world.

That is, ego may be

characterized as being composed of two capacities —
reflecting.

knowing and

The capacity of knowing may be understood psychologi

cally as Psyche's method of engaging the material world, and occurs
by means of either faith or reason.

Faith, understood psychologically,
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means either a knowing as a result of revelation, where Intuitive
functioning of Psyche (sense of future possibilities) precedes the
feeling functioning (value determination) of Psyche, or a knowing
based on belief, where the feeling (valuing) function of Psyche
and its certitude precedes the more instinctive function of
intuition (prescience).

Reason, an alternative means of knowing

to that of faith, may occur either deductively, where the operation
of the Psyche's thinking function (language-logic) precedes the fun
ctioning of sensation operations (sense perception), or inductively,
where the sensation function of Psyche and its supply of raw data
precedes the more abstract operations of the thinking function.
Knowing by way of Faith (revelation or belief) and by way of Reason
(deductively or inductively) is viewed as Psyche's primary method
of engaging itself in the material object-world.
The second capacity of ego, the reflective capacity, may be
understood as the ability of Psyche to view itself, or at least
view its self-in-process (willfulness).

This capacity offers the

possibility for Psyche to understand the likely patterns of ex
pression which may become willed and possibly literally enacted by
itself.

This viewing of self or will is not a viewing of ego, but

rather a viewing by_ ego —

a viewing by means of ego's reflection

capacity.
Here we will also make allowances for other means, beyond the
reflective capacity of ego, by which Psyche may come to know itself,
however, these other possibilities are beyond our immediate concern
with presenting for illustration this psychological perspective of
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human Psyche and its madness.
Self processes or willfulness represents the second major
dimension of Psyche and may be understood as the unique expression
of a particular human Psyche in time and space.

This expression

of self or will, or the process of willing appears to a certain
degree related to and influenced by the same unique archetypal or
instinctual patterns which have combined to articulate and define
the images of Psyche's ego processes and capacities.

That is,

the dominant instinctual or archetypal themes which have most in
fluenced and shaped the ego processes and configurations in a par
ticular human Psyche pattern the possible expressions of self or
will as literal psychic events, enactments or involvements take
place within a particular cultural matrix in the external objectworld.
Self or will appears as Psyche's unique "carrier" of process
or possibility into the world and may be understood as the vehicle
for Psyche's capacity for transforming or materializing its arche
typal-instinctual possibilities and potentials into execution and
enactment.

It is Psyche's (ego) capacity to reflect this process

of materialization or transformation of its self (willfulness)
which permits a fuller and more elaborate and complete enactment
or materialization of Psyche.

(When we can see and know what part

we play in the drama, we can understand its potential for moving us
to some finale, and on to the next drama).
The literal, external "attention" and incarnation these arche
typal-instinctual processes of Psyche receive by way of Psyche's
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self or will, and through the reflective capacity of Psyche's ego
appear to stimulate and increase the possibility for new or re
newed activity within Psyche's archetypal-instinctual dimension.
This renewed activity, in an everchanging pattern and configura
tion of images from Psyche's archetypal-instinctual dimension, may
constellate further changes, developments and elaborations in
Psyche's ego processes, thereby increasing Psyche's capacity

to

know and reflect itself (or its self). In this manner, the self
process dimension of Psyche (willfullness) may continue its own
unique materialization within the world.

In shifting patterns

and processions of images, and in generally reoccurring themes,
Psyche becomes literally involved with life through these concrete
enactments in the world.
Madness, then, from this psychological perspective appears
as one of Psyche's most powerful reoccurring images or myths through
which to return attention, energy and focus to itself.

Madness

may bring with it, at first, complete disconnection from material
life and the literal object-world.

However, it is through this en

actment of "self-ishness", par excellance, that Psyche may trans
form, reorganize and revitalize itself (its self), and thereby re
turn to become re-engaged, re-materialized, and re-connected to
life, the world and other kindred souls.
Myth-Making
In the course of Western culture, Psyche's madness has been
understood predominantly through two mythic perspectives or
"realities", the nominalistic perspective of reason and the
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realistic perspective of faith, associated more with direct sub
jective experience.

In our previous myth of Psyche we have called

these "ego's two ways of knowing."

If, for a moment, like Tart

(1977), we assume that both of these ways of knowing, with their
sometimes vastly different perspectives, are both valid and that
when they differ from each other they do so because of different
consensual fields or contexts, then we appear to be up against a
new kind of psychic dualism.

Although structurally similar to the

Cartesian mind-body dualism (which even today continues its legacy
of confusion) this dualism of reason and faith is of a different
logical type (Whitehead and Russell, 1913).
Here, without vigilance, we may again become trapped in a too
literal understanding of Psyche's ways of knowing, and therefore
also of Psyche's ways of understanding its myth of madness.

Bateson

(1979), in his development of Pierce's (1940) notion of abduction,
offers some assistance and perhaps a way out, at least for now.
Abduction is understood as a lateral extension of abstract components
of descriptions, that is, an understanding through noticing similar
ity.

In using this notion psychologically, a strictly literal

manner of reasoning is not required, nor
affective impact of faith (revelation

does it demand the

or belief) to produce a know

ledge of events or experience.
With this manner of knowing it is simply a matter of Psyche's
recognition (a re-knowing of something once known).
at all be confused with associationallearning.
use here, is Psyche's ability to know

This should not

Abduction, in my

by way of recognizing
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similarities, obviously more than a mere similarity or resemblance,
itself, to Plotinus' method of reversion, epistrophe.

This is

Psyche's way of knowing by way of answering the question, "What is
this experience like?" or better still, "What do I imagine is like
this?"
Since through abduction Psyche may recognize and understand
a similarity of pattern in the literal, external, object-world, as
well as "likeness" in the realm of subjective imaginal experiences,
we must avoid applying either-or categories in Psyche's abducting
way of knowing and understanding.

What we are attempting to con

struct here is not a mentalistic or materialistic epistemology of
Psyche, but rather Psyche's own epistemology —

Soul's science

of knowing, literally, what Soul has to stand on in order to "tell."
Bateson (1979) has noted that "any change in our epistemology will
involve shifting our whole system of abductions.

We must pass, he

said, "through the. threat of that chaos where thought becomes
possible"

(pp. 142-143).

im

Psyche's capacity for knowing by way of

abduction offers a way out of a reason-faith dualism, and perhaps a
way into Psyche's myth about its madness and itself.
Through abducting or noticing the similarities of a madman's
experience with the experiences of those in his group (as well as
similarity with far wider ranges of human and non-human experience
within natural and supernatural realms) we may find a way to see
through the barriers of "consensual realities" which often arise
through a dualistic epistemology of reason and faith.

This return

to Psyche's knowing and understanding through "similarity" and
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"likeness” may provide the madman, as well, with a method of re
collecting and reconnecting his experience with himself and with
others in his group.

Psyche's recognition of the likeness in its

madness or movement, this particular pattern through time, or
series of images (myth), provides for a new means of reconnecting
with and influencing the world.

"The fantasy

[myth] then becomes

morphogenetic; that is, it becomes a determinant of the shape of
society" (Bateson, 1979, p. 140).
Understood from this perspective, both the madman's interaction
with his society and Psyche's moving myth of madness proceed through
a spiral of disconnection —

recollection —

reconnection, "a zigzag

ladder of dialectic between form and process" (Bateson, 1979, p.
194).
Out of this spiral movement of Psyche's experience of madness
may arise an understanding or knowledge through recognition of simi
larity or likeness.

Psyche's understanding and knowing its madness

through abduction occurs by way of its zigzag dialectical process of
myth-making.

This myth-making process, from the Greek muthopoiein

(literally, to create understanding), moves by way of images.

These

moving images connect, disconnect, recollect, and reconnect, thereby
moving Psyche, through madness, to understanding and meaning.
Psyche's experience of meaning and understanding may emerge then,
from madness, through Psyche's myth-making process —
by way of similarity and likeness.

mad movement

Psyche may experience an under

standing of its movement through its capacities of myth-making and
abduction.
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CHAPTER VII
SOUL-MAKING
What gives soul to people is the
capacity to experience.
— Christou
Psyche's experience of madness, Soul's myth-making movement,
is the subject of investigation in this essay.

The myths of Psyche's

experience of madness are understood as "Soul's understanding the
events of its change and movement."
This essay has reviexxred various accounts of the human Psyche's
madness during Primitive, Classical, Medieval, Renaissance and En
lightenment periods of Western culture.

These accounts were reviewed

from a mythic perspective to provide a method of seeing through par
ticular literal enactments of madmen and their social groups to more
general patterns or images of Psyche's experience.

This review of

psychopathology (Psyche-Pathos-Logos) from a mythic perspective
attempts to establish a method of understanding Psyche's madness
which is truly psychological (a Logos of Soul), rather than men
talistic or materialistic.

This perspective understands a psycho

logy of madness which recognizes Psyche's direct experience of mad
ness (psychopathology) as the primary data —

a science of Soul's

pathos, not the logic of abnormal mental processes or disordered
physiological functions.
Specific accounts of Psyche's madness within Western culture
were first presented and then reviewed from a mythic perspective in
order to achieve an understanding of a particular experience of
157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158

madness from Soul’s perspective, that is, an understanding of Psyche's
madness based upon a logic appropriate to psychological experience.
In this way, the verification of an understanding or meaning of a
particular occurrence of madness relies not upon an analysis of mental
or physical events (i.e., motives, intention, ideas, behaviors, bio
chemical reactions, etc.), but rather is to be found within the exper
ience of Psyche itself— Soul's movement.

From this perspective,

Psyche's madness is not understood to be located within mind or body,
even though Psyche may well experience mental or physical madness.
Rather, mind and body, the mental and physical dimensions of Psyche,
are understood to be within Psyche's experience, that is, within
Soul.
A mythic perspective and the somewhat similar methods of
"reversion" (epistrophe) and "abduction" are presented as methods
of inquiry appropriate to a science of Soul, and more specifically
to the study of Psyche's experience of its madness— Soul's move
ment.
Psyche's myth of madness, then appears as this spiral moving
process of Soul itself, the movement or moving by Soul as it
shifts perspective toward the events and experiences of itself and
the world, and shifts the world's perspective of its events and
experiences, through its movement.
then, is Soul's movement.

Psyche's myth of its madness,

Soul's movement from recollection to

recollection, Soul's movement by way of recollection.
In Western culture madness is a way Soul receives recognition.
Psyche's experience of its movement, through madness, rescues Soul
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from a constriction of expression which has arisen in Western cul
ture from our either/or understandings of mind and body; that is,
the human Psyche's experiences of mental events or physical events.
Except through madness, with its "out-of-body" and "out-of-mind"
possibilities, Psyche's capacity to experience itself (Soul's
movement) is contained and restricted within mental experiences
and events or physical experiences and events.

Rarely appreciated

within Western culture is Psyche's capacity to experience itself
in categories other than mind and body.

Psyche's experience of

madness recovers for Soul a new range of movement, and returns
attention to the very capacity of Psyche to experience (experiri,
to try).
Psyche's myth of madness, Soul's experience of movement, emer
ges as one of Psyche's most important images or myths about itself.
This mad movement, this experience of Soul's motion, appears as an
image so universally powerful within the human Psyche in Western
culture that it is as if Soul's own very existence, its own veri
fication, its very be-ing must always be delicately silhouetted by
the myth of madness.

Or perhaps, as Aquinas sensed in his Aurora

Consurgens, "psychosis" (soul-stuff) is that from which the human
Soul is formed, and also the way Soul becomes transformed.
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SOUL-MAKING
Familiar images bend and break,
patterns of nature appear,
The call of Hades beckons
the silent shades draw near;
Then I-Ierme's matrix rises up —
a grid to still the world,
Out of the land-locked vessel
into the void now hurled —

From pneuma, soma, water, fire —
an efflorescent spiral pyre,
An image enters, faint and dim,
an image holding stuff within,
The stuff of Soul again in motion
Soul's return— metempsychosis.
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